A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procur...A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.展开更多
In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria ...In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.展开更多
To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method ...To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.展开更多
In this paper, we study the optimal procurement management by reverse auctions for a price-setting newsvendor(retailer) in a single period setting. The retailer facing price-dependent stochastic demand first designs a...In this paper, we study the optimal procurement management by reverse auctions for a price-setting newsvendor(retailer) in a single period setting. The retailer facing price-dependent stochastic demand first designs a procurement contract and then invites the suppliers to bid for this contract in the reverse auction. The winning supplier produces and delivers the demanded quantity.The retailer obtains the procurement quantity and simultaneously determines the retail price. By using the price elasticity of the lost-sales rate, we show that the retailer’s expected profit(excluding the procurement cost) is a concave function of the purchased quantity, which can be used to obtain the optimal procurement and retail pricing decisions for the retailer. Further, when the underlying random term of demand function is normally distributed under left-truncation(at 0), we get the analytical expressions of the purchased quantity and expected profit function for the retailer. Moreover, some numerical examples are given.展开更多
This paper presents a comparison mechanism for a simple procurement auction and generalized Nash bargaining solution in a procurement circumstance. The buyer who hopes to fulfill a project has two options. First, she ...This paper presents a comparison mechanism for a simple procurement auction and generalized Nash bargaining solution in a procurement circumstance. The buyer who hopes to fulfill a project has two options. First, she may award the project to the old provider with an efficient quality by bargaining Second, she may give the project to the firm who submits the lowest bid through a simple procurement second-price sealed-bid auction with a pre-fixed quality. We compare the expected revenue in the auction with the deterministic profit of the bargaining. In different parameters cases, we find the borderline functions between the two options with respect to the buyer＇s bargaining power and the amount of bidders. We also compare our simple procurement auction （SPA） with the optimal multidimensional bid auction by Che （1993）, and find our model protects the buyer＇s private valuation information by forfeiting some profits. Some properties of the difference between the two auctions are proposed, especially there is no revenue difference when the amount of bidders approaches infinity.展开更多
One of the remarkable features of the next generation network is the integration of heterogeneous wireless networks, which enables mobile users with multi-mode terminals access to the best available network seamlessly...One of the remarkable features of the next generation network is the integration of heterogeneous wireless networks, which enables mobile users with multi-mode terminals access to the best available network seamlessly. However, most of previous work only takes account of either maximizing single user＇s utility or the whole network＇s payoff, rarely considers the negotiation between them. In this paper, we propose a novel network selection approach using improved multiplicative multi-attribute auction （MMA）. At first, an improved MMA method is put forward to define the user＇s utility. Additionally, user cost is defined by considering allocated bandwidth, network load intensity and cost factor parameter. And last the best suitable network is selected according to the user＇s performance-cost-ration. Simulation results confirm that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing scheme in terms of network selection＇s fairness, user＇s performance-cost-ration, load balancing and the number of accommodated users.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(7127105171371002+1 种基金71471032)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,NEU,China(N140607001)
文摘A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70231010 and No.70321001)
文摘In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.
基金supported by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation of China under Grant No. 200159National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 70571014
文摘To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.
基金Supported by Hunan Provincial Department of Education Fund(20A485,19K093)National Center for Applied Mathematics in Hunan Province。
文摘In this paper, we study the optimal procurement management by reverse auctions for a price-setting newsvendor(retailer) in a single period setting. The retailer facing price-dependent stochastic demand first designs a procurement contract and then invites the suppliers to bid for this contract in the reverse auction. The winning supplier produces and delivers the demanded quantity.The retailer obtains the procurement quantity and simultaneously determines the retail price. By using the price elasticity of the lost-sales rate, we show that the retailer’s expected profit(excluding the procurement cost) is a concave function of the purchased quantity, which can be used to obtain the optimal procurement and retail pricing decisions for the retailer. Further, when the underlying random term of demand function is normally distributed under left-truncation(at 0), we get the analytical expressions of the purchased quantity and expected profit function for the retailer. Moreover, some numerical examples are given.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 70701040
文摘This paper presents a comparison mechanism for a simple procurement auction and generalized Nash bargaining solution in a procurement circumstance. The buyer who hopes to fulfill a project has two options. First, she may award the project to the old provider with an efficient quality by bargaining Second, she may give the project to the firm who submits the lowest bid through a simple procurement second-price sealed-bid auction with a pre-fixed quality. We compare the expected revenue in the auction with the deterministic profit of the bargaining. In different parameters cases, we find the borderline functions between the two options with respect to the buyer＇s bargaining power and the amount of bidders. We also compare our simple procurement auction （SPA） with the optimal multidimensional bid auction by Che （1993）, and find our model protects the buyer＇s private valuation information by forfeiting some profits. Some properties of the difference between the two auctions are proposed, especially there is no revenue difference when the amount of bidders approaches infinity.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Funds of China for Young Scholar (61001115)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China (2012RC0126,2011RC0110)
文摘One of the remarkable features of the next generation network is the integration of heterogeneous wireless networks, which enables mobile users with multi-mode terminals access to the best available network seamlessly. However, most of previous work only takes account of either maximizing single user＇s utility or the whole network＇s payoff, rarely considers the negotiation between them. In this paper, we propose a novel network selection approach using improved multiplicative multi-attribute auction （MMA）. At first, an improved MMA method is put forward to define the user＇s utility. Additionally, user cost is defined by considering allocated bandwidth, network load intensity and cost factor parameter. And last the best suitable network is selected according to the user＇s performance-cost-ration. Simulation results confirm that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing scheme in terms of network selection＇s fairness, user＇s performance-cost-ration, load balancing and the number of accommodated users.
