Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

Cooperative Anti-Jamming and Interference Mitigation for UAV Networks: A Local Altruistic Game Approach

To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference and external malicious jamming. A cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation method based on local altruistic is proposed to optimize UAVs’ channel selection. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is modeled to formulate the confrontation relationship between UAVs and the jammer. A local altruistic game is modeled with each UAV considering the utilities of both itself and other UAVs. A distributed cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the convergence of the proposed algorithm and the impact of the transmission power on the system loss value are analyzed, and the anti-jamming performance of the proposed algorithm can be improved by around 64% compared with the existing algorithms.

MANUFACTURING SYSTEM SCHEDULING BASED ON MULTI-AGENT COOPERATION GAME

Aiming at the flexible manufacturing system with multi-machining and multi-assembly equipment, a new scheduling algorithm is proposed to decompose the assembly structure of the products, thus obtaining simple scheduling problems and forming the cOrrespOnding agents. Then, the importance and the restriction of each agent are cOnsidered, to obtain an order of simple scheduling problems based on the cooperation game theory. With this order, the scheduling of sub-questions is implemented in term of rules, and the almost optimal scheduling results for meeting the restriction can be obtained. Experimental results verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheduling algorithm.

Cooperative maneuver decision making for multi-UAV air combat based on incomplete information dynamic game

Cooperative autonomous air combat of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs)is one of the main combat modes in future air warfare,which becomes even more complicated with highly changeable situation and uncertain information of the opponents.As such,this paper presents a cooperative decision-making method based on incomplete information dynamic game to generate maneuver strategies for multiple UAVs in air combat.Firstly,a cooperative situation assessment model is presented to measure the overall combat situation.Secondly,an incomplete information dynamic game model is proposed to model the dynamic process of air combat,and a dynamic Bayesian network is designed to infer the tactical intention of the opponent.Then a reinforcement learning framework based on multiagent deep deterministic policy gradient is established to obtain the perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium solution of the air combat game model.Finally,a series of simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method,and the simulation results show effective synergies and cooperative tactics.

THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner＇s Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two con- trol strategies are proposed： compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a coop- erator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can＇t prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）. On the other hand, compensation for the coopera- tor can＇t prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit

The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.

Cooperative game theory-based steering law design of a CMG system

Spacecraft require a large-angle manoeuvre when performing agile manoeuvring tasks, therefore a control moment gyroscope(CMG) is employed to provide a strong moment.However, the control of the CMG system easily falls into singularity, which renders the actuator unable to output the required moment. To solve the singularity problem of CMGs, the control law design of a CMG system based on a cooperative game is proposed. First, the cooperative game model is constructed according to the quadratic programming problem, and the cooperative strategy is constructed. When the strategy falls into singularity, the weighting coefficient is introduced to carry out the strategy game to achieve the optimal strategy. In theory, it is proven that the cooperative game manipulation law of the CMG system converges, the sum of the CMG frame angular velocities is minimized, the energy consumption is small, and there is no output torque error. Then, the CMG group system is simulated.When the CMG system is near the singular point, it can quickly escape the singularity. When the CMG system falls into the singularity, it can also escape the singularity. Considering the optimization of angular momentum and energy consumption, the feasibility of the CMG system steering law based on a cooperative game is proven.

A cooperative detection game:UAV swarm vs.one fast intruder

This paper studies a special defense game using unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV)swarm against a fast intruder.The fast intruder applies an offensive strategy based on the artificial potential field method and Apollonius circle to scout a certain destination.As defenders,the UAVs are arranged into three layers:the forward layer,the midfield layer and the back layer.The co-defense mechanism,including the role derivation method of UAV swarm and a guidance law based on the co-defense front point,is introduced for UAV swarm to co-detect the intruder.Besides,five formations are designed for comparative analysis when ten UAVs are applied.Through Monte Carlo experiments and ablation experiment,the effectiveness of the proposed co-defense method has been verified.

Case Study on the Forestry Cooperation Model from Game Structure Perspective

Take Chinese yew cooperative organization for example,different game structures of forestry cooperation model were analyzed,the elative merit and applicable occasion was discussed combined with empirical investigation,and some suggestions were given also.The results showed that depending entirely on normal forest farmers cooperate spontaneously is difficult.Policies should be designed from the perspective of promoted village cadres and influential family salons to cooperation.When market factors become the main obstacle,it is necessary to introduce companies,relax constraints of forest management and build the right market atmosphere.According to unequal status of company and forest farmers,develop the cooperation model of " company + cooperation organization + farmers".In certain circumstances,especially there are several companies vicious competition,the intervention of association can play a coordinating role.

