Decentralization, Supervision, and Chinese Local Government Debt

Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.

The Transformation of Environmental Governance from the Point of the Interaction between Government and National People's Congress

Taking cadmium pollution in X River as an example, the interaction between National People＇s Congress and local government was de- scribed. How the local government transforms its role in environment protection with the help of several deputies to National People＇s Congress was expounded from the angle of social construction, which also enlightened the way to build an environment protection road with Chinese characteristics.

Local Government Debt,Sectoral Linkage and Resource Allocation Efficiency

Increasing the efficiency of resource allocation is the basis and guarantee for boosting high-quality economic development.Based on the panel data of Chinese industrial enterprises and cities from 2008 to 2013,this paper studies the influence of infrastructure construction demand shocks represented by local government debt expansion on the efficiency of sectoral resource allocation from the perspective of sectoral linkage.According to the empirical findings,local government debt significantly reduces the resource allocation efficiency of manufacturing sector that is highly related to infrastructure construction.This conclusion is still tenable after the robustness test using the simulated local government debt as an instrumental variable.Further mechanism tests show that there are two reasons for the decline of the efficiency of resource allocation in manufacturing sector that is highly related to infrastructure construction.First,more product demands and investments brought by the expansion of local government debt flow to less productive enterprises in the sector.Second,resource misallocation reduces the probability of high-productivity enterprises entering the market and low-productivity enterprises exiting the market,and the effect is more prominent in cities with high dependence on state-owned enterprises and high pressure on officials to be promoted.According to this study,the performance management of local government debt should be further strengthened,and particular attention should be paid to the influence of local government debt on enterprise investment and financing crowding out and resource misallocation.

The Governance of Local Government Debt from the Perspective of Fiscal and Financial Coordination:Evidence from Financial Markets

Theories based on fiscal guarantees cannot explain either the fact that the continuously decline in local fiscal resources has not significantly increased local government financing costs,or the fact that local government debt has been rising at a time of strict central government regulation.The theoretical and empirical analyses provided in this study show that it is the financial resources under local government control that provide the implicit guarantee for local government debt.Such financial resources lower local governments’financing costs but have the potential to lead to the contagion of financial risk through local government to the financial sector.Therefore,to look at the question solely in terms of either fiscal or financial sector guarantees will not be sufficient to resolve the problem of local government debt.The central government needs to coordinate fiscal and financial policies under a joint management framework in a way that rationally disperses and resolves the risks attached to local government debt and avoids the assumption of excessive risk by either sector.At the same time,close attention should be paid to local financial institutions’asset quality and their money market reputation to avoid the risk of contagion from local financial institutions to local public finance.

数字金融对地方政府债务风险的影响效应研究——基于动态SDM模型的实证检验

基于中国金融安全战略,本文选取2011―2020年中国31个省份数据,构建动态SDM模型,实证检验数字金融对地方政府债务风险的影响效应。研究发现:数字金融与地方政府债务风险均存在空间依赖性,并且数字金融对地方政府债务风险存在负向直接影响和负向空间溢出效应。从结构异质性看,覆盖广度和数字化程度分别存在负向和正向的直接影响,以及正向和负向的空间溢出效应,使用深度仅存在负向直接影响。从区域异质性看,东部地区的影响效应为正向,中部和东北地区的影响效应均为负向,而西部地区存在负向直接影响和“由促转抑”的空间溢出效应。本文从动态视角揭示了数字金融对地方政府债务风险的影响机制,为防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了新视角。

The Tamale Local Boy Scouts Association in the Northern Territories Protectorate in the 1920s

In 1907,military leader Robert Baden-Powell started the Boy Scouts Association in England as the British colonial government officers instituted Tamale village as the administrative centre of the Northern Territories Protectorate.Sam Yarney worked with Frank Collyer the European bank cashier and scoutmaster who started the Boy Scouts in the Gold Coast Colony in 1914,the year the First World War started.In 1922,Governor Gordon Guggisberg,who was brigadier general during the war was the chief scout.He reorganized the Local Boy Scouts Association in the Tamale Government School that received select boys from various schools in the Northern Territories Protectorate.The schoolboys excelled in the Standard VII and Civil Service Examinations to work with the government institutions and train as teachers and telegraphists.Arthur James Philbrick the chief scout commissioner of the Northern Territories employed Yarney as the assistant scout commissioner in the Southern Province to take on the staff of the reorganized Tamale Local Boy Scouts Association and register the 1st Tamale Troop.The scout officers subscribed to a Scout Fund to buy kit,for the schoolboys who passed the Tenderfoot Tests to buy uniforms and perform at events.

