The fable paradigm of the gender pay gap： Evidence from Portuguese private firms

This study investigates gender income disparity in Portuguese firms using separate Tobit models for men and women. While job segregation seems to be one of the major sources of gender disparity, women do not appear to be systematically underpaid in predominantly female occupations, regardless of the industry. The authors found that gender pay gap is larger in domestic firms, and it increases with employees＇ accumulated tenure and decreases with advanced education for women and on labor market entry. Despite showing some encouraging cracks, the glass ceiling still continues to prevent women from reaching top management positions. Finally, despite it appears wage disparity does exist, and it will probably continue to exist, the results point towards a window of opportunity for women.

Review of Women’s Employment in Greece in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries

In the early 20th century,the role of Greek women in the working environment was considered complementary,and the type of work they would do should fit their Review of Women’s Employment in Greece in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries gender stereotypes.Therefore,they were low-paid workers and employees,and they were the first to be laid off.Despite the fact that the number of Greek women participating in the labor market has increased,many of them were obliged to work due to the high rate of men’s unemployment since there was no other way to sustain the living level of the household(Alpha Bank,2018).Greek women’s participation in the labor market was accompanied by an increase in flexible types of employment along with the pay gap between men and women,which remained persistent due to the existence of discrimination.

Exploring the Gap:the Influence of Chair-CEO Age Dissimilarity on CEO Monitoring and Incentives

This paper investigates how the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and CEO power affect the dispersion and change of chair-CEO pay gap from both static and dynamic perspectives.The substantial age dissimilarity between the chairman and the CEO gives rise to cognitive conflict,thereby increasing board monitoring for firms with greater monitoring needs.Using data of China s listed firms from 2009 to 2017,we find a significant negative effect of CEO power on pay gap between the chairman and the CEO.In addition,when CEO is a member of the board or compensation committee,the power of CEO has different influences on the compensation,but the cognitive conflicts caused by chair-CEO age dissimilarity always inhibit the CEO s power.Thus,age dissimilarity has become an important complement to the board s regulatory mechanisms.

Confucian culture and the external pay gap

We examine the impact of Confucian philosophy on external pay gaps,and find that a Confucianist atmosphere is negatively associated with firms’external pay gaps for both executives and employees.Mechanistically,the Confucian concept of“righteousness”reduces the self-interested motivation of management,in turn reducing executives’external pay gap;“humaneness”causes management to focus on protecting employees’rights and interests,benefiting employees’compensation;and“honesty”improves information disclosure,reducing the external compensation gap for both executives and general employees.The inhibitory effect of Confucian culture on the external pay gap is greater in regions with weak formal institutions and non-state-owned firms,while foreign cultural shocks attenuate the Confucian influence.Finally,the Confucian culture-driven reduction of the external pay gap improves enterprises’economic efficiency.

Troubled by unequal pay rather than low pay:The incentive effects of a top management team pay gap

We examine the relationships with firm performance of the internal pay gap among individual members of the top management team(TMT) and the compensation level of TMT members relative to their industry peers. We find that pay gap is positively related to firm performance and that this positive relation is stronger when the TMT pay level is higher than the industry median. However, we do not observe such effects in Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),in which both the executive managerial market and compensation are government-regulated. We also document that cutting central SOE managers' pay level can increase firm value, whereas doing so for local SOE managers has the opposite effect. Our findings have important implications for research on TMT compensation as well as for policy makers considering SOE compensation reform.

Board affiliation and pay gap

This paper examines the effects of board affiliation on the corporate pay gap.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that boards with a greater presence of directors appointed by block shareholders have lower pay gaps. Furthermore, the governance effects of board affiliation with and without pay are distinguished. The empirical results show that board affiliation without pay is negatively related to the pay gap, while board affiliation with pay is positively related to the pay gap. Overall, the results shed light on how block shareholders affect their companies' pay gaps through board affiliation.

Estimating the Relative Level of Minimum Wage in China

It is generally believed in existing literature that China＇s minimum wage is too low and must be raised substantially. Such a view is highly misleading given the inconsistent statistical standards for minimum and average wages. In order to ensure comparability, this paper has adjusted the statistical scope for minimum and average wages respectively. If employees of urban private and self-employed businesses are included in calculating the average wage, the minimum-to-average wage ratio will increase by about 0.06; if the minimum wage standards of various localities include personal contributions to social insurance and the housing fund, the minimum-to-average wage ratio will increase by 0.008; if overtime pay is deducted from the average wage, the minimum-to-average wage ratio will further increase by around O. 06.In addition, if the median wage is used in place of the average wage, the minimum-to-average wage ratio will increase by at least 0.08. After these adjustments, China＇s minimum-to-average wage ratio for 2013 will increase from 0.28 to 0.49, which is within the range of between 0.40 and 0.60 that is recognized internationally as reasonable. Our analysis suggests that as far as the immediate interests of workers are concerned, it is more imperative to unify the statistical approaches for minimum and average wages in China than to raise the minimum wage standard. In order to achieve the expected effect, simply raising the minimum wage alone is not enough. What is also necessary is to enhance supervision and inspection on compliance by firms with the minimum wage policy, particularly the overtime pay regulations. An alternative is to replace monthly minimum wage with hourly minimum wage.

Economic sharing of honors: Equal or Exclusive?

The objective of this study is to examine whether and how non-financial performances,specifically the awards achieved by the corporates,are associated with the distribution of the compensation of the managers and other employees within the corporations.Through an investigation of the correlation between corporate awards and compensation,we find that corporate awards as collective honors raise managers’compensation but significantly reduce non-managerial compensation,thus widening the pay gap within the company.Our empirical evidence also shows that these correlations are more significant in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises.In addition,our evidence reveals that although corporate awards increase the stickiness of managers’compensation but not that of other employees,the corporate awards can still stimulate better financial performance and market value by motivating both managers and other employees.Our empirical evidence implies that because only managers are responsible for and evaluated by comprehensive corporate performance,the issues of fairness and efficiency are not raised when the economic benefits provided by corporate awards are unequally shared.