This paper investigates a wireless powered and backscattering enabled sensor network based on the non-linear energy harvesting model, where the power beacon(PB) delivers energy signals to wireless sensors to enable th...This paper investigates a wireless powered and backscattering enabled sensor network based on the non-linear energy harvesting model, where the power beacon(PB) delivers energy signals to wireless sensors to enable their passive backscattering and active transmission to the access point(AP). We propose an efficient time scheduling scheme for network performance enhancement, based on which each sensor can always harvest energy from the PB over the entire block except its time slots allocated for passive and active information delivery. Considering the PB and wireless sensors are from two selfish service providers, we use the Stackelberg game to model the energy interaction among them. To address the non-convexity of the leader-level problem, we propose to decompose the original problem into two subproblems and solve them iteratively in an alternating manner. Specifically, the successive convex approximation, semi-definite relaxation(SDR) and variable substitution techniques are applied to find a nearoptimal solution. To evaluate the performance loss caused by the interaction between two providers, we further investigate the social welfare maximization problem. Numerical results demonstrate that compared to the benchmark schemes, the proposed scheme can achieve up to 35.4% and 38.7% utility gain for the leader and the follower, respectively.展开更多
With the development of renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaics and wind power,it has become a research hotspot to improve the consumption rate of new energy and reduce energy costs through the deployment ...With the development of renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaics and wind power,it has become a research hotspot to improve the consumption rate of new energy and reduce energy costs through the deployment of energy storage.To solve the problem of the interests of different subjects in the operation of the energy storage power stations(ESS)and the integrated energy multi-microgrid alliance(IEMA),this paper proposes the optimization operation method of the energy storage power station and the IEMA based on the Stackelberg game.In the upper layer,ESS optimizes charging and discharging decisions through a dynamic pricing mechanism.In the lower layer,IEMA optimizes the output of various energy conversion coupled devices within the IEMA,as well as energy interaction and demand response(DR),based on the energy interaction prices provided by ESS.The results demonstrate that the optimization strategy proposed in this paper not only effectively balances the benefits of the IEMA and ESS but also enhances energy consumption rates and reduces IEMA energy costs.展开更多
This paper mainly investigates the coordinated anti-jamming channel access problems in multiuser scenarios where there exists a tracking jammer who senses the spectrum and traces the channel with maximal receiving pow...This paper mainly investigates the coordinated anti-jamming channel access problems in multiuser scenarios where there exists a tracking jammer who senses the spectrum and traces the channel with maximal receiving power.To cope with the challenges brought by the tracking jammer,a multi-leader onefollower anti-jamming Stackelberg(MOAS)game is formulated,which is able to model the complex interactions between users and the tracking jammer.In the proposed game,users act as leaders,chose their channel access strategies and transmit firstly.The tracking jammer acts as the follower,whose objective is to find the optimal jamming strategy at each time slot.Besides,the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums(SEs)is proved,which means users reach Nash Equilibriums(NEs)for each jamming strategy while the jammer finds its best response jamming strategy for the current network access case.An active attraction based anti-jamming channel access(3ACA)algorithm is designed to reach SEs,where jammed users keep their channel access strategies unchanged to create access chances for other users.To enhance the fairness of the system,users will adjust their strategies and relearn after certain time slots to provide access chances for those users who sacrifice themselves to attract the tracking jammer.展开更多
Cold-chain logistics system(CCLS)plays the role of collecting and managing the logistics data of frozen food.However,there always exist problems of information loss,data tampering,and privacy leakage in traditional ce...Cold-chain logistics system(CCLS)plays the role of collecting and managing the logistics data of frozen food.However,there always exist problems of information loss,data tampering,and privacy leakage in traditional centralized systems,which influence frozen food security and people’s health.The centralized management form impedes the development of the cold-chain logistics industry and weakens logistics data availability.This paper first introduces a distributed CCLS based on blockchain technology to solve the centralized management problem.This system aggregates the