Resale price maintenance(RPM) exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition.Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in...Resale price maintenance(RPM) exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition.Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement.We found that in reality,effects of jump-dealing and RPM can offset each other.This paper systematically proposed the offsetting theory of jump-dealing and RPM,and analyzed their policy implications for anti price monopoly,thus providing some simple principles and methods to the law enforcement against vertical price monopoly.This will not only reduce the possible "superfluous actions " in current law enforcement,but also help avoid compounded mistakes due to difficulties of enforcement.展开更多
With the rise of the Internet and E-commence,it has become common for consumers in the book,clothing,electronic appliances,furniture and cosmetic industries to engage in a phenomenon termed"store-browsing-web-pur...With the rise of the Internet and E-commence,it has become common for consumers in the book,clothing,electronic appliances,furniture and cosmetic industries to engage in a phenomenon termed"store-browsing-web-purchasing"(SBWP).These are customers who tend to acquire service and information about particular products at traditional(brick and motar)retail stores but purchase them online at a lower price.This creates new issues and new perspectives to the science of law and economics.This paper addresses the issue of SBWP based on the industrial organization theory(especially the vertical dual-pricing system).It then endeavors to demonstrate the three"jump-dealing"theorems of SBWP from analyzing the business models,consumer purchasing patterns and price differences in distributing channels.Furthermore,we extrapolate the theory of jump-dealing and resale price maintenance(RPM)offsetting based on previous findings.The main conclusions are the following:if a company's RPM strategies substantially eliminate competition,then jump-dealing behavior from consumers shouM be encouraged.Conversely,if this jump-dealing behavior from consumers brings about anti-competition and free riding problems,then a company's RPM strategies should be exempted.展开更多
基金phase-wise achievement of the project B-T-C Paradigm and Application of "Jump-dealing"(Project No.:71272190)funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,headed by Professor Yu Li,vice president of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,director of Center for Economic Analysis of Law and Policy Evaluation and member of Expert Advisory Board of the State Council Anti-monopoly Commission of China
文摘Resale price maintenance(RPM) exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition.Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement.We found that in reality,effects of jump-dealing and RPM can offset each other.This paper systematically proposed the offsetting theory of jump-dealing and RPM,and analyzed their policy implications for anti price monopoly,thus providing some simple principles and methods to the law enforcement against vertical price monopoly.This will not only reduce the possible "superfluous actions " in current law enforcement,but also help avoid compounded mistakes due to difficulties of enforcement.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71272190,"The B-T-C Paradigm and Application for'Jump-Dealing'Problems")
文摘With the rise of the Internet and E-commence,it has become common for consumers in the book,clothing,electronic appliances,furniture and cosmetic industries to engage in a phenomenon termed"store-browsing-web-purchasing"(SBWP).These are customers who tend to acquire service and information about particular products at traditional(brick and motar)retail stores but purchase them online at a lower price.This creates new issues and new perspectives to the science of law and economics.This paper addresses the issue of SBWP based on the industrial organization theory(especially the vertical dual-pricing system).It then endeavors to demonstrate the three"jump-dealing"theorems of SBWP from analyzing the business models,consumer purchasing patterns and price differences in distributing channels.Furthermore,we extrapolate the theory of jump-dealing and resale price maintenance(RPM)offsetting based on previous findings.The main conclusions are the following:if a company's RPM strategies substantially eliminate competition,then jump-dealing behavior from consumers shouM be encouraged.Conversely,if this jump-dealing behavior from consumers brings about anti-competition and free riding problems,then a company's RPM strategies should be exempted.
