Short_term batch cultures were used to measure the phosphate_dependent growth kinetics for a marine microalga, Tetraselmis subcordiformis (Wille) Hazen, and a marine macroalga, Ulva pertusa Kjellm. Results wer...Short_term batch cultures were used to measure the phosphate_dependent growth kinetics for a marine microalga, Tetraselmis subcordiformis (Wille) Hazen, and a marine macroalga, Ulva pertusa Kjellm. Results were fitted to the Monod model. U. pertusa had a lower half_saturation constant and maximum growth rate, which were 0.016 μmol/L and 0.16 d -1 respectively, while the growth kinetics of T. subcordiformis were 0.021 μmol/L and 0.83 d -1 . Long_term semicontinuous nutrient competition experiments were performed between T. subcordiformis and U. pertusa under phosphate limitation in laboratory. Loss rates were manipulated to get the same or different resource requirement values ( R * ) of the two species. Comparison between the theoretical predictions derived from Monod kinetics and the outcome of competition experiments indicated that the Monod model could predict the results only when the R * values of the two species were significantly different, and T. subcordiformis displaced U. pertusa when they had the same resource requirements. The Monod model can only partly predict the competition results between microalga and macroalga.展开更多
Malicious attacks against data are unavoidable in the interconnected,open and shared Energy Internet(EI),Intrusion tolerant techniques are critical to the data security of EI.Existing intrusion tolerant techniques suf...Malicious attacks against data are unavoidable in the interconnected,open and shared Energy Internet(EI),Intrusion tolerant techniques are critical to the data security of EI.Existing intrusion tolerant techniques suffered from problems such as low adaptability,policy lag,and difficulty in determining the degree of tolerance.To address these issues,we propose a novel adaptive intrusion tolerance model based on game theory that enjoys two-fold ideas:(1)it constructs an improved replica of the intrusion tolerance model of the dynamic equation evolution game to induce incentive weights;and (2)it combines a tournament competition model with incentive weights to obtain optimal strategies for each stage of the game process.Extensive experiments are conducted in the IEEE 39-bus system,whose results demonstrate the feasibility of the incentive weights,confirm the proposed strategy strengthens the system’s ability to tolerate aggression,and improves the dynamic adaptability and response efficiency of the aggression-tolerant system in the case of limited resources.展开更多
Technical standard is typically characterized by network effect.The key point for a technical standard is the consumers' choice,which is based on consumers' maximum benefits.When a technical standard becomes a...Technical standard is typically characterized by network effect.The key point for a technical standard is the consumers' choice,which is based on consumers' maximum benefits.When a technical standard becomes a national standard,its interests have been integrated into the national interests.National interests are divided into economic profits and security factors.From the perspective of consumers' choice,this paper deals with the main factors which affect the result of technical standard competition- the risk and profits of intellectual property based on the assumption of bounded rationality and dynamic game theory.展开更多
In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and tw...In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and two cases of collusion,are constructed.The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis.The results indicate that the manufacturer's marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers.However,due to the manufacturer's green cost,the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer's profitability.The retailers'Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level.However,there is an opposite result in collusion.Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer's green sensitivity is higher than a threshold.When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products,retailers prefer collusion,and then choose the Stackelberg behavior.Manufacturers'profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.展开更多
In this paper,we proposed an innovation diffusion model with three compartments to investigate the diffusion of an innovation(product)in a particular region.The model exhibits two equilibria,namely,the adopter-free an...In this paper,we proposed an innovation diffusion model with three compartments to investigate the diffusion of an innovation(product)in a particular region.The model exhibits two equilibria,namely,the adopter-free and an interior equilibrium.The existence and local stability of the adopter-free and interior equilibria are explored in terms of the effective Basic Influence Number(BIN)R_(A).It is investigated that the adopter free steady-state is stable if R_(A)<1.By consideringτ(the adoption experience of the adopters)as the bifurcation parameter,we have been able to obtain the critical value ofτresponsible for the periodic solutions due to Hopf bifurcation.The direction and stability analysis of bifurcating periodic solutions has been performed by using the arguments of normal form theory and the center manifold theorem.Exhaustive numerical simulations in the support of analytical results have been presented.展开更多