我国地方政府债务的研究进展与动态演变——基于CNKI文献的Citespace可视化分析

本文基于Citespace图谱分析方法,以1993—2019年CNKI数据库中政府债务研究领域的核心期刊为数据源,对政府债务领域的发文数量、作者、研究机构进行文献可视化分析,通过解读政府债务研究领域的高频关键词图谱、关键词时区图分析出我国政府债务领域的研究热点和动态演变,研究表明“地方政府债务政策管理”是政府债务这一研究领域的未来研究趋势。

基于CiteSpace对国内地方政府债务的可视化分析

地方政府债务是连接金融政策和财政政策的重要工具。文章以CNKI数据库中2008—2022年的979篇CSSCI文献为样本,借助CiteSpace可视化软件对我国地方政府债务的研究现状、热点及趋势进行分析,结果表明:我国有关地方政府债务的研究总体呈增长趋势,但作者和机构没有形成紧密的联系网;研究领域主要集中在地方债务、金融风险、隐性债务等方面,未来可以从隐性债务及其风险方面进行更加丰富的研究。

政府债务预算硬约束与地方财政可持续性提升

地方政府债务风险的不断积累已成为地方财政可持续性的最大阻碍。以新《预算法》实施后,地方政府债务管理的“开前门”和“关后门”两个阶段改革为准自然实验,分析了政府债务预算硬约束对地方财政可持续性的影响。研究发现:地方政府债务管理的两阶段改革都对地方财政可持续性具有显著的正向提升影响;从作用机制来看,“开前门”和“关后门”阶段改革分别通过财政收支巩固和债务规模控制来发挥对地方财政可持续性的有效作用;异质性分析来看,地方政府举债行为激励较弱和财政监管力度较高的地方,政府债务预算硬约束对地方财政可持续性的正向效应会更加显著。研究结果为推进债务预算硬约束来防范地方政府债务风险和提升地方财政可持续性提供了政策启示。

非对称信息视角下中国区域金融风险的影响机制

本文基于委托代理理论,构建非对称信息视角下中国区域金融风险影响机制的分析框架,并采用TVP-SV-VAR模型探究不同地区区域内金融风险影响机制的异质性。研究表明,非对称信息下金融系统委托代理行为致使商业银行存在信贷配给,资金倾斜助长了地方债扩张和房地产泡沫累积,一旦债务违约及泡沫破裂造成大量银行不良资产积聚,将引发区域金融风险。异质性研究发现,经济发达地区中房地产泡沫是区域金融风险形成的主导因素;经济次发达地区中地方政府过度举债是引致区域金融风险的主要冲击;而经济欠发达地区的区域金融风险是地方政府过度举债与房地产泡沫共同作用所致。国家金融监督管理总局应严控商业银行信贷资金流向,并对地方债扩张和房地产泡沫等区域金融风险影响因素实行“属性+对策”的差异化监管,构建风险治理的区域协作平台,提高区域金融风险的防范处置能力。

地方债务水平如何影响企业区位选择?——基于企业创新与政府信用双重视角分析

地方债务水平不仅关系地方政府财政健康,同时也影响企业投资决策。基于企业创新与政府信用双重视角,使用中国284个地级市2013—2022年面板数据,运用面板回归模型和中介效应模型识别了地方债务水平对企业区位选择的影响及其作用机制。结果表明:地方债务水平对企业区位选择具有显著负向影响,且这一影响具有一定的滞后性;企业创新和政府信用在该影响机制中均发挥了部分中介作用;对不同地区、不同财政自给率水平的城市以及不同类型债务结构来说,地方债务水平对企业区位选择具有显著的异质性影响。以上结果在进行调整解释变量、变更被解释变量的衡量标准、门槛效应检验等一系列检验后保持稳健。笔者据此提出转变城市发展思维,构建新型政府与企业关系等政策建议。

数字金融对地方政府债务的影响研究——基于省级面板数据的实证检验

本文基于2015—2021年中国省级面板数据实证研究数字金融对地方政府债务的影响,发现两者呈现出显著为负的非线性关系,数字金融的发展对地方政府优化自身债务、降低系统性金融风险具有积极作用。采用系统聚类将31个省(区、市)分为发展中、次发达、发达地区三大组别,发现数字金融对地方政府债务的抑制作用在发展中地区表现得最为显著。市场化水平在数字金融抑制地方政府债务过程中具有正向调节作用,特别是当市场化水平跨越一定的门槛值以后,数字金融对地方政府债务的影响显著增强。在此基础上,提出了数字金融背景下分类施策缓解各级地方政府债务问题的相关建议。

Disclosure of government financial information and the cost of local government's debt financing——Empirical evidence from provincial investment bonds for urban construction

China's slowing economic growth and rapid urbanization have made local government debt financing a significant issue.This study uses a sample of China's provincial government data for the 2006–2012 period to examine the effect of the disclosure of financial information by local governments on their debt financing costs.The results show that financial information disclosure is conducive to public supervision and enhances government credibility,leading to a decrease in the cost of debt financing.Furthermore,increased government economic intervention increases the strength of the association between financial information disclosure and the cost of debt financing.Increased government audit prevention function weakens the strength of the association between financial information disclosure and the cost of debt financing.