production base,storage,transport,detection,processing,and consumer to form a cold-chain logistics union.The blockchain ledger guarantees that the logistics data cannot be tampered with and establishes a traceability mechanism for food safety incidents.Meanwhile,to improve the value of logistics data,a Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model has been proposed between the logistics data resource provider and the consumer.The competition between resource price and volume balances the resource supplement and consumption.This model can help to achieve an optimal resource price when the Stackelberg game obtains Nash equilibrium.The two participants also can maximize their revenues with the optimal resource price and volume by utilizing the backward induction method.Then,the performance evaluations of transaction throughput and latency show that the proposed distributed CCLS is more secure and stable.The simulations about the variation trend of data price and amount,optimal benefits,and total benefits comparison of different forms show that the resource allocation model is more efficient and practical.Moreover,the blockchain-based CCLS and Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model also can promote the value of logistic data and improve social benefits.展开更多
Demand response(DR)using shared energy storage systems(ESSs)is an appealing method to save electricity bills for users under demand charge and time-of-use(TOU)price.A novel Stackelberg-game-based ESS sharing scheme is...Demand response(DR)using shared energy storage systems(ESSs)is an appealing method to save electricity bills for users under demand charge and time-of-use(TOU)price.A novel Stackelberg-game-based ESS sharing scheme is proposed and analyzed in this study.In this scheme,the interactions between selfish users and an operator are characterized as a Stackelberg game.Operator holds a large-scale ESS that is shared among users in the form of energy transactions.It sells energy to users and sets the selling price first.It maximizes its profit through optimal pricing and ESS dispatching.Users purchase some energy from operator for the reduction of their demand charges after operator's selling price is announced.This game-theoretic ESS sharing scheme is characterized and analyzed by formulating and solving a bi-level optimization model.The upper-level optimization maximizes operator's profit and the lower-level optimization minimizes users'costs.The bi-level model is transformed and linearized into a mixed-integer linear programming(MILP)model using the mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints(MPEC)method and model linearizing techniques.Case studies with actual data are carried out to explore the economic performances of the proposed ESS sharing scheme.展开更多
With increasing reforms related to integrated energy systems(IESs),each energy subsystem,as a participant based on bounded rationality,significantly influences the optimal scheduling of the entire IES through mutual l...With increasing reforms related to integrated energy systems(IESs),each energy subsystem,as a participant based on bounded rationality,significantly influences the optimal scheduling of the entire IES through mutual learning and imitation.A reasonable multiagent joint operation strategy can help this system meet its low-carbon objectives.This paper proposes a bilayer low-carbon optimal operational strategy for an IES based on the Stackelberg master-slave game and multiagent joint operation.The studied IES includes cogeneration,power-to-gas,and carbon capture systems.Based on the Stackelberg master-slave game theory,sellers are used as leaders in the upper layer to set the prices of electricity and heat,while energy producers,energy storage providers,and load aggregators are used as followers in the lower layer to adjust the operational strategy of the system.An IES bilayer optimization model based on the Stackelberg master-slave game was developed.Finally,the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)condition and linear relaxation technology are used to convert the bilayer game model to a single layer.CPLEX,which is a mathematical program solver,is used to solve the equilibrium problem and the carbon emission trading cost of the system when the benefits of each subject reach maximum and to analyze the impact of different carbon emission trading prices and growth rates on the operational strategy of the system.As an experimental demonstration,we simulated an IES coupled with an IEEE 39-node electrical grid system,a six-node heat network system,and a six-node gas network system.The simulation results confirm the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed model.展开更多
