Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager ins...Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations.Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China,we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts.We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises,whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship.Furthermore,we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives’on-the-job consumption.Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications.展开更多
A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, the latter often ba...A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, the latter often based in China. The broad reason for this hostility is the belief that state-owned enterprises pursue non-commercial objectives with resulting damage to host economies. This paper argues that the empirical evidence shows SOEs are increasingly exhibiting market-owned behavior. Furthermore, any adverse consequences of non-commercial behavior are likely to be realized primarily by the SOEs themselves.展开更多
基金the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project 71602059,71872192,71602039)the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province,China(Project 2015A030310223,2016A030313482)the Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China(Project 15YJC630051).
文摘Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations.Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China,we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts.We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises,whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship.Furthermore,we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives’on-the-job consumption.Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications.
文摘A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, the latter often based in China. The broad reason for this hostility is the belief that state-owned enterprises pursue non-commercial objectives with resulting damage to host economies. This paper argues that the empirical evidence shows SOEs are increasingly exhibiting market-owned behavior. Furthermore, any adverse consequences of non-commercial behavior are likely to be realized primarily by the SOEs themselves.