The possibility for two competitive firms to form a strategic alliance was quantitatively analyzed with the game theory. The strategic alliance could be formed in an infinitely repeated game with complete information ...The possibility for two competitive firms to form a strategic alliance was quantitatively analyzed with the game theory. The strategic alliance could be formed in an infinitely repeated game with complete information or a finitely repeated game with incomplete information. In the former situation, the discount ratio is important. If the discount ratio is large enough, alliance would be a possible solution. In the latter situation, the bigger the possibility of the rationality is, the more possible is for both firms to make strategic alliance.展开更多
文摘Short_term batch cultures were used to measure the phosphate_dependent growth kinetics for a marine microalga, Tetraselmis subcordiformis (Wille) Hazen, and a marine macroalga, Ulva pertusa Kjellm. Results were fitted to the Monod model. U. pertusa had a lower half_saturation constant and maximum growth rate, which were 0.016 μmol/L and 0.16 d -1 respectively, while the growth kinetics of T. subcordiformis were 0.021 μmol/L and 0.83 d -1 . Long_term semicontinuous nutrient competition experiments were performed between T. subcordiformis and U. pertusa under phosphate limitation in laboratory. Loss rates were manipulated to get the same or different resource requirement values ( R * ) of the two species. Comparison between the theoretical predictions derived from Monod kinetics and the outcome of competition experiments indicated that the Monod model could predict the results only when the R * values of the two species were significantly different, and T. subcordiformis displaced U. pertusa when they had the same resource requirements. The Monod model can only partly predict the competition results between microalga and macroalga.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.51977113,62293500,62293501 and 62293505).
文摘Malicious attacks against data are unavoidable in the interconnected,open and shared Energy Internet(EI),Intrusion tolerant techniques are critical to the data security of EI.Existing intrusion tolerant techniques suffered from problems such as low adaptability,policy lag,and difficulty in determining the degree of tolerance.To address these issues,we propose a novel adaptive intrusion tolerance model based on game theory that enjoys two-fold ideas:(1)it constructs an improved replica of the intrusion tolerance model of the dynamic equation evolution game to induce incentive weights;and (2)it combines a tournament competition model with incentive weights to obtain optimal strategies for each stage of the game process.Extensive experiments are conducted in the IEEE 39-bus system,whose results demonstrate the feasibility of the incentive weights,confirm the proposed strategy strengthens the system’s ability to tolerate aggression,and improves the dynamic adaptability and response efficiency of the aggression-tolerant system in the case of limited resources.
文摘Technical standard is typically characterized by network effect.The key point for a technical standard is the consumers' choice,which is based on consumers' maximum benefits.When a technical standard becomes a national standard,its interests have been integrated into the national interests.National interests are divided into economic profits and security factors.From the perspective of consumers' choice,this paper deals with the main factors which affect the result of technical standard competition- the risk and profits of intellectual property based on the assumption of bounded rationality and dynamic game theory.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51875332)the Capacity Building Projects of Some Local Universities of Shanghai Science and Technology Commission(No.18040501600).
文摘In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and two cases of collusion,are constructed.The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis.The results indicate that the manufacturer's marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers.However,due to the manufacturer's green cost,the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer's profitability.The retailers'Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level.However,there is an opposite result in collusion.Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer's green sensitivity is higher than a threshold.When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products,retailers prefer collusion,and then choose the Stackelberg behavior.Manufacturers'profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.
文摘In this paper,we proposed an innovation diffusion model with three compartments to investigate the diffusion of an innovation(product)in a particular region.The model exhibits two equilibria,namely,the adopter-free and an interior equilibrium.The existence and local stability of the adopter-free and interior equilibria are explored in terms of the effective Basic Influence Number(BIN)R_(A).It is investigated that the adopter free steady-state is stable if R_(A)<1.By consideringτ(the adoption experience of the adopters)as the bifurcation parameter,we have been able to obtain the critical value ofτresponsible for the periodic solutions due to Hopf bifurcation.The direction and stability analysis of bifurcating periodic solutions has been performed by using the arguments of normal form theory and the center manifold theorem.Exhaustive numerical simulations in the support of analytical results have been presented.
基金TheprojectofscienceandtechnologydepartmentinZhejiangprovince (No .2 0 0 3C30 0 4 8)
文摘The possibility for two competitive firms to form a strategic alliance was quantitatively analyzed with the game theory. The strategic alliance could be formed in an infinitely repeated game with complete information or a finitely repeated game with incomplete information. In the former situation, the discount ratio is important. If the discount ratio is large enough, alliance would be a possible solution. In the latter situation, the bigger the possibility of the rationality is, the more possible is for both firms to make strategic alliance.
