Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for dom...Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the RD subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed.The equilibrium output, RD investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, RD investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the RD investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal RD investment under the RD investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the RD product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm RD investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage RD innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the RD investment subsidy policy.展开更多
Although championed by academia and policy-makers, the theory of ＂wave phenomenon＂ is a questionable explanation for overcapacity. First, enterprises do not necessarily share the same expectation for future demand o...Although championed by academia and policy-makers, the theory of ＂wave phenomenon＂ is a questionable explanation for overcapacity. First, enterprises do not necessarily share the same expectation for future demand of a promising industry. Second, in its model, overcapacity is explained as a deviation from equilibrium under the incomplete information hypothesis, which is in fact nothing but normal in a market economy. The prime reason for overcapacity resides in the fact that local governments are engaged in a subsidy competition to attract investment. We endeavor to illustrate the following via modeling： the subsidy effect produced by local government＇s offering of cheaper land and matching loans results in less investment from companies. Under this circumstance, enterprises channel a disproportionate amount of funding to building production capacity, which overloads the entire industry. To address the problem, reforms are needed in land property, environmental protection policies, and financial and fiscal systems.展开更多
基金The Special Project of Innovative Methods and Work Funded by Ministry of National Science and Technology of China(No.2013IM030600)
文摘Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the RD subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed.The equilibrium output, RD investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, RD investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the RD investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal RD investment under the RD investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the RD product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm RD investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage RD innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the RD investment subsidy policy.
基金This paper is sponsored by the Chinese National Social Science Foundation Project Industrial Overcapacity, Redundant Construction in the Transitioning China： Formation and Management （grant 09AZD017）, the Chinese National Social Science Foundation Project ＂Overcapacity Management and Reform of the Financing System （grant 09AJY002）, the Chinese National Social Science Foundation Project ＂Restructuring and Revitalization Planning of Key Industries in China＂ （grant 10zd＆026）, the Chinese National Social Science Foundation Project ＂A New Industrialized Path： Industrial Restructuring and Upgrading （grant 06＆ZD002）, MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences in Universities Financial Innovation, Capital Market and Regional Economic Growth （grant 10JJD790027） Nanjing University ＂985＂ Project of Humanities and Social Sciences ＂Improving indigenous innovation capability in China＂ （grant NJU985FW01 ）
文摘Although championed by academia and policy-makers, the theory of ＂wave phenomenon＂ is a questionable explanation for overcapacity. First, enterprises do not necessarily share the same expectation for future demand of a promising industry. Second, in its model, overcapacity is explained as a deviation from equilibrium under the incomplete information hypothesis, which is in fact nothing but normal in a market economy. The prime reason for overcapacity resides in the fact that local governments are engaged in a subsidy competition to attract investment. We endeavor to illustrate the following via modeling： the subsidy effect produced by local government＇s offering of cheaper land and matching loans results in less investment from companies. Under this circumstance, enterprises channel a disproportionate amount of funding to building production capacity, which overloads the entire industry. To address the problem, reforms are needed in land property, environmental protection policies, and financial and fiscal systems.
