Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are importan...Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.展开更多
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the comp...Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.展开更多
According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with ...According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.展开更多
Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this artic...Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.展开更多
基金the financial support of the Deloitte Professorship
文摘Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.
文摘Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
基金funded by grants from the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71772029)LiaoNing Revitalization Talents Program(No.XLYC2007052)Tax Accounting Research Center of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
文摘According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.
基金We thank two anonymous referees and the editor who greatly improved the paper. Helpful comments were obtained from Xiangqin Qi, Fu Xin, Wei Xu, and Zhenye Yao from the seminars at Nanjing University. We acknowledge financial support from National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 71372032, 71302036 and 71272238） and the National Social Science Foundation （Grant No. 11AJL003）. Errors remain our own.
文摘Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.
