This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one ...This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one retailer in which the retailer designs contracts to coordinate the supplier＇s production in a two-mode production environment. This focuses on an option contract that consists of two option prices and one exercise price. By theoretical analysis and numerical example, we find that such a contract can coordinate the supplier and retailer to act in the best interest of the channel. The optimal pricing conditions are given as follows： First, option prices should be negatively correlated to the exercise price and should be in a relevant range. Second, the first-period option price should be no greater than the second-period price and should be linearly correlated to the second-period option price when the latter is beyond some threshold. The results show that such option contracts can arbitrarily allocate the extra system profit between the two parties so that each party is in a win-win situation.展开更多
这份报纸考虑通过离线、联机的隧道为一小部分房间的分发由一个宾馆和一个联机旅行代理人(OTA ) 组成的宾馆供应链。在商人合作假设下面，为无常建模并且要求克服分散的决定的劣势，二合作机制，也就是，一个二阶段的订合同和一种选择...这份报纸考虑通过离线、联机的隧道为一小部分房间的分发由一个宾馆和一个联机旅行代理人(OTA ) 组成的宾馆供应链。在商人合作假设下面，为无常建模并且要求克服分散的决定的劣势，二合作机制，也就是，一个二阶段的订合同和一种选择收缩，被介绍在宾馆供应链增加利润。这份报纸在不同合同模型下面调查宾馆和 OTA 的最佳的决定。而且，作者在不同模型下面在宾馆和 OTA 的利润上分析需求无常和需求可变性和宾馆能力的相互作用的效果。结果证明二阶段的订合同和选择合同能增加全部供应链和宾馆的利润；然而，仅仅当宾馆能力是相对小的，需求可变性大时， OTA 的利润能通过二阶段的订合同和选择合同被增加；否则，二合作机制不能增加 OTA 利润。展开更多
This paper considers the two-echelon supply chain system which consists of single agricultural producers and retailers,and analyzes the impact of sharing ratio on the option ordering quantity,and retailers and produce...This paper considers the two-echelon supply chain system which consists of single agricultural producers and retailers,and analyzes the impact of sharing ratio on the option ordering quantity,and retailers and producers' expected profits.Studies have shown that in the case of decentralization,when the revenue sharing ratio is between 0 and 0.3,the option ordering quantity of farm produce is a decreasing function of the sharing ratio; when the revenue sharing ratio is between 0.3 and 1,the option ordering quantity of farm produce is an increasing function of sharing ratio; when the revenue sharing ratio is between 0.421 and 1,the agricultural producers and retailers' expected profits are an increasing function of sharing ratio.Finally,through the numerical calculation,the applicability of the conclusions is verified,to provide a reference for the supply chain management practices.展开更多
通过期权机制,建立供应链协调过程中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型(N ew svendor)的情况。供应商通过制定期权的价格政策和选择合适的产品出清方式,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商...通过期权机制,建立供应链协调过程中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型(N ew svendor)的情况。供应商通过制定期权的价格政策和选择合适的产品出清方式,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商也因此通过期权而获得相应的风险补偿,从而达到供应链协调,实现帕累托最优。根据电子半导体类产品的特征,对论文中的理论模型进行详细的模拟分析,结果验证了期权契约在供应链协调过程中的有效性。展开更多
通过期权机制,分别建立了基于需求预测的两阶段生产和订购模式下的集中决策型和合作型供应链中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制要优于传统的报童模型(N ew svendor)。在合作型供应链中,供应商和零售商根据预测结果合理地安排其两阶...通过期权机制,分别建立了基于需求预测的两阶段生产和订购模式下的集中决策型和合作型供应链中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制要优于传统的报童模型(N ew svendor)。在合作型供应链中,供应商和零售商根据预测结果合理地安排其两阶段的生产和订购量,通过选择不同的期权价格政策,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商也因此通过期权而获得相应的风险补偿,从而实现供应链协调。最后根据电子半导体类产品的特征,对论文中的理论模型进行了详细的模拟分析,结果验证了期权契约在需求预测环境下的供应链协调过程中的有效性。展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 70532004 and 70621061)
文摘This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one retailer in which the retailer designs contracts to coordinate the supplier＇s production in a two-mode production environment. This focuses on an option contract that consists of two option prices and one exercise price. By theoretical analysis and numerical example, we find that such a contract can coordinate the supplier and retailer to act in the best interest of the channel. The optimal pricing conditions are given as follows： First, option prices should be negatively correlated to the exercise price and should be in a relevant range. Second, the first-period option price should be no greater than the second-period price and should be linearly correlated to the second-period option price when the latter is beyond some threshold. The results show that such option contracts can arbitrarily allocate the extra system profit between the two parties so that each party is in a win-win situation.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71471066,71371006,71090403Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University(NCET-13-0219)Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China under Grant No.20130172110029
文摘这份报纸考虑通过离线、联机的隧道为一小部分房间的分发由一个宾馆和一个联机旅行代理人(OTA ) 组成的宾馆供应链。在商人合作假设下面，为无常建模并且要求克服分散的决定的劣势，二合作机制，也就是，一个二阶段的订合同和一种选择收缩，被介绍在宾馆供应链增加利润。这份报纸在不同合同模型下面调查宾馆和 OTA 的最佳的决定。而且，作者在不同模型下面在宾馆和 OTA 的利润上分析需求无常和需求可变性和宾馆能力的相互作用的效果。结果证明二阶段的订合同和选择合同能增加全部供应链和宾馆的利润；然而，仅仅当宾馆能力是相对小的，需求可变性大时， OTA 的利润能通过二阶段的订合同和选择合同被增加；否则，二合作机制不能增加 OTA 利润。
基金Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(7093200571102055)+1 种基金Youth Fund Project of Sichuan Provincial Department of Education(13ZB003514ZA0304)
文摘This paper considers the two-echelon supply chain system which consists of single agricultural producers and retailers,and analyzes the impact of sharing ratio on the option ordering quantity,and retailers and producers' expected profits.Studies have shown that in the case of decentralization,when the revenue sharing ratio is between 0 and 0.3,the option ordering quantity of farm produce is a decreasing function of the sharing ratio; when the revenue sharing ratio is between 0.3 and 1,the option ordering quantity of farm produce is an increasing function of sharing ratio; when the revenue sharing ratio is between 0.421 and 1,the agricultural producers and retailers' expected profits are an increasing function of sharing ratio.Finally,through the numerical calculation,the applicability of the conclusions is verified,to provide a reference for the supply chain management practices.
文摘通过期权机制,建立供应链协调过程中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型(N ew svendor)的情况。供应商通过制定期权的价格政策和选择合适的产品出清方式,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商也因此通过期权而获得相应的风险补偿,从而达到供应链协调,实现帕累托最优。根据电子半导体类产品的特征,对论文中的理论模型进行详细的模拟分析,结果验证了期权契约在供应链协调过程中的有效性。
文摘通过期权机制,分别建立了基于需求预测的两阶段生产和订购模式下的集中决策型和合作型供应链中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制要优于传统的报童模型(N ew svendor)。在合作型供应链中,供应商和零售商根据预测结果合理地安排其两阶段的生产和订购量,通过选择不同的期权价格政策,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商也因此通过期权而获得相应的风险补偿,从而实现供应链协调。最后根据电子半导体类产品的特征,对论文中的理论模型进行了详细的模拟分析,结果验证了期权契约在需求预测环境下的供应链协调过程中的有效性。
