Auction was widely used to tackle spectrum allocation and sharing in the secondary market under the condition of spectrum scarcity. In real communication system, such as broadband communication, the utilization of spe...Auction was widely used to tackle spectrum allocation and sharing in the secondary market under the condition of spectrum scarcity. In real communication system, such as broadband communication, the utilization of spectrum resource is various because of different requirements and complex application scenarios. So, these schemes cannot be directly applied to the above wireless communication system. To solve this problem, a new model where sellers/buyers can sell/buy multi-unit for heterogeneous spectrum was proposed and a truthful multi-unit double auction framework was designed for heterogeneous spectrum trading. A valuation function is first applied to represent the buyer's true valuation of the sub-band and reflect the buyer's satisfaction degree and a novel concept termed ‘virtual player' was introduced. Then the buyer group was constructed based on the conflict graph to reuse the same spectrum among interference-free buyers in both spatial and temporal domains. The winner determination strategy and algorithm of clearing price were designed elaborately. According to the theoretical analysis, the scheme can satisfy three critical economic properties: truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Finally, simulation results show that the proposed scheme can achieve better user satisfaction, auction efficiency and spectrum reuse rate for the real communication system. The proposed auction framework is practical and effective.展开更多
In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is a...In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. Besides the privacy-preserving issue, the performance guarantee of social efficiency maximization is also crucial for auction mechanism design. In this paper, we study the auction mechanisms that consider the above two aspects. We discuss two multi-unit auction models： the identical multiple-items auction and the distinct multiple-items auction.Since the problem of determining a multi-unit auction mechanism that can maximize its social efficiency is NPhard, we design a series of nearly optimal multi-unit auction mechanisms for the proposed models. We prove that the proposed auction mechanisms are strategyproof. Moreover, we also prove that the privacy of bid value from each bidder can be preserved in the auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the strategyproof multi-unit auction mechanisms that simultaneously consider privacy preservation and social efficiency maximization. The extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanisms have low computation and communication overheads.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61531007,51877010)
文摘Auction was widely used to tackle spectrum allocation and sharing in the secondary market under the condition of spectrum scarcity. In real communication system, such as broadband communication, the utilization of spectrum resource is various because of different requirements and complex application scenarios. So, these schemes cannot be directly applied to the above wireless communication system. To solve this problem, a new model where sellers/buyers can sell/buy multi-unit for heterogeneous spectrum was proposed and a truthful multi-unit double auction framework was designed for heterogeneous spectrum trading. A valuation function is first applied to represent the buyer's true valuation of the sub-band and reflect the buyer's satisfaction degree and a novel concept termed ‘virtual player' was introduced. Then the buyer group was constructed based on the conflict graph to reuse the same spectrum among interference-free buyers in both spatial and temporal domains. The winner determination strategy and algorithm of clearing price were designed elaborately. According to the theoretical analysis, the scheme can satisfy three critical economic properties: truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Finally, simulation results show that the proposed scheme can achieve better user satisfaction, auction efficiency and spectrum reuse rate for the real communication system. The proposed auction framework is practical and effective.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61572342 and 61672369)the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (Nos. BK20151240 and BK20161258)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Nos. 2015M580470 and 2016M591920)
文摘In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. Besides the privacy-preserving issue, the performance guarantee of social efficiency maximization is also crucial for auction mechanism design. In this paper, we study the auction mechanisms that consider the above two aspects. We discuss two multi-unit auction models： the identical multiple-items auction and the distinct multiple-items auction.Since the problem of determining a multi-unit auction mechanism that can maximize its social efficiency is NPhard, we design a series of nearly optimal multi-unit auction mechanisms for the proposed models. We prove that the proposed auction mechanisms are strategyproof. Moreover, we also prove that the privacy of bid value from each bidder can be preserved in the auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the strategyproof multi-unit auction mechanisms that simultaneously consider privacy preservation and social efficiency maximization. The extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanisms have low computation and communication overheads.
