One of the key problems in the use of underground gas storage is frequent leakage. It can lead to the actual gas storage amount being less than that accounted for. Combining numerical simulation and parameter auto fit...One of the key problems in the use of underground gas storage is frequent leakage. It can lead to the actual gas storage amount being less than that accounted for. Combining numerical simulation and parameter auto fit, this paper ascertains the dynamic variation of the pressure in the storage reservoir, adjusts the actual injecting and producing gas to fit the accounted pressure with the tested pressure, obtains the gas leakage of the storage, and then determines the difference between accounted amount and leakage amount. The result is the actual reserves of the storage. The simulation result shows that the method presented can provide a theoretic foundation for estimating the leakage amount, thereby ensuring the actual reserves, searching the leakage route, and reducing leakage by adjusting the storage method.展开更多
Recently, Wu et al(2019 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58 1854) found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji’s quantum private comparison protocol(2017 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 561517), that is, a malicious participant...Recently, Wu et al(2019 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58 1854) found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji’s quantum private comparison protocol(2017 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 561517), that is, a malicious participant can steal another’s secret data without being detected through an active attack means. In this paper, we show that Wu et al’s active attack is also effective for several other existing protocols, including the ones proposed by Ji et al and Zha et al(2016 Commun. Theor. Phys. 65 711;2018 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57 3874). In addition,we propose what a passive attack means, which is different from Wu et al’s active attack in that the malicious participant can easily steal another’s secret data only by using his own secret data after finishing the protocol, instead of stealing the data by forging identities when executing the protocol. Furthermore, we find that several other existing quantum private comparison protocols also have such an information leakage problem. In response to the problem, we propose a simple solution, which is more efficient than the ones proposed by Wu et al, because it does not consume additional classical and quantum resources.展开更多
文摘One of the key problems in the use of underground gas storage is frequent leakage. It can lead to the actual gas storage amount being less than that accounted for. Combining numerical simulation and parameter auto fit, this paper ascertains the dynamic variation of the pressure in the storage reservoir, adjusts the actual injecting and producing gas to fit the accounted pressure with the tested pressure, obtains the gas leakage of the storage, and then determines the difference between accounted amount and leakage amount. The result is the actual reserves of the storage. The simulation result shows that the method presented can provide a theoretic foundation for estimating the leakage amount, thereby ensuring the actual reserves, searching the leakage route, and reducing leakage by adjusting the storage method.
基金supported by the State Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 61332019the Major State Basic Research Development Program of China(973 Program)under grant 2014CB340601+1 种基金the National Science Foundation of China under grant 61202386 and grant 61402339the National Cryptography Development Fund of China under grant MMJJ201701304。
文摘Recently, Wu et al(2019 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58 1854) found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji’s quantum private comparison protocol(2017 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 561517), that is, a malicious participant can steal another’s secret data without being detected through an active attack means. In this paper, we show that Wu et al’s active attack is also effective for several other existing protocols, including the ones proposed by Ji et al and Zha et al(2016 Commun. Theor. Phys. 65 711;2018 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57 3874). In addition,we propose what a passive attack means, which is different from Wu et al’s active attack in that the malicious participant can easily steal another’s secret data only by using his own secret data after finishing the protocol, instead of stealing the data by forging identities when executing the protocol. Furthermore, we find that several other existing quantum private comparison protocols also have such an information leakage problem. In response to the problem, we propose a simple solution, which is more efficient than the ones proposed by Wu et al, because it does not consume additional classical and quantum resources.