地方政府债务违约风险传导机制及最优债务置换

建立防范化解地方债务风险长效机制,建立同高质量发展相适应的政府债务管理机制是新时代实现经济高质量发展的必然要求。近期,地方政府债务迎来集中置换期,但在置换中最优比率该如何确定?理论分析层面,本文构建了包含同业拆借市场的异质性商业银行的三期模型,分析地方政府债务违约风险向商业银行流动性风险转移的传导机制。地方政府债务违约减少了商业银行的流动性,推高短期资金利率,带来了银行的流动性风险和破产风险。债务置换政策能够缓解这种不利影响,然而,过高的债务置换率反而会增加商业银行的流动性风险和破产风险。因此,债务置换政策存在收益与风险的权衡,最优债务置换率应该等于地方政府债务违约率。本文进一步论证了债务置换率的合理区间和地方政府融资能力对债务置换的影响。实证检验层面,本文采用2015—2019年地方政府债务置换数据,运用双向固定效应模型检验了地方政府债务违约可能性对债务置换强度的影响和地方政府融资能力的调节效应,进一步佐证了理论分析,为当前地方政府债务置换工作提供参考和借鉴。

地方政府隐性债务置换与国家经济安全发展

“开前门、堵后门”是中国地方政府债务治理的基本原则,通过债务置换实现债务显性化是该原则的具体表现之一。虽然地方政府债务置换缓解了地方政府的财政压力,减轻了财政负担,但并没有从根本上消除财政风险,其中的财政、金融风险及其政策不确定性也会影响国家经济安全的发展。对此,在梳理中国2015—2023年历次地方政府债务置换方案的基础上,文章研究地方政府隐性债务置换潜在的财政、金融风险及其对国家经济安全的影响。另外,从治理地方债务问题出发,提出防范债务置换风险、提高国家经济安全的改革建议。

地方政府债务与企业投资“脱实向虚”

如何理解地方政府债务在国民经济发展中的影响作用是当前学术界与政府部门关注的焦点议题。本文采用2009—2018年中国上市公司数据,基于融资结构视角实证考察了地方政府债务对企业投资的影响效应和作用机制。研究发现:第一,地方政府债务扩张导致了非国有上市公司实体投资下降和金融投资上升,而对国有上市公司投资没有显著影响;第二,这一影响具有明显的地区、行业和企业个体异质性;第三,在地方政府债务攀升下非国有上市公司的融资结构变化,是导致企业投资“脱实向虚”的潜在影响机制;第四,从发展角度来看,金融投资收益率会随着地方政府债务增加而下降,因此长期持续增加金融投资不利于企业经营发展和国民经济运行,而政府债务资金投向基建民生领域能够缓解实体投资下滑。最后,根据研究结论,本文提出了具有针对性的政策建议。

分税制改革视域下的地方政府债务治理:理论辨析与路径展望

本文通过回顾分税制改革的历史沿革、制度特征和学术争鸣,试图厘清分税制改革对地方政府债务治理的影响机制和改革路径。本文认为,分税制改革有效发挥了中央和地方“两个积极性”,初步构建起同社会主义市场经济体制相适应的分权治理框架。从影响效果来看,分税制改革引领的“双重激励”将地方政府行政动员能力和市场增进能力有效结合起来,激励地方政府举债筹资建设了大量市政基础设施;但侧重“事上”而非“安下”的责任约束机制也导致地方政府债务风险不断衍生泛化、变相积聚。本文为推进高质量发展背景下的分税制改革和地方政府债务治理、构建高水平社会主义市场经济体制提供了财权划分、事权配置、行政监察、市场约束等改革战略取向。

Local Government Debt, Factor Misallocation and Regional Economic Performance in China

This paper examines total factor efficiency and productivity performance by taking into account local government debt （LGD） in 31 Chinese provincial regions for the period 2000-2013. The results show that neglecting LGD may overstate economic performance in Chinese provinces. The eastern region shows better performance in single jactor efficiency and total factor efficiency than the non-eastern regions. The western region shows the worst total factor performance. The north-eastern region is the only region that has experienced a decline in total factor performance. The state-dominated, investment- driven development model may help technological progress across Chinese regions but could lead to significant factor misallocation. We argue that biases towards more state- dominated investment and land supply in less productive western, central and north- eastern regions, at the expense of investment and land supply in more productive eastern regions, have contributed to the recent slowdown in economic growth in China. Therefore, .further market-oriented reforms in factor markets should be considered in the future.

减税降费规模与地方政府债务风险治理——机制与证据

减税降费是中国为积极应对经济下行压力、维护全局经济稳定的重要政策手段,但其规模的不断扩大会加剧地方政府债务风险。本文通过构建包含“借”、“用”、“还”3个环节的风险指标体系,采用熵权-TOPSIS法测算2015~2022年中国省级地方政府债务风险指数,使用双向固定效应模型、面板门槛模型实证分析减税降费规模对地方政府债务风险的影响。研究发现,减税降费规模与地方政府债务风险总体上呈正相关关系,并且存在经济发展水平的门槛效应,当经济发展水平跨过门槛值时,地方政府债务风险增长速度将显著降低。同时,减税降费规模与地方政府债务风险间存在非线性关系,随着减税降费规模不断扩大,地方政府债务风险增速也将被遏制。