Contemporary liberal theory on moral rights argues that moral rights associated with personal liberty constitute a strong constraint on the boundaries of state power.Therefore,the core issue of the penalty justificati...Contemporary liberal theory on moral rights argues that moral rights associated with personal liberty constitute a strong constraint on the boundaries of state power.Therefore,the core issue of the penalty justification is not the purpose of the penalty,but the reason for the penalty to refrain from infringing on the moral rights of individuals.In order to justify the penal system,scholars have explored solutions such as limiting the content of rights,waiving rights,and finally rights forfeiture.However,the concept of rights forfeiture cannot be reasonably integrated into the framework of the liberal theory of moral rights.The failure of these attempts stems from the patchwork understanding of rights presupposed by the liberal theory of moral rights.There is another systematic way of understanding rights that offers a better justification.Individual rights are not an independent non-derivative moral justification,and both individual rights and the penal power of the state are only part of a specific(realistic or ideal)system of rules that collectively serve certain values.The real question of penalty justification is not why the punishment does not infringe on the moral rights of individuals,but whether the overall institutional arrangements,including the penal system,are justifiable for all citizens,including the punished.展开更多
In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an i...In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.展开更多
发布/订阅系统技术具有异步、松散耦合和多对多通信的特点,有着广阔的应用前景.但是,已有的发布/订阅系统技术不能满足动态环境下有延迟需求的应用要求.针对时间约束问题,扩展了发布/订阅系统的语法,建立了延迟模型,提出了一种基于收益...发布/订阅系统技术具有异步、松散耦合和多对多通信的特点,有着广阔的应用前景.但是,已有的发布/订阅系统技术不能满足动态环境下有延迟需求的应用要求.针对时间约束问题,扩展了发布/订阅系统的语法,建立了延迟模型,提出了一种基于收益机制的分布式发布/订阅系统时间约束保障技术和使系统获益最大化的调度算法MTEP(maximum total earning priority),其特点是能够满足订阅者和发布者指定延迟约束的需求,通过与订阅者商定的价格和违约成本信息来有效地利用网络带宽,适应网络环境的动态变化.实验结果表明,该调度策略和FCFS(first come first service)、最短时间优先和固定优先级等传统策略相比,可使订阅者接收到的有效事件明显增多,并使系统收益显著改善.展开更多
基金the phased achievement of the 2023university(college)-level research program of the Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C(National Academy of Governance):Research on the Legal Foundation of Digital Human Rights and Its Legal Guarantee Approaches。
文摘Contemporary liberal theory on moral rights argues that moral rights associated with personal liberty constitute a strong constraint on the boundaries of state power.Therefore,the core issue of the penalty justification is not the purpose of the penalty,but the reason for the penalty to refrain from infringing on the moral rights of individuals.In order to justify the penal system,scholars have explored solutions such as limiting the content of rights,waiving rights,and finally rights forfeiture.However,the concept of rights forfeiture cannot be reasonably integrated into the framework of the liberal theory of moral rights.The failure of these attempts stems from the patchwork understanding of rights presupposed by the liberal theory of moral rights.There is another systematic way of understanding rights that offers a better justification.Individual rights are not an independent non-derivative moral justification,and both individual rights and the penal power of the state are only part of a specific(realistic or ideal)system of rules that collectively serve certain values.The real question of penalty justification is not why the punishment does not infringe on the moral rights of individuals,but whether the overall institutional arrangements,including the penal system,are justifiable for all citizens,including the punished.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(72031009 and 71871171)the National Social Science Foundation of China(20&ZD058).
文摘In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60573126(国家自然科学基金)the National High-Tech Research and Development Plan of China under Grant Nos.2007AA04Z148, 2007AAO1Z149(国家高技术研究发展计划(863))the National Basic Research Program of China under Grant No.2002CB312005(国家重点基础研究发展计划(973))
文摘发布/订阅系统技术具有异步、松散耦合和多对多通信的特点,有着广阔的应用前景.但是,已有的发布/订阅系统技术不能满足动态环境下有延迟需求的应用要求.针对时间约束问题,扩展了发布/订阅系统的语法,建立了延迟模型,提出了一种基于收益机制的分布式发布/订阅系统时间约束保障技术和使系统获益最大化的调度算法MTEP(maximum total earning priority),其特点是能够满足订阅者和发布者指定延迟约束的需求,通过与订阅者商定的价格和违约成本信息来有效地利用网络带宽,适应网络环境的动态变化.实验结果表明,该调度策略和FCFS(first come first service)、最短时间优先和固定优先级等传统策略相比,可使订阅者接收到的有效事件明显增多,并使系统收益显著改善.
