The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competitio...The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.展开更多
It is the view of this paper that both market and non-market mechanisms can stimulate corporate innovation and have their respective areas of application. As a major developing country, China should create a national ...It is the view of this paper that both market and non-market mechanisms can stimulate corporate innovation and have their respective areas of application. As a major developing country, China should create a national innovation policy system to coordinate these incentives in order to promote economic transition and upgrade through corporate innovation. Innovation policies are determined by a country's technology level. The premise for most advanced economies to follow market-based incentives is a foundation of early-stage non-market policies, as their governments frequently resorted to non-market means such as state-owned enterprises in the early stage of development. This paper also concludes that technological uncertainty can well describe the technological characteristics of industries. For industries with less technological uncertainty, non-market means are more likely to succeed. Lastly, this paper employs the dimensions of both technology level and industrial technology characteristics for a quantitative analysis on the scope of industries to which the two incentive mechanisms are applicable, divides them into quadrants in order to discuss the boundary between market-based and non-market incentives, and explore ways to achieve effective interplay between government and market.展开更多
文摘The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.
基金sponsored by the Key Project of National Social Sciences Foundation “Study on the Interplay Between Industrial Upgrade and the Pathway of Environmental Regulation” (Grant No. 14AJY015)the Key Project of National Soft Science Research Program “Study on the Disruptive Technology Innovation Mechanism and Its Impact on Industrial Development” (Grant No. 2013GXS6B213)
文摘It is the view of this paper that both market and non-market mechanisms can stimulate corporate innovation and have their respective areas of application. As a major developing country, China should create a national innovation policy system to coordinate these incentives in order to promote economic transition and upgrade through corporate innovation. Innovation policies are determined by a country's technology level. The premise for most advanced economies to follow market-based incentives is a foundation of early-stage non-market policies, as their governments frequently resorted to non-market means such as state-owned enterprises in the early stage of development. This paper also concludes that technological uncertainty can well describe the technological characteristics of industries. For industries with less technological uncertainty, non-market means are more likely to succeed. Lastly, this paper employs the dimensions of both technology level and industrial technology characteristics for a quantitative analysis on the scope of industries to which the two incentive mechanisms are applicable, divides them into quadrants in order to discuss the boundary between market-based and non-market incentives, and explore ways to achieve effective interplay between government and market.