To strengthen border patrol measures, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) are gradually used in many countries to detect illegal entries on borders. However, how to efficiently deploy limited UAVs to patrol on borders of l...To strengthen border patrol measures, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) are gradually used in many countries to detect illegal entries on borders. However, how to efficiently deploy limited UAVs to patrol on borders of large areas remains challenging. In this paper, we first model the problem of deploying UAVs for border patrol as a Stackelberg game. Two players are considered in this game: The border patrol agency is the leader,who optimizes the patrol path of UAVs to detect the illegal immigrant. The illegal immigrant is the follower, who selects a certain area of the border to pass through at a certain time after observing the leader’s strategy. Second, a compact linear programming problem is proposed to tackle the exponential growth of the number of leader’s strategies. Third, a method is proposed to reduce the size of the strategy space of the follower. Then, we provide some theoretic results to present the effect of parameters of the model on leader’s utilities. Experimental results demonstrate the positive effect of limited starting and ending areas of UAV’s patrolling conditions and multiple patrolling altitudes on the leader ’s utility, and show that the proposed solution outperforms two conventional patrol strategies and has strong robustness.展开更多
In the competitive energy market,energy retailers are facing the uncertainties of both energy price and demand,which requires them to formulate reasonable energy purchasing and selling strategies for improving their c...In the competitive energy market,energy retailers are facing the uncertainties of both energy price and demand,which requires them to formulate reasonable energy purchasing and selling strategies for improving their competitiveness in this market.Particularly,the attractive multi-energy retail packages are the key for retailers to increase their benefit.Therefore,combined with incentive means and price signals,five types of multi-energy retail packages such as peak-valley time-of-use(TOU)price package and day-night bundled price package are designed in this paper for retailers.The iterative interactions between retailers and end-users are modeled using a bi-level model of stochastic optimization based on multi-leader multi-follower(MLMF)Stackelberg game,in which retailers are leaders and end-users are followers.Retailers make decisions to maximize the profit considering the conditional value at risk(CVaR)while end-users optimize the satisfaction of both energy comfort and economy.Besides,a distributed algorithm is proposed to obtain the Nash equilibrium of above MLMF Stackelberg game model while the particle swarm optimization(PSO)algorithm and CPLEX solver are applied to solve the optimization model for each participant(retailer or end-user).Numeral results show that the designed retail packages can increase the overall profit of retailers,and the overall satisfaction of industrial users is the highest while that of residential users is the lowest after game interaction.展开更多
As the current global environment is deteriorating,distributed renewable energy is gradually becoming an important member of the energy internet.Blockchain,as a decentralized distributed ledger with decentralization,t...As the current global environment is deteriorating,distributed renewable energy is gradually becoming an important member of the energy internet.Blockchain,as a decentralized distributed ledger with decentralization,traceability and tamper-proof features,is an importantway to achieve efficient consumption andmulti-party supply of new energy.In this article,we establish a blockchain-based mathematical model of multiple microgrids and microgrid aggregators’revenue,consider the degree of microgrid users’preference for electricity thus increasing users’reliance on the blockchainmarket,and apply the one-master-multiple-slave Stackelberg game theory to solve the energy dispatching strategy when each market entity pursues the maximum revenue.The simulation results show that the blockchain-based dynamic game of the multi-microgrid market can effectively increase the revenue of both microgrids and aggregators and improve the utilization of renewable energy.展开更多
To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference a...To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference and external malicious jamming. A cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation method based on local altruistic is proposed to optimize UAVs’ channel selection. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is modeled to formulate the confrontation relationship between UAVs and the jammer. A local altruistic game is modeled with each UAV considering the utilities of both itself and other UAVs. A distributed cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the convergence of the proposed algorithm and the impact of the transmission power on the system loss value are analyzed, and the anti-jamming performance of the proposed algorithm can be improved by around 64% compared with the existing algorithms.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61901229 and No.62071242)the Project of Jiangsu Engineering Research Center of Novel Optical Fiber Technology and Communication Network(No.SDGC2234)+1 种基金the Open Research Project of Jiangsu Provincial Key Laboratory of Photonic and Electronic Materials Sciences and Technology(No.NJUZDS2022-008)the Post-Doctoral Research Supporting Program of Jiangsu Province(No.SBH20).
