In this paper we derive a multi-choice TU game from r-replica of exchange economy with continuous, concave and monetary utility functions, and prove that the cores of the games converge to a subset of the set of Edgew...In this paper we derive a multi-choice TU game from r-replica of exchange economy with continuous, concave and monetary utility functions, and prove that the cores of the games converge to a subset of the set of Edgeworth equilibria of exchange economy as r approaches to infinity. We prove that the dominance core of each balanced multi-choice TU game, where each player has identical activity level r, coincides with the dominance core of its corresponding r-replica of exchange economy. We also give an extension of the concept of the cover of the game proposed by Shapley and Shubik （J Econ Theory 1： 9-25, 1969） to multi-choice TU games and derive some sufficient conditions for the nonemptyness of the core of multi-choice TU game by using the relationship among replica economies, multi-choice TU games and their covers.展开更多
In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core...In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.展开更多
基金Supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Hebei Province of China(A2014205152)
文摘In this paper we derive a multi-choice TU game from r-replica of exchange economy with continuous, concave and monetary utility functions, and prove that the cores of the games converge to a subset of the set of Edgeworth equilibria of exchange economy as r approaches to infinity. We prove that the dominance core of each balanced multi-choice TU game, where each player has identical activity level r, coincides with the dominance core of its corresponding r-replica of exchange economy. We also give an extension of the concept of the cover of the game proposed by Shapley and Shubik （J Econ Theory 1： 9-25, 1969） to multi-choice TU games and derive some sufficient conditions for the nonemptyness of the core of multi-choice TU game by using the relationship among replica economies, multi-choice TU games and their covers.
文摘In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.
