Intrinsic value in nature is a key concept in professional environmental ethics literature in the West. Western scholars such as Holmes Rolston III and Paul Taylor argue that the philosophical foundation of environmen...Intrinsic value in nature is a key concept in professional environmental ethics literature in the West. Western scholars such as Holmes Rolston III and Paul Taylor argue that the philosophical foundation of environmental ethics should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. Influenced by this concept, some influential Chinese environmental ethics scholars such as Yu Mouchang and Lu Feng argue that the foundation of environmental ethics in China should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. This paper holds that the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical meaning of intrinsic value in nature is the legacy of Western philosophical traditions, which is in conflict with the Chinese philosophical traditions. Meanwile, the paper argues that the Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature can become the foundation for Chinese environmental ethics. The Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is based on aesthetic appreciation of nature and people＇s participation in the beauty of nature.展开更多
The idea of intrinsic value is pervasive in environmental ethics and animal ethics.In fact,the view that certain non-human animals and the environment have intrinsic value is the basis of many ethicists’claim that we...The idea of intrinsic value is pervasive in environmental ethics and animal ethics.In fact,the view that certain non-human animals and the environment have intrinsic value is the basis of many ethicists’claim that we are morally obligated to treat these non-human animals and the environment well.In this paper,I argue that these ethicists often conflate intrinsic and final value.If something is finally valuable,then it is valuable for its own sake or in its own right either in virtue of its internal or external properties.To be intrinsically valuable is just to be finally valuable in virtue of one’s internal or intrinsic properties.Given this understanding of intrinsic value,many animal and environmental ethicists end up committing themselves to the view that the source of the moral status of certain non-human animals and the environment is some set of their respective internal or intrinsic properties.However,I argue that the value that they are often concerned with is based on non-human animals’and the environment’s external or extrinsic properties(sentience,rareness,uniqueness,diversity,etc.).This means that these ethicists need only defend the claim that certain non-human animals and the environment are extrinsically finally valuable as opposed to intrinsically valuable.展开更多
Do we really care whether our beliefs are true？ Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer： Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is ＂a consis...Do we really care whether our beliefs are true？ Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer： Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is ＂a consistently negative＂ one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user＇s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.展开更多
文摘Intrinsic value in nature is a key concept in professional environmental ethics literature in the West. Western scholars such as Holmes Rolston III and Paul Taylor argue that the philosophical foundation of environmental ethics should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. Influenced by this concept, some influential Chinese environmental ethics scholars such as Yu Mouchang and Lu Feng argue that the foundation of environmental ethics in China should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. This paper holds that the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical meaning of intrinsic value in nature is the legacy of Western philosophical traditions, which is in conflict with the Chinese philosophical traditions. Meanwile, the paper argues that the Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature can become the foundation for Chinese environmental ethics. The Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is based on aesthetic appreciation of nature and people＇s participation in the beauty of nature.
文摘The idea of intrinsic value is pervasive in environmental ethics and animal ethics.In fact,the view that certain non-human animals and the environment have intrinsic value is the basis of many ethicists’claim that we are morally obligated to treat these non-human animals and the environment well.In this paper,I argue that these ethicists often conflate intrinsic and final value.If something is finally valuable,then it is valuable for its own sake or in its own right either in virtue of its internal or external properties.To be intrinsically valuable is just to be finally valuable in virtue of one’s internal or intrinsic properties.Given this understanding of intrinsic value,many animal and environmental ethicists end up committing themselves to the view that the source of the moral status of certain non-human animals and the environment is some set of their respective internal or intrinsic properties.However,I argue that the value that they are often concerned with is based on non-human animals’and the environment’s external or extrinsic properties(sentience,rareness,uniqueness,diversity,etc.).This means that these ethicists need only defend the claim that certain non-human animals and the environment are extrinsically finally valuable as opposed to intrinsically valuable.
文摘Do we really care whether our beliefs are true？ Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer： Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is ＂a consistently negative＂ one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user＇s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.
