Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning： Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

This paper discusses a neglected theme in Wittgenstein＇s writings on meaning and psychology from the early 1930s until 1949. Throughout this period Wittgenstein deals with aspects of meaning of words and pictures that cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms but have to be related to experience and perception. Wittgenstein＇s reading of William James, I argue, has sharpened his eye for the many pitfalls in coming to terms with this experiential notion of meaning. James＇s treatment of experiences of meaning succumbs to the temptation to postulate ~~meaning-bodies,＂ bearers of meaning apart from the way and context in which we use the particular words. I argue that the conflation of what Wittgenstein calls the transitive and intransitive use of words is at the root of postulating meaning-bodies. I also argue that contemporary treatments of experiences of meaning are similarly vulnerable to James＇s confusion.