A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymme...A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.展开更多
From the background of small peasant management and information asymmetry,this paper introduced the middle profit sharing model and discussed influence factors and ownership of pricing power of agricultural products. ...From the background of small peasant management and information asymmetry,this paper introduced the middle profit sharing model and discussed influence factors and ownership of pricing power of agricultural products. It obtained following results:( i) the transaction scale has positive effect on farmer's pricing power of agricultural products,while the competitor's transaction scale has negative effect on it,so does the cost for information search;( ii) under the condition of small peasant management system,farmer is in a relatively weak position in the distribution of pricing power of agricultural products,due to factors such as small transaction scale,information asymmetry and farmer's weak negotiation ability;( iii) through cooperative game,farmer and buyers can share cooperative surplus at the agreed ratio;( iv) the introduction of self-organizing specialized farmers cooperatives is favorable for solving the problem of pricing power of agricultural products,and possible problems,such as " collective action dilemma" and " fake cooperatives" in the cooperative development process can be solved by internal and external division of labor and specialization of cooperatives.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No70671021)Jiangsu Postdoctoral Foundation (No0601015C)
文摘A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.
文摘From the background of small peasant management and information asymmetry,this paper introduced the middle profit sharing model and discussed influence factors and ownership of pricing power of agricultural products. It obtained following results:( i) the transaction scale has positive effect on farmer's pricing power of agricultural products,while the competitor's transaction scale has negative effect on it,so does the cost for information search;( ii) under the condition of small peasant management system,farmer is in a relatively weak position in the distribution of pricing power of agricultural products,due to factors such as small transaction scale,information asymmetry and farmer's weak negotiation ability;( iii) through cooperative game,farmer and buyers can share cooperative surplus at the agreed ratio;( iv) the introduction of self-organizing specialized farmers cooperatives is favorable for solving the problem of pricing power of agricultural products,and possible problems,such as " collective action dilemma" and " fake cooperatives" in the cooperative development process can be solved by internal and external division of labor and specialization of cooperatives.
