It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the...It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and reduces the efficiency of total market. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between buyer and seller in C2C e-market;because of the influence of information asymmetry, many customers suffered from being cheated by sellers with defective products in practice. These frequent cases will deteriorate long term relationship between sellers and buyers. Here we focus on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on oral risk with repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both firms and customers effectively avoid morality risk and realize a win-win situation.展开更多
The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal...The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ11[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ11c'(a*)u(s(π)) at the present stage when the information is symmetric.While the information is asymmetric,the first order optimal condition changed into v'(π-s(π))u'(s(π))=λ21+μ21(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a)).In other words,the higher the output,the more and more income of insured.The paper also modifies the models,when the information is symmetric,the insurers determine the effort level of insured-a* based on the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ12[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ12h'(a*)u(s(π));to the contrary,the first order optimal condition would change into v'(π*-s(π*))u'(s(π*))=λ22+μ22(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a))-λh(a)f(π,a)-μh'(a)f(π,a).The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured(agricultural producers).If the insured manage the objects of insurance more seriously,the rate of disasters would be lowered.Therefore,the insurance claimed against the insured would be lessened,and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.展开更多
文摘It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and reduces the efficiency of total market. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between buyer and seller in C2C e-market;because of the influence of information asymmetry, many customers suffered from being cheated by sellers with defective products in practice. These frequent cases will deteriorate long term relationship between sellers and buyers. Here we focus on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on oral risk with repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both firms and customers effectively avoid morality risk and realize a win-win situation.
文摘The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ11[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ11c'(a*)u(s(π)) at the present stage when the information is symmetric.While the information is asymmetric,the first order optimal condition changed into v'(π-s(π))u'(s(π))=λ21+μ21(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a)).In other words,the higher the output,the more and more income of insured.The paper also modifies the models,when the information is symmetric,the insurers determine the effort level of insured-a* based on the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ12[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ12h'(a*)u(s(π));to the contrary,the first order optimal condition would change into v'(π*-s(π*))u'(s(π*))=λ22+μ22(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a))-λh(a)f(π,a)-μh'(a)f(π,a).The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured(agricultural producers).If the insured manage the objects of insurance more seriously,the rate of disasters would be lowered.Therefore,the insurance claimed against the insured would be lessened,and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.
