Combined Optimal Dispatch of Thermal Power Generators and Energy Storage Considering Thermal Power Deep Peak Clipping and Wind Energy Emission Grading Punishment

Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.

Power,punishment,patriarchy in Shakespeare’s Othello

An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.

An Unusual Punishment

One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Mathematical Neurolaw of Crime and Punishment: The <i>q</i>-Exponential Punishment Function

Whether people tend to punish criminals in a socially-optimal manner (i.e., hyperbolic punishment) or not is unknown. By adopting mathematical models of probabilistic punishment behavior (i.e., exponential, hyperbolic, and q-exponential probability discounting model based on Tsallis thermodynamics and neuroeconomics, Takahashi, 2007, Physica A;Takahashi et al., 2012, Applied Mathematics), we examined 1) fitness of the models to behavioral data of uncertain punishment, and 2) deviation from the socially optimal hyperbolic punishment function. Our results demonstrated that, the q-exponential punishment function best fits the behavioral data, and people overweigh the severity of punishment at small punishing probabilities and underweigh the severity of punishment at large punishing probabilities. In other words, people tend to punish crimes too severely and mildly with high and low arrest rate (e.g., homicide vs. excess of speed limit), respectively. Implications for neuroeconomics and neurolaw of crime and punishment (Takahashi, 2012, NeuroEndocrinology Letters) are discussed.

Role of Reward and Punishment in Education

This essay aims at illustrate the important role, of reward and punishment in education from a psychological viewpoint. According to Stimulus and Response theory, reward and punishment are now commonly used by teachers to encourage both congnitive activities and appropriate behaviour in classroom . Either of them can be used to encourage or supervise the students in learning, and rewarding is fawoured. However reward mechanism must be used properly and under control. It should 't be overused. Also, there is a place for punishment in education because errors need to be pointed out and antisocial behaviour should be corrected. It can be applied only when the intensity, duration and timing are carefully considered. In a word , reward system . is undoubtedly to have positive effect while punishment is proved to cause unpredictable result. Those specific informations are mentioned in the essay that follows.

The Rationale for Victims' Cooperation in Cases of Pleading Guilty and Accepting Punishment from the Perspective of Protecting the Right of Action

In the context of the more frequent application of the leniency system for pleading guilty and accepting punishment,the connotations of the rules on victim involvement should be enriched in the 2018 Criminal Procedure Law.Victims deeply influenced by the concept of cooperative justice will also have an intention to cooperate,thus resulting in a rationale for victims’cooperation.Victims’cooperation features a subjectivity of interactivity,understanding,and constraint.This kind of cooperation faces the accused,the procuratorial organ,and the court.The jurisprudential function of the rationale for cooperation of victims is embodied in such aspects as recognizing the victims as eligible subjects,enhancing the legal force of the recognizance in a case of pleading guilty and accepting punishment,and consolidating the legitimate basis for victim to obtain legal assistance.Oriented to protecting right of action of the victim,understanding and developing the rationale for the cooperation of the victim can start by reaching a judicial consensus on the"two limits"principle,optimizing the right of action system for victims,achieving the interconnection of multi-level litigation systems,and improving the rules on lenient punishment to enrich the plan for protecting victims’right of action in cases of pleading guilty and accepting punishment.

Discussion on the abolishment and recovery of corporal punishment in Xingfa Zhi of JinShu

Xingfa Zhi of JinShu recorded the field of ancient Chinese law live debate on major issues in detail,providing a vivid example in understanding the development of ancient Chinese law.These issues included the abolition of revenge,the Amnesty Penalty,the stability of law,the evolution of law,and the Abolishment and recovery of the corporal punishment.This article is only discussed on the related issues of the Abolishment and recovery of the corporal punishment.

基于季节性碳交易机制的园区综合能源系统低碳经济调度

为有效提高碳排放配额分配的合理性,并且避免年度结算时碳排放量超标导致环境污染加剧问题,提出基于奖惩因子的季节性碳交易机制,以园区综合能源系统(park integrated energy system,PIES)为对象进行低碳经济调度。首先,构建包含能量层–碳流层–管理层的综合能源系统(integrated energy system,IES)运行框架,建立电气热多能流供需动态一致性模型;其次,分析系统内“日–季节–年度”碳排放特性,打破传统应用指标法的配额分配方法,采用灰色关联分析法建立碳排放配额分配模型,并基于奖惩阶梯碳价制定季节性碳交易机制;最后,以系统内全寿命周期运行成本及碳交易成本最小为目标,对执行季节性碳交易机制的PIES进行低碳经济调度,分析长时间尺度下季节性储能参与调度的减碳量。搭建IEEE 33节点电网5节点气网7节点热网的PIES,并基于多场景进行算例分析,验证此调度方法能够实现零碳经济运行,保证系统供能可靠性,为建立零碳园区奠定理论基础。

生态补偿视角下流域跨界水污染协同治理机制设计及演化博弈分析

针对流域相邻两地区和流域管理机构三方博弈主体,引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制,构建流域跨界水污染三方演化博弈理论模型。通过稳定性分析得出流域跨界水污染协同治理理想状态的稳定条件,并结合新安江流域生态补偿试点案例进行仿真分析。结果表明:(1)引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制可有效推动新安江流域相邻两地采取达标排放行为,促使系统达到(1, 1, 0)稳定状态;(2)动态奖惩机制组合使用有助于系统演化,从博弈主体初始意愿、实施效能和支持倾向等角度综合考虑,动态奖励-静态惩罚策略监管效果最优,动态奖励-动态惩罚策略次之;(3)流域跨界水污染协同治理的实现策略与相邻两地达标排放的治理成本与收益、双向生态补偿金额度、流域管理机构发放生态补偿奖励金额、积极监管成本和收益等因素密切相关。

地方政府为何会推进举报式执法?

