This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,...This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007-2017 period.Our key findings suggest that managers’shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’financial misreporting,and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance.Furthermore,managers’motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises(nonSOEs),suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the"absence of ownership"problem believed to affect SOEs.Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.展开更多
Can peer-to-peer lending platforms mitigate fraudulent behaviors?Or have lending players been acting similar to free-riders?This paper constructs a new proxy to investigate lending platform misconduct and compares the...Can peer-to-peer lending platforms mitigate fraudulent behaviors?Or have lending players been acting similar to free-riders?This paper constructs a new proxy to investigate lending platform misconduct and compares the FICO score and the LendingClub credit grade.To examine whether the lack of verification by the Fintech platform affects lenders’collection performance,I explore the recovery rate(RR)of non-performing loans through a mixed-continuous model.The regression results show that the degree of prudence taken by the lending platform in the pre-screening activity negatively affects the detection of some misreporting borrowers.I also find that the Fintech platform’s missing verification information(e.g.,annual income and employment length)affects the RR of non-performing loans,thereby hampering lenders’collection performance.展开更多
文摘This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007-2017 period.Our key findings suggest that managers’shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’financial misreporting,and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance.Furthermore,managers’motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises(nonSOEs),suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the"absence of ownership"problem believed to affect SOEs.Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.
文摘Can peer-to-peer lending platforms mitigate fraudulent behaviors?Or have lending players been acting similar to free-riders?This paper constructs a new proxy to investigate lending platform misconduct and compares the FICO score and the LendingClub credit grade.To examine whether the lack of verification by the Fintech platform affects lenders’collection performance,I explore the recovery rate(RR)of non-performing loans through a mixed-continuous model.The regression results show that the degree of prudence taken by the lending platform in the pre-screening activity negatively affects the detection of some misreporting borrowers.I also find that the Fintech platform’s missing verification information(e.g.,annual income and employment length)affects the RR of non-performing loans,thereby hampering lenders’collection performance.
