GAMES ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE PRICING UNDER CONSIDERING MORAL HAZARD

This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.

Study on the Price Design and Contract Stability of "Company + Farmer" Model with Time Preference under Double Moral Hazards

The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.

Trade credit contracting in a risk-averse supply chain under adverse selection and moral hazard

Trade credit,as an effective tool for integrating and coordinating material,information,and financial flows in supply chain management,is becoming increasingly widespread.We explore how a manufacturer can design optimal trade credit contracts when a risk-averse retailer hides its sales cost information(adverse selection)and selling effort level(moral hazard).We develop incentive models for a risk-averse supply chain when adverse selection and moral hazard coexist,which are then compared with the results under single information asymmetry(moral hazard).Moreover,we analyze the effects of private information and risk-aversion coefficient on contract parameters,selling effort level and the profit or utility of the supply chain.The study shows that when the degree of retailer’s risk aversion is within a certain range,reasonable trade credit contracts designed by the manufacturer can effectively induce the retailer to report its real sales cost and encourage it to exert appropriate effort.Furthermore,we find that the optimal trade credit period,optimal transfer payment,and retailer’s optimal sales effort level under dual information asymmetry are less than those under single information asymmetry.Numerical analysis are conducted to demonstrate the effects of the parameters on decisions and profits.

The Effect of Reputation to the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Market with Game Theory

It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and reduces the efficiency of total market. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between buyer and seller in C2C e-market;because of the influence of information asymmetry, many customers suffered from being cheated by sellers with defective products in practice. These frequent cases will deteriorate long term relationship between sellers and buyers. Here we focus on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on oral risk with repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both firms and customers effectively avoid morality risk and realize a win-win situation.

Venture Capital Finance-Eliminating Double Sided Moral Hazards through Trade-off between Economic and Behavioural Economic Aspects-A Case Analysis

Venture capital finance has two aspects,the economic aspect and the behavioural economic aspect.The economic aspect includes issues such as conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist(VC),asymmetric information,moral hazard,and compensation issues for both the parties.The behavioural economic aspect is related to relational factors such as empathy and a feeling of fairness and trust shown by both the parties.Therefore,while deciding the financer,entrepreneur should consider both relational aspect and value add services of the financier and strike optimal trade-off.The ensuing case analysis has been carried out focusing on elimination of double-sided moral hazards through a proper trade-off between economy and behavioural economic theories(aspects).The performance of the venture can be enhanced by balancing both of these theories in practice.An equity distribution that represents economic reward is a source of motivation for both the parties to put optimal efforts towards the success of the venture.This was seen in the case analysis,when the parties perceived the initial equity distribution agreement as fair,the satisfaction level of all the parties increased,leading to the reduction in the possibility of double-sided moral hazard and ensuring the success of the venture.Moreover,the analysis shows that information sharing and two-way communication increases trust and improves decision quality.It further focusses on how feedback and proper work distribution results in efficiency of performance for each of the stakeholders,leading to reduced probability of double-sided moral hazards.

Prevention of the Member＇s Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Alliance

Moral hazard is an important factor threatening stability of dynamic alliance. Firstly, the paper describes the problem of moral hazard in dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole Model of moral hazard prevention. Then, by introducing a third-party system into dynamic alliance, a model of incomplete information dynamic game theory is formulated in the principal-agent framework. The model shows the dynamic consistency between a member＇s income and the dynamic alliance＇s profit, and that moral hazard can be prevented by an allocation policy With both characteristics of incentive measures and supervision, which is designed by a third-party system. Finally, the composition of the third-party system is discussed.

A PENALTY FUNCTION METHOD FOR THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM WITH AN INFINITE NUMBER OF INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINTS UNDER MORAL HAZARD

In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.

The Association of Hepatitis B Vaccine Supply Policy with Timing of Receipt of the First Dose of Hepatitis B Vaccination

An estimated 800,000 - 1.4 million persons in the US have chronic hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection. The risk for chronic infection is greatest among young children;approximately 90% of infants will remain chronically infected with HBV. Approximately 25% of those who become chronically infected during childhood die prematurely from cirrhosis or liver cancer. Hepatitis B vaccination is the most effective measure to prevent HBV infection and its consequences. In 2006, 29 US states had Hepatitis B Vaccine Supply (HBVS) policy which either supplies hepatitis B vaccine at no cost to all providers for all children or provides hepatitis B vaccine to delivery hospitals-only free of charge for all infants;other 21 US states and the District of Columbia did not have. 17,636 infants born in 2006 obtained from 2007-2009 National Immunization Survey (NIS) were analyzed with survival analysis procedures of Kaplan-Meier estimate and Cox proportional hazards model for complex sample survey to evaluate the association between state HBVS policy and the timing of infant age in days to receipt of hepatitis B vaccination. State HBVS policy is associated with infant age in days from birth to receipt of the first dose of hepatitis B vaccine (P < 0.01), and to completion of the 3-dose hepatitis B vaccine series (P < 0.01). Receipt of the first dose of hepatitis B vaccine occurred 31% earlier among infants residing in states with HBVS policy than among infants residing in states without (adjusted hazards ratio 1.31, 95%CI (1.23, 1.39)). Completion of the 3-dose hepatitis B vaccine series were 12% sooner among infants living in states with HBVS policy than among infants living in states without (adjusted hazards ratio 1.12, 95%CI (1.06, 1.18)). State HBVS policy may help overcome barriers to timely delivery of hepatitis B vaccines to infants.