A Value for Games Defined on Graphs

Given a graph g=( V,A ) , we define a space of subgraphs M with the binary operation of union and the unique decomposition property into blocks. This space allows us to discuss a notion of minimal subgraphs (minimal coalitions) that are of interest for the game. Additionally, a partition of the game is defined in terms of the gain of each block, and subsequently, a solution to the game is defined based on distributing to each player (node and edge) present in each block a payment proportional to their contribution to the coalition.

How to promote cooperative innovation in environmentally friendly technology:a case of agricultural biotechnology in China

This study explored the factors influencing cooperative innovation in environmentally friendly agricultural biotechnology in China.First,we constructed an evolutionary game model comprising the factors of net income of cooperative innovation,net income of independent innovation,market constraints,and government subsidies.Using MATLAB simulation,we assigned different values to the aforementioned variables to explore the evolutionary trend of innovators’willingness to cooperate.Results showed that when the values of net income of cooperative innovation,net income of independent innovation,market constraints,and government subsidies exceeded the threshold,innovators’willingness to cooperate was significantly enhanced.Furthermore,the proportion of innovators who cooperated with others gradually increased to 100%;otherwise,it gradually decreased to 0%.Comparing the simulation curve with the real evolution curve of cooperative innovation in agricultural biotechnology in China,we found that the gradual decline in the willingness to cooperate could be due to insufficient subsidies for cooperative innovation,low income from cooperative innovation,weak profitability of innovators,and weak market constraints.

Benefit community promotes evolution of cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma game

Exploring the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma is valuable and it arises considerable concerns of many researchers. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to promote cooperation, called benefit community,in which cooperators linking together form a common benefit community and all their payoffs obtained from game are divided coequally. The robustness of conclusions is tested for the PDG(prisoners' dilemma game) on square lattice and WS small world network. We find that cooperation can be promoted by this typical mechanism, especially, it can diffuse and prevail more easily and rapidly on the WS small world network than it on the square lattice, even if a big temptation to defect b. Our research provides a feasible direction to resolve the social dilemma.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner＇s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.

Integrating the environmental factor into the strategy updating rule to promote cooperation in evolutionary games

Many previous studies have shown that the environment plays an important role for social individuals. In this paper, we integrate the environmental factor, which is defined as the average payoff of all a player＇s neighbours, with the standard Fermi updating rule by introducing a tunable parameter, w. It is found that the level of cooperation increases remarkably, and that the cooperators can better resist the invasion of defection with an increase in w. This interesting phenomenon is then explained from a microscopic view. In addition, the universality of this mechanism is also proved with the help of the small-world network and the random regular graph. This work may be helpful in understanding cooperation behaviour in species from unicellular organisms up to human beings.

Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability p or update their strategies with probability 1 - p depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of p via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals＇ behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.

Modeling and game strategy analysis of suppressing IADS for multiple fighters' cooperation

This paper addresses the problem of suppression of the integrated air defense system(IADS) by multiple fighters’ cooperation. Considering the dynamic changing of the number of the nodes in the operational process, a profit model for the influence of the mission’s cost for the whole system is developed for both offense and defensive sides. The scenario analysis is given for the process of suppressing the IADS by multiple fighters. Based on this scenario analysis, the modeling method and the specific expression for the payoff function are proposed in four cases for each node. Moreover, a distributed virtual learning algorithm is designed for the n-person and n-strategy game, and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium(MSNE) of this game can be solved from the n × m × 3-dimensional profit space. Finally, the simulation examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the game algorithm.

Cooperation influenced by the correlation degree of two-layered complex networks in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games

An evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game is investigated on two-layered complex networks respectively representing interaction and learning networks in one and two dimensions. A parameter q is introduced to denote the correlation degree between the two-layered networks. Using Monte Carlo simulations we studied the effects of the correlation degree on cooperative behaviour and found that the cooperator density nontrivially changes with q for different payoff parameter values depending on the detailed strategy updating and network dimension. An explanation for the obtained results is provided.

On fairness,full cooperation,and quantum game with incomplete information

Quantum entanglement has emerged as a new resource to enhance cooperation and remove dilemmas.This paper aims to explore conditions under which full cooperation is achievable even when the information of payoff is incomplete.Based on the quantum version of the extended classical cash in a hat game,we demonstrate that quantum entanglement may be used for achieving full cooperation or avoiding moral hazards with the reasonable profit distribution policies even when the profit is uncertain to a certain degree.This research further suggests that the fairness of profit distribution should play an important role in promoting full cooperation.It is hopeful that quantum entanglement and fairness will promote full cooperation among distant people from various interest groups when quantum networks and quantum entanglement are accessible to the public.

Effects of Dimers on Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game

We investigate the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimets on cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers, which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as one type of interaction through which information between communities is communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same strategy.