举报式执法因其兼具工具价值和民主价值,被地方政府在社会管理时所选择应用。我国地方政府在举报式执法手段的选择与治理方式方面存在显著的地区差异性,以150787份通过公民举报而推进的行政处罚案件为研究对象,通过对中国各地区2015—2021年的面板数据进行测算与研究发现,地方财力、地方执法压力以及公众参与需求,是地方政府选择与公众进行合作、采取举报式执法治理手段的重要考量因素。此外,地方举报制度建设能够显著促进地方政府选择举报式执法,并提高合作治理程度。在下一阶段的中国社会治理改革中,地方政府应建立科学的举报奖励制度,促进政社合作,以举报式执法之优势缓解行政资源匮乏与政府信息不对称的治理问题。

认罪认罚从宽制度的再完善:以轻微犯罪治理为场域

目前,我国已经进入轻微犯罪时代。通过认罪认罚从宽制度治理轻微犯罪是重要的刑事司法途径。然而,轻微犯罪治理与认罪认罚从宽制度之间仍存在一定的不适性,特别是实体与程序的衔接不畅、治理需求与制度供给的不一致等。因此,应当强化轻微犯罪治理与认罪认罚从宽制度之间的契合度与协同性,以轻微犯罪治理的实际需求为导向,按照刑事一体化的理念,不断完善认罪认罚从宽制度及其相关的实施机制。当前,刑法与认罪认罚从宽制度之间的制度性“沟壑”亟待填补。为此,既需要调试现行刑法理论的互斥部分,也要重新审视刑法总则相关规定的适宜性和有效性,进而及时启动必要的实体性立法修正程序。《刑事诉讼法》修改在即,整合性的程序回应也势在必行,独立的认罪认罚从宽协商程序、更加健全的量刑协商机制等均是轻罪治理的主要关切点。

前景理论视角下废旧动力电池回收监管演化博弈分析

废旧动力电池具有较强的负外部性,违背了新能源汽车设计的初衷。为促进废旧动力电池有效回收,将前景理论与演化博弈论耦合,综合考虑政府、企业(汽车生产)和公众之间的利益,促使政府和公众对企业进行共同监督,构建三方博弈模型。针对初始意愿、罚款组成、风险态度系数和损失规避系数的不同情况,进行模拟数值仿真,并结合现实中废旧动力电池的认识度、奖惩机制和盈利信心进行分析。研究表明:提高公众或政府的初始监督意愿,可以促进企业回收废旧动力电池;当企业的回收策略为亏损时,提高企业对公众的补偿金额、降低企业的风险态度系数和损失规避系数,可以促进企业积极回收;在废旧动力电池回收过程中,共同监督的效果优于单独监督。

从消极惩罪到积极治理:中国特色轻罪治理体系的反思与完善

当今中国社会的犯罪现象正在经历从重罪到轻罪的重大变化,我国轻罪治理体系也应与时俱进地进行完善。这要求我们取轻罪之长,避轻罪之短。首先,要明确轻罪的定义,可以法定刑3年有期徒刑为上限、以处带有保安处分性质的限制或剥夺人身自由措施为下限,这一轻罪概念既契合我国刑事立法和司法的现实,也是面向未来轻罪立法的一种前瞻性考虑。然后,对轻罪扩张现象进行反思,厘清轻罪扩张带来的正面功能和负面效应,指明其具有回应民意、完善立法、规范行为的优势,也揭示其简化司法、异化刑罚、附随后果过剩的缺陷。在此基础上,对我国轻罪治理体系进行完善,在实体层面依据《刑法》第13条的但书规定和第37条的定罪免刑规定,建立多元的轻罪处遇模式;在程序法层面贯彻“三分原则”;在附随后果上严格限制适用主体、对象和内容;在前科消灭上逐步建立犯罪记录封存、注销和复权制度。这样多措并举,推动我国轻罪治理体系从消极惩罪向积极治理的现代化转型。

生态环境法典的罪刑条款设置

“《刑法典》是环境刑法更好的归属”的观点,只是一种主观判断,不一定符合事实;我国清末以来的刑法典都预设了多元刑事立法模式,单一刑法典模式不是由刑法典自身形成的,而是由于其他法律不设置罪刑条款形成的,生态环境法典应当直接设置环境犯罪的罪刑条款;罪刑条款应当与行为规则、行政处罚条款密切接近,故应采取分散型设置方式;行政刑法的特点是通过补强行为规则,确保行为规则的有效性,故生态环境法典中的罪刑条款通常采取行政犯的表述方式,但部分条款也可以采取刑法犯的表述方式;罪刑条款应以行政处罚条款为基础,通过增加不法要素与责任要素的方式,使环境犯罪具备应受刑罚处罚性;处理行政处罚与刑罚处罚的关系时,重在防止以刑罚处罚替代行政处罚;应当将行为人积极履行《民法典》规定的“修复生态环境责任”,规定为环境犯罪的减免处罚事由;生态环境法典中的罪刑条款设置应注重必要性、明确性、合理性、协调性,不必顾虑与现行刑法典中环境犯罪条款的重复与交叉。

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。