Analysis of Moral Hazard in Engineering Agent Construction System

Analyze the moral hazard issues in the construction agency system,and enumerate the performance of moral hazard.Deeply analyze the causes,start with strengthening supervision and perfecting incentive measures,eliminate the impact of moral hazard,and give play to the advantages of agent construction.

The Application and Modification of Delegation-Agent Model in Agricultural Insurance

The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ11[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ11c'(a*)u(s(π)) at the present stage when the information is symmetric.While the information is asymmetric,the first order optimal condition changed into v'(π-s(π))u'(s(π))=λ21+μ21(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a)).In other words,the higher the output,the more and more income of insured.The paper also modifies the models,when the information is symmetric,the insurers determine the effort level of insured-a* based on the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ12[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ12h'(a*)u(s(π));to the contrary,the first order optimal condition would change into v'(π*-s(π*))u'(s(π*))=λ22+μ22(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a))-λh(a)f(π,a)-μh'(a)f(π,a).The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured(agricultural producers).If the insured manage the objects of insurance more seriously,the rate of disasters would be lowered.Therefore,the insurance claimed against the insured would be lessened,and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.

The Secret Salary—Corporate Governance of Pension Contributions to Members of the Management Boards in Dax-30 Enterprises in Germany in the Years 2015 and 2016

The salaries of the chief executive officers of the DAX-30 enterprises are often in the spotlight of the public and the general discussion.By contrast,the pension contributions for the members of the management boards of the DAX-30 enterprises are mostly below the radar,although they have become increasingly more significant during the past years.In spite of the given transparency by the German Corporate Governance Code(the“code”)and its obliging conversion into the management remuneration disclosure law(VorstOG),the pension contributions have not moved in the spotlights of the public and their attention.The illustration of the extent of the pension contributions for DAX-30 enterprises shows the quintessential point of this investigation.Additionally,their administrative forms are discussed,implied moral hazard problems are illuminated,and malus regulations for pension contributions are examined.The result of the investigation will contain recommendations for supervisory boards and the government commission of the German Corporate Governance Code as well as ideas for further research.

环境污染责任保险与企业ESG表现

作为绿色金融工具的环境污染责任保险会提升企业ESG表现,还是适得其反?本文根据环责险投保企业名单,结合沪深A股上市企业2009—2022年数据,探讨了企业投保环责险与ESG表现之间的关系。研究发现,企业投保环责险存在道德风险,在将可能的环境污染赔偿转嫁给保险公司后,企业会减弱环境治理动机和增加“漂绿”行为,从而导致ESG表现下降。异质性分析表明,外部治理监督能约束投保企业的道德风险,内部兼顾环境保护的经营目标和充足的绿色投入是企业进行环境治理的保障,因此在公众环境关注度和环境规制水平较高、环境执法力度较强的地区,重污染行业和竞争程度较低的行业中,以及国有企业和外部关注度较高的企业中,投保环责险对企业ESG表现的负面效应较弱。进一步分析发现,投保环责险对企业ESG表现的负面效应主要集中于环境和公司治理维度,投资者对企业购买环责险的短期市场反应显著为负。基于上述发现,本文建议进一步完善环保领域的法律法规体系,提高环境规制水平和环境执法力度,同时优化环责险产品设计,根据事故发生率等因素实行差别化保险费率和理赔标准。

Research on Credit Default Swaps Pricing Considering Moral Hazard Incentive under Reduce-Form Model

Equilibrium pricing of credit default swaps(CDS)promotes efficient identification of credit risk in the market,which in turn leads to efficient allocation of resources.However,even when CDS have been priced in equilibrium,i.e.,when premiums are equal to anticipated payments,the moral hazard incentives of CDS buyers increase with CDS transactions.Consequentially,it becomes an interesting research direction to study the impact of moral hazard incentives on the trading mechanism or pricing of derivatives(CDS).Most of the existing literature on the impact of moral hazard incentives in CDS pricing on derivatives trading mechanisms takes a macro perspective and focuses on the agreement risk effect.The literature exploring the analysis of the impact of moral hazard on the probability of agreement default from a micro perspective is not yet available.With this in mind,this paper focuses on the mechanisms by which“fraud”,an extreme manifestation of micro-moral hazard incentives,affects the probability of default.This paper introduces for the first time the concept of“claiming fraud”by credit protection buyers,which is different from the macro perspective of moral hazard incentives,and thus defines a specific extreme form of moral hazard incentives.Meanwhile,to address the intrinsic feature of the lack of economic explanatory power of the reduce-form model,this paper introduces a moral hazard incentive factor into the reduce-form model,and proposes a moral hazard state variable as a function of the asset value of the reference entity,which gives the reduce-form model strong economic explanatory power,and the default predictability is reduced by the description of the reduce-form model.In terms of the object of study,this paper considers the issue of moral hazard incentives in the presence of claiming fraud in two reference entities to further explore the impact of moral hazard incentives on default protection at the micro level in terms of cyclic default.Finally,based on the analysis of the results of the numerical simulation experiments,it is proposed that increasing the number of reference assets for CDS buyers will help to reduce the moral hazard incentives of the buyer,and thus the anticipated payments to the buyer,i.e.,we attempt to endogenize the credit risk of an asset by allowing the asset holder to choose the probability of the asset going up or down,which helps to understand the phenomenon of moral hazard incentives in CDS trading.