文摘This paper investigates a wireless powered and backscattering enabled sensor network based on the non-linear energy harvesting model, where the power beacon(PB) delivers energy signals to wireless sensors to enable their passive backscattering and active transmission to the access point(AP). We propose an efficient time scheduling scheme for network performance enhancement, based on which each sensor can always harvest energy from the PB over the entire block except its time slots allocated for passive and active information delivery. Considering the PB and wireless sensors are from two selfish service providers, we use the Stackelberg game to model the energy interaction among them. To address the non-convexity of the leader-level problem, we propose to decompose the original problem into two subproblems and solve them iteratively in an alternating manner. Specifically, the successive convex approximation, semi-definite relaxation(SDR) and variable substitution techniques are applied to find a nearoptimal solution. To evaluate the performance loss caused by the interaction between two providers, we further investigate the social welfare maximization problem. Numerical results demonstrate that compared to the benchmark schemes, the proposed scheme can achieve up to 35.4% and 38.7% utility gain for the leader and the follower, respectively.
基金supported by the Guangxi Science and Technology Major Special Project (Project Number GUIKEAA22067079-1).
文摘With the development of renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaics and wind power,it has become a research hotspot to improve the consumption rate of new energy and reduce energy costs through the deployment of energy storage.To solve the problem of the interests of different subjects in the operation of the energy storage power stations(ESS)and the integrated energy multi-microgrid alliance(IEMA),this paper proposes the optimization operation method of the energy storage power station and the IEMA based on the Stackelberg game.In the upper layer,ESS optimizes charging and discharging decisions through a dynamic pricing mechanism.In the lower layer,IEMA optimizes the output of various energy conversion coupled devices within the IEMA,as well as energy interaction and demand response(DR),based on the energy interaction prices provided by ESS.The results demonstrate that the optimization strategy proposed in this paper not only effectively balances the benefits of the IEMA and ESS but also enhances energy consumption rates and reduces IEMA energy costs.
文摘This paper mainly investigates the coordinated anti-jamming channel access problems in multiuser scenarios where there exists a tracking jammer who senses the spectrum and traces the channel with maximal receiving power.To cope with the challenges brought by the tracking jammer,a multi-leader onefollower anti-jamming Stackelberg(MOAS)game is formulated,which is able to model the complex interactions between users and the tracking jammer.In the proposed game,users act as leaders,chose their channel access strategies and transmit firstly.The tracking jammer acts as the follower,whose objective is to find the optimal jamming strategy at each time slot.Besides,the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums(SEs)is proved,which means users reach Nash Equilibriums(NEs)for each jamming strategy while the jammer finds its best response jamming strategy for the current network access case.An active attraction based anti-jamming channel access(3ACA)algorithm is designed to reach SEs,where jammed users keep their channel access strategies unchanged to create access chances for other users.To enhance the fairness of the system,users will adjust their strategies and relearn after certain time slots to provide access chances for those users who sacrifice themselves to attract the tracking jammer.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 92046001,61962009the Doctor Scientific Research Fund of Zhengzhou University of Light Industry underGrant 2021BSJJ033Key ScientificResearch Project of Colleges andUniversities in Henan Province(CN)under Grant No.22A413010.
