期刊文献+
共找到1篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance
1
作者 曹志东 刘春红 俞自由 《Journal of Donghua University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2001年第4期119-122,共4页
The dynamic signaling game-model is employed to study countermeasures of Q, U and C for supply-demand on financial market. As the game result, the mixed equilibrium of Q and U exists naturally without FRS. It is concl... The dynamic signaling game-model is employed to study countermeasures of Q, U and C for supply-demand on financial market. As the game result, the mixed equilibrium of Q and U exists naturally without FRS. It is concluded that FRS on market admittance is objective demand of financial market, also the rational management behavior of government FRSI. And in addition to the empirical criteria, the FRS agreements between FRSI and financial-institutions should be considered as one of advanced FRS techniques. These must cover:① the regulation conformed status investigation with sufficient frequency,② corresponding punitive measures with sufficient strength. Thus the information can be delivered FRSI have ensured only qualified and regulation-conformed financial-institutions could be allowed to enter. That could safeguard the steadiness of the financial market. 展开更多
关键词 Financial Regulation and Supervision ( FRS ) market admittance Game Analysis RATIONAL
下载PDF
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部