大湾区给排水企业安全智能化体系建设思路探讨

为有效提升给排水企业安全管理成效,探索采用新一代信息化技术成果转化搭建给排水企业“智能化”安全管理平台,加速智能化深度融入安全生产核心业务,减少安全事故发生。结合大湾区现有给排水企业工程实践数据与信息化研究成果,从概念与框架、执行指标与子系统、建设要求3个方面分析给排水企业安全智能化体系的建设思路,介绍了政策法规合规管理、教育培训管理、安全要素管理、隐患排查管理、应急事件管理、统计分析及分级管控等子系统在施工、运营、维护等环节中的应用,对给排水企业智能化发展趋势、技术路线和发展过程中面临的挑战进行了分析,以期为给排水企业未来可持续发展提供参考。

Research on a Kind of Double-sided Moral Hazard Problem

This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.

J. M. Keynes＇ paradox： The saving glut

The present paper offers an opportunity to explore Keynes＇ contribution to our understanding of crisis by returning to him seminal contribution in the theory of the effective demand. The analysis contrasts this approach with the neoclassical orthodoxy regarding the theory of the interest rate and the relation between saving and investment. The author poses the fundamental question： Can a policy of stimulating saving promote investment？ By using the ＂Saving Paradox＂ presented in chapter sixteen, as a framework for interpreting Bernanke＇s description of the saving glut and the current account deficit of the U.S. economy, the author offers an answer that is useful for understanding the current situation. The author also shows how moral hazard plays a significant role in the current crisis.

融资道德风险下订单农业供应链成员信任决策研究

基于订单农业供应链中农户转移资金用途的道德风险问题,考虑农户受资金约束和农户互惠动机,构建公司与农户的序贯互惠信任博弈模型,通过农户完全理性、农户具有互惠动机但公司不提供担保融资、农户具有互惠动机且公司提供担保融资3种情形,分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对供应链成员信任的影响及信任决策问题.结果发现:当公司不提供担保融资时,无论农户是否具有互惠动机,双方都不能建立信任互惠关系;当公司提供担保融资且农户具有互惠动机时,则存在3种序贯互惠均衡,在互惠动机满足一定条件时可以实现双方互信;最后,通过算例分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对农户互惠敏感程度和守信用概率的影响,提出增强农户互惠动机,设置合理的利益共享和监督机制及丰富订单农业融资服务等建议.

DRG付费下医疗服务供方道德风险表现与防范对策

目的:梳理医保支付方式改革下医疗服务供方道德风险的行为表现,提出防范的对策建议。方法:收集35家样本医院DRG结算数据,对编码人员进行问卷调查,对相关部门工作人员进行访谈,探究医疗服务供方道德风险的疑点与特征。结果:DRG付费引发医疗服务供方新的道德风险行为,在医疗服务前期、中期、后期有不同的表现形式,给患者、医保基金和医疗机构造成了不利影响。结论:DRG付费下要加强对医疗服务供方监管,创新监管模式,完善医保沟通渠道,建立协商谈判机制,加强诊疗规范,提高编码能力,防范新型道德风险行为。

浅析共享单车市场的逆向选择和道德风险——以ofo共享单车为例

从2016年底开始,国内的共享单车忽然就火了起来.目前,各个大城市的路边上排满多种样式和不同颜色的共享单车.共享单车通过当前很流行的互联网+,然后整合线下的社会资源,抓住人们在现实生活中的'最后1公里'的出行这一特点,共享单车企业各自以不同的方式竞争和获益.但是,共享单车在市场中却面临着逆向选择和道德风险的问题.对此,本文针对共享单车面临的问题进行分析并提出相应的合理的建议.

医疗保险会引致道德风险吗?——以城乡居民医保为例

文章使用2005—2018年中国老年健康影响因素跟踪调查的五期平衡面板数据,使用双向固定效应模型,分析参加城乡居民医保对老年人道德风险的影响。研究发现,参保并不会引致老年人不健康行为增多的事前道德风险,但会带来医疗费用支出上涨的事后道德风险;年龄越小、健康状况变差的老年人在参保后更易出现医疗费用支出上涨的事后道德风险;相较于城镇居民医保,老年人在参加新农合后更易出现医疗费用支出上涨的事后道德风险,参保引致的事后道德风险主要来源于门诊支出上涨。这启示我们一是要清晰认识医疗卫生政策评估的多维属性,二是要创新城乡居民基本医疗保险制度的发展理念。