文摘Cold-chain logistics system(CCLS)plays the role of collecting and managing the logistics data of frozen food.However,there always exist problems of information loss,data tampering,and privacy leakage in traditional centralized systems,which influence frozen food security and people’s health.The centralized management form impedes the development of the cold-chain logistics industry and weakens logistics data availability.This paper first introduces a distributed CCLS based on blockchain technology to solve the centralized management problem.This system aggregates the production base,storage,transport,detection,processing,and consumer to form a cold-chain logistics union.The blockchain ledger guarantees that the logistics data cannot be tampered with and establishes a traceability mechanism for food safety incidents.Meanwhile,to improve the value of logistics data,a Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model has been proposed between the logistics data resource provider and the consumer.The competition between resource price and volume balances the resource supplement and consumption.This model can help to achieve an optimal resource price when the Stackelberg game obtains Nash equilibrium.The two participants also can maximize their revenues with the optimal resource price and volume by utilizing the backward induction method.Then,the performance evaluations of transaction throughput and latency show that the proposed distributed CCLS is more secure and stable.The simulations about the variation trend of data price and amount,optimal benefits,and total benefits comparison of different forms show that the resource allocation model is more efficient and practical.Moreover,the blockchain-based CCLS and Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model also can promote the value of logistic data and improve social benefits.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(U21A20478)Zhejiang Provincial Nature Science Foundation of China(LZ21F030004)Key-Area Research and Development Program of Guangdong Province(2018B010107002)。
文摘Demand response(DR)using shared energy storage systems(ESSs)is an appealing method to save electricity bills for users under demand charge and time-of-use(TOU)price.A novel Stackelberg-game-based ESS sharing scheme is proposed and analyzed in this study.In this scheme,the interactions between selfish users and an operator are characterized as a Stackelberg game.Operator holds a large-scale ESS that is shared among users in the form of energy transactions.It sells energy to users and sets the selling price first.It maximizes its profit through optimal pricing and ESS dispatching.Users purchase some energy from operator for the reduction of their demand charges after operator's selling price is announced.This game-theoretic ESS sharing scheme is characterized and analyzed by formulating and solving a bi-level optimization model.The upper-level optimization maximizes operator's profit and the lower-level optimization minimizes users'costs.The bi-level model is transformed and linearized into a mixed-integer linear programming(MILP)model using the mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints(MPEC)method and model linearizing techniques.Case studies with actual data are carried out to explore the economic performances of the proposed ESS sharing scheme.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.62063016)。
文摘With increasing reforms related to integrated energy systems(IESs),each energy subsystem,as a participant based on bounded rationality,significantly influences the optimal scheduling of the entire IES through mutual learning and imitation.A reasonable multiagent joint operation strategy can help this system meet its low-carbon objectives.This paper proposes a bilayer low-carbon optimal operational strategy for an IES based on the Stackelberg master-slave game and multiagent joint operation.The studied IES includes cogeneration,power-to-gas,and carbon capture systems.Based on the Stackelberg master-slave game theory,sellers are used as leaders in the upper layer to set the prices of electricity and heat,while energy producers,energy storage providers,and load aggregators are used as followers in the lower layer to adjust the operational strategy of the system.An IES bilayer optimization model based on the Stackelberg master-slave game was developed.Finally,the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)condition and linear relaxation technology are used to convert the bilayer game model to a single layer.CPLEX,which is a mathematical program solver,is used to solve the equilibrium problem and the carbon emission trading cost of the system when the benefits of each subject reach maximum and to analyze the impact of different carbon emission trading prices and growth rates on the operational strategy of the system.As an experimental demonstration,we simulated an IES coupled with an IEEE 39-node electrical grid system,a six-node heat network system,and a six-node gas network system.The simulation results confirm the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed model.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71971075,71871079)the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2019YFE0110300)+1 种基金the Anhui Provincial Natural Science Foundation (1808085MG213)the Fundamental R esearch Funds for the Central Universities (PA2019GDPK0082)。
文摘To strengthen border patrol measures, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) are gradually used in many countries to detect illegal entries on borders. However, how to efficiently deploy limited UAVs to patrol on borders of large areas remains challenging. In this paper, we first model the problem of deploying UAVs for border patrol as a Stackelberg game. Two players are considered in this game: The border patrol agency is the leader,who optimizes the patrol path of UAVs to detect the illegal immigrant. The illegal immigrant is the follower, who selects a certain area of the border to pass through at a certain time after observing the leader’s strategy. Second, a compact linear programming problem is proposed to tackle the exponential growth of the number of leader’s strategies. Third, a method is proposed to reduce the size of the strategy space of the follower. Then, we provide some theoretic results to present the effect of parameters of the model on leader’s utilities. Experimental results demonstrate the positive effect of limited starting and ending areas of UAV’s patrolling conditions and multiple patrolling altitudes on the leader ’s utility, and show that the proposed solution outperforms two conventional patrol strategies and has strong robustness.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52077146)the Sichuan Science and Technology Program(No.2023YFSY0032).
