This study delves into the formation dynamics of alliances within a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)that encom-passes a manufacturer,a retailer,and an e-commerce platform.It leverages Stackelberg game for this explorati...This study delves into the formation dynamics of alliances within a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)that encom-passes a manufacturer,a retailer,and an e-commerce platform.It leverages Stackelberg game for this exploration,contrasting the equilibrium outcomes of a non-alliance model with those of three differentiated alliance models.The non-alliance model acts as a crucial benchmark,enabling the evaluation of the motivations for various supply chain entities to engage in alliance formations.Our analysis is centered on identifying the most effective alliance strategies and establishing a coordination within these partnerships.We thoroughly investigate the consequences of diverse alliance behaviors,bidirectional free-riding and cost-sharing,and the resultant effects on the optimal decision-making among supply chain actors.The findings underscore several pivotal insights:(1)The behavior of alliances within the supply chain exerts variable impacts on the optimal pricing and demand of its members.In comparison to the non-alliance(D)model,the manufacturer-retailer(MR)and manufacturer-e-commerce platform(ME)alliances significantly lower both offline and online resale prices for new and remanufactured goods.This adjustment leads to an enhanced demand for products via the MR alliance’s offline outlets and the ME alliance’s online platforms,thereby augmenting the profits for those within the alliance.Conversely,retailer-e-commerce platform(ER)alliance tends to increase the optimal retail price and demand across both online and offline channels.Under specific conditions,alliance behavior can also increase the profits of non-alliance members,and the profits derived through alliance channels also exceed those from non-alliance channels.(2)The prevalence of bidirectional free-riding behavior largely remains constant across different alliance configurations.Across these models,bidirectional free-riding typically elevates the equilibrium prices in offline channel while negatively affecting the equilibrium prices in other channel.(3)The effect of cost-sharing shows relative uniformity across the various alliance models.Across all configurations,cost-sharing tends to reduce the manufacturer’s profits.Nonetheless,alliances initiated by the manufacturer can counteract these negative impacts,providing a strategic pathway to bolster CLSC profitability.展开更多
Edge computing devices are widely deployed.An important issue that arises is in that these devices suffer from security attacks.To deal with it,we turn to the blockchain technologies.The note in the alliance chain nee...Edge computing devices are widely deployed.An important issue that arises is in that these devices suffer from security attacks.To deal with it,we turn to the blockchain technologies.The note in the alliance chain need rules to limit write permissions.Alliance chain can provide security management functions,using these functions to meet the management between the members,certification,authorization,monitoring and auditing.This article mainly analyzes some requirements realization which applies to the alliance chain,and introduces a new consensus algorithm,generalized Legendre sequence(GLS)consensus algorithm,for alliance chain.GLS algorithms inherit the recognition and verification efficiency of binary sequence ciphers in computer communication and can solve a large number of nodes verification of key distribution issues.In the alliance chain,GLS consensus algorithm can complete node address hiding,automatic task sorting,task automatic grouping,task node scope confirmation,task address binding and stamp timestamp.Moreover,the GLS consensus algorithm increases the difficulty of network malicious attack.展开更多
基金This work was supported by the Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China(No.20YJA630009)Shandong Natural Science Foundation of China(No.ZR2022MG002).
文摘This study delves into the formation dynamics of alliances within a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)that encom-passes a manufacturer,a retailer,and an e-commerce platform.It leverages Stackelberg game for this exploration,contrasting the equilibrium outcomes of a non-alliance model with those of three differentiated alliance models.The non-alliance model acts as a crucial benchmark,enabling the evaluation of the motivations for various supply chain entities to engage in alliance formations.Our analysis is centered on identifying the most effective alliance strategies and establishing a coordination within these partnerships.We thoroughly investigate the consequences of diverse alliance behaviors,bidirectional free-riding and cost-sharing,and the resultant effects on the optimal decision-making among supply chain actors.The findings underscore several pivotal insights:(1)The behavior of alliances within the supply chain exerts variable impacts on the optimal pricing and demand of its members.In comparison to the non-alliance(D)model,the manufacturer-retailer(MR)and manufacturer-e-commerce platform(ME)alliances significantly lower both offline and online resale prices for new and remanufactured goods.This adjustment leads to an enhanced demand for products via the MR alliance’s offline outlets and the ME alliance’s online platforms,thereby augmenting the profits for those within the alliance.Conversely,retailer-e-commerce platform(ER)alliance tends to increase the optimal retail price and demand across both online and offline channels.Under specific conditions,alliance behavior can also increase the profits of non-alliance members,and the profits derived through alliance channels also exceed those from non-alliance channels.(2)The prevalence of bidirectional free-riding behavior largely remains constant across different alliance configurations.Across these models,bidirectional free-riding typically elevates the equilibrium prices in offline channel while negatively affecting the equilibrium prices in other channel.(3)The effect of cost-sharing shows relative uniformity across the various alliance models.Across all configurations,cost-sharing tends to reduce the manufacturer’s profits.Nonetheless,alliances initiated by the manufacturer can counteract these negative impacts,providing a strategic pathway to bolster CLSC profitability.
基金We gratefully acknowledge anonymous reviewers who read drafts and made many helpful suggestions.This work is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program No.2018YFC0807002.
文摘Edge computing devices are widely deployed.An important issue that arises is in that these devices suffer from security attacks.To deal with it,we turn to the blockchain technologies.The note in the alliance chain need rules to limit write permissions.Alliance chain can provide security management functions,using these functions to meet the management between the members,certification,authorization,monitoring and auditing.This article mainly analyzes some requirements realization which applies to the alliance chain,and introduces a new consensus algorithm,generalized Legendre sequence(GLS)consensus algorithm,for alliance chain.GLS algorithms inherit the recognition and verification efficiency of binary sequence ciphers in computer communication and can solve a large number of nodes verification of key distribution issues.In the alliance chain,GLS consensus algorithm can complete node address hiding,automatic task sorting,task automatic grouping,task node scope confirmation,task address binding and stamp timestamp.Moreover,the GLS consensus algorithm increases the difficulty of network malicious attack.
