Chinese investment in Greenland

In 2009 Greenland moved to a more extensive degree of self-government in relation to the Kingdom of Denmark （the Realm）, and most policy areas related to business activities and investment are now under the control of Greenland. Under the Self-Government Act, Greenland has issued legislation within several business sectors and other business-related policy areas, including the mineral resources sector. Today, Greenland is highly dependent on fishing and fish exports; however, the government is quite ambi-tious in its desire to develop new business sectors and attract foreign investment, including investment from China, especially to develop its mineral resources. China is now the second largest economy in the world, and outbound investments by Chinese companies present unprecedented opportunities for both the Chinese companies and their global partners. However, Chinese outbound investment faces many hurdles, both at home and elsewhere. It is highly advisable for Chinese companies to evaluate the regulatory, political, environmental, labor, and financial conditions and under-stand what remedies may mitigate the risks they identify before investing in Green land. This paper investigates and analyzes the hurdles faced by Chinese investors in both Greenland and the Danish Realm. The paper focuses on but is not limited to investments in the mining industry.

Incentives to Invest in Improving Quality in the Telecommunications Industry

This paper investigates the incentives of invest in improving quality （as opposed to investments in new activities） in the telecommunications industry, based on the example of wireless markets. What is the impact of competition on incentives to invest, and on capacities to invest？ What is the role of the rate of penetration and technical progress？ This paper highlights the fact that investment incentives are positively related to potential for technical progress. Investment incentives also depend on market structure, competition intensity, and penetration rate, but not monotonically. This paper consists of a theoretical part which, under assumptions of full market coverage and market share symmetry, shows that for each national market, there is a target level of investment which companies strive to achieve but had not exceeded, and an empirical part that confirms the findings of the theoretical part and explains the differences with the theoretical part by relaxing the assumptions of full coverage and market share symmetry. This target level on the one hand depends on the potential for technical progress and on the other hand, depends on the rate of penetration. From a social perspective, this target level is the best amount that companies are encouraged to invest. Non-achievement of the target level entails underinvestment and a decrease in consumer surplus and welfare and may slow down technical progress. A data set covering 30 countries over a period of eight years is used to empirically prove the existence of a change in investment behavior depending on whether or not the target level is achieved. A low margin per user may hamper achievement of the target level. As a result, maximum consumer surplus and welfare occur under imperfect competition but not under perfect competition.