文摘In the competitive energy market,energy retailers are facing the uncertainties of both energy price and demand,which requires them to formulate reasonable energy purchasing and selling strategies for improving their competitiveness in this market.Particularly,the attractive multi-energy retail packages are the key for retailers to increase their benefit.Therefore,combined with incentive means and price signals,five types of multi-energy retail packages such as peak-valley time-of-use(TOU)price package and day-night bundled price package are designed in this paper for retailers.The iterative interactions between retailers and end-users are modeled using a bi-level model of stochastic optimization based on multi-leader multi-follower(MLMF)Stackelberg game,in which retailers are leaders and end-users are followers.Retailers make decisions to maximize the profit considering the conditional value at risk(CVaR)while end-users optimize the satisfaction of both energy comfort and economy.Besides,a distributed algorithm is proposed to obtain the Nash equilibrium of above MLMF Stackelberg game model while the particle swarm optimization(PSO)algorithm and CPLEX solver are applied to solve the optimization model for each participant(retailer or end-user).Numeral results show that the designed retail packages can increase the overall profit of retailers,and the overall satisfaction of industrial users is the highest while that of residential users is the lowest after game interaction.
基金This research was funded by the NSFC under Grant No.61803279in part by the Qing Lan Project of Jiangsu,in part by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant Nos.2020M671596 and 2021M692369+3 种基金in part by the Suzhou Science and Technology Development Plan Project(Key Industry Technology Innovation)under Grant No.SYG202114in part by the Open Project Funding from Anhui Province Key Laboratory of Intelligent Building and Building Energy Saving,Anhui Jianzhu University,under Grant No.IBES2021KF08in part by the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province under Grant No.KYCX23_3320in part by the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province under Grant No.SJCX22_1585.
文摘As the current global environment is deteriorating,distributed renewable energy is gradually becoming an important member of the energy internet.Blockchain,as a decentralized distributed ledger with decentralization,traceability and tamper-proof features,is an importantway to achieve efficient consumption andmulti-party supply of new energy.In this article,we establish a blockchain-based mathematical model of multiple microgrids and microgrid aggregators’revenue,consider the degree of microgrid users’preference for electricity thus increasing users’reliance on the blockchainmarket,and apply the one-master-multiple-slave Stackelberg game theory to solve the energy dispatching strategy when each market entity pursues the maximum revenue.The simulation results show that the blockchain-based dynamic game of the multi-microgrid market can effectively increase the revenue of both microgrids and aggregators and improve the utilization of renewable energy.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.62271253,61901523,62001381)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.NS2023018)+2 种基金the National Aerospace Science Foundation of China under Grant 2023Z021052002the open research fund of National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory,Southeast University (No.2023D09)Postgraduate Research & Practice Innovation Program of NUAA (No.xcxjh20220402)。
文摘To improve the anti-jamming and interference mitigation ability of the UAV-aided communication systems, this paper investigates the channel selection optimization problem in face of both internal mutual interference and external malicious jamming. A cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation method based on local altruistic is proposed to optimize UAVs’ channel selection. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is modeled to formulate the confrontation relationship between UAVs and the jammer. A local altruistic game is modeled with each UAV considering the utilities of both itself and other UAVs. A distributed cooperative anti-jamming and interference mitigation algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the convergence of the proposed algorithm and the impact of the transmission power on the system loss value are analyzed, and the anti-jamming performance of the proposed algorithm can be improved by around 64% compared with the existing algorithms.