将Bag of Words算法引入木材图像识别领域中,介绍Bag of Words算法在木材识别上的实现过程。首先用SURF提取特征点,然后再对这些特征点进行聚类,得到类心。基于类心得到各个训练树种的向量柱形图和待识别树种图片的向量柱形图。选择分...将Bag of Words算法引入木材图像识别领域中,介绍Bag of Words算法在木材识别上的实现过程。首先用SURF提取特征点,然后再对这些特征点进行聚类,得到类心。基于类心得到各个训练树种的向量柱形图和待识别树种图片的向量柱形图。选择分类器对用向量柱形图描述的木材图像进行分类。这将提高木材识别的效率,为没有木材专业知识的人能较为准确地辨别树种提供较为可靠的方法。展开更多
This paper discusses a neglected theme in Wittgenstein＇s writings on meaning and psychology from the early 1930s until 1949. Throughout this period Wittgenstein deals with aspects of meaning of words and pictures tha...This paper discusses a neglected theme in Wittgenstein＇s writings on meaning and psychology from the early 1930s until 1949. Throughout this period Wittgenstein deals with aspects of meaning of words and pictures that cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms but have to be related to experience and perception. Wittgenstein＇s reading of William James, I argue, has sharpened his eye for the many pitfalls in coming to terms with this experiential notion of meaning. James＇s treatment of experiences of meaning succumbs to the temptation to postulate ~~meaning-bodies,＂ bearers of meaning apart from the way and context in which we use the particular words. I argue that the conflation of what Wittgenstein calls the transitive and intransitive use of words is at the root of postulating meaning-bodies. I also argue that contemporary treatments of experiences of meaning are similarly vulnerable to James＇s confusion.展开更多
文摘将Bag of Words算法引入木材图像识别领域中,介绍Bag of Words算法在木材识别上的实现过程。首先用SURF提取特征点,然后再对这些特征点进行聚类,得到类心。基于类心得到各个训练树种的向量柱形图和待识别树种图片的向量柱形图。选择分类器对用向量柱形图描述的木材图像进行分类。这将提高木材识别的效率,为没有木材专业知识的人能较为准确地辨别树种提供较为可靠的方法。
文摘This paper discusses a neglected theme in Wittgenstein＇s writings on meaning and psychology from the early 1930s until 1949. Throughout this period Wittgenstein deals with aspects of meaning of words and pictures that cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms but have to be related to experience and perception. Wittgenstein＇s reading of William James, I argue, has sharpened his eye for the many pitfalls in coming to terms with this experiential notion of meaning. James＇s treatment of experiences of meaning succumbs to the temptation to postulate ~~meaning-bodies,＂ bearers of meaning apart from the way and context in which we use the particular words. I argue that the conflation of what Wittgenstein calls the transitive and intransitive use of words is at the root of postulating meaning-bodies. I also argue that contemporary treatments of experiences of meaning are similarly vulnerable to James＇s confusion.
