Criminal networks erode the legitimacy of democratic politics, affecting regions as diverse as Latin America （Briscoe, Perdomo, ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2014）, the Baltic States （Villaveces-Izquierdo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 201...Criminal networks erode the legitimacy of democratic politics, affecting regions as diverse as Latin America （Briscoe, Perdomo, ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2014）, the Baltic States （Villaveces-Izquierdo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2013）, and West Africa （Aning ＆ Edu-Afful, 2013a; 2013b）. Contemporary research on this topic describes various factors that might increase the vulnerability of political actors, institutions, and processes to organized crime （Uribe Burcher, 2017）. In addition, there is a need to identify strategies to strengthen those political actors, institutions, and processes, making them resilient against criminal influence. Drawing from extensive field research conducted in Latin America, Africa, and West Asia in 2015-2016 （Perdomo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2016; Hunter ＆ Reitano, 2016; Briscoe ＆ Goff, 2016a; 2016b）, as well as additional desk research conducted during the same period, this paper maps a set of 28 actions that may increase these institutions＇ and actors＇ resilience to the influence of organized crime networks based on documented global experiences implementing such measures. The paper also reflects some of the findings from a pilot experience to assess the threat of nexus between organized crime in democratic politics in Peru conducted in 2015-2016, which used some of the proposed action points to build a prevention and mitigation plan.展开更多
In recent years, increased attention from the media, the international community and policy makers has highlighted the destabilizing effects criminal networks have on the legitimacy of democratic politics, as well as ...In recent years, increased attention from the media, the international community and policy makers has highlighted the destabilizing effects criminal networks have on the legitimacy of democratic politics, as well as the capacity of democratic systems to deliver basic services. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development highlighted in 2014 how illicit financial flows drain the state from resources needed to provide basic services （OECD, 2014）. While this problem affects not only developing and fragile states, these countries are particularly affected as this phenomenon tends to exacerbate inequality （Briscoe, Perdomo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2014）. Mapping the factors that make politics vulnerable to the influence of organized crime is a key element in the effort to implement adequate strategies to prevent and mitigate this phenomenon. This paper explores 21 threat factors identified, understood as some of the conditions that may contribute to the likelihood that political corruption linked to organized crime takes place. These threat factors underline institutional weaknesses--including those related to illicit political fmance---and organized crime activities, which create opportunities for illicit networks to penetrate democratic political systems. The paper also discusses how these institutional weaknesses interrelate to specific criminal markets and networks. The paper draws from extensive desk research in 2015, which complements previous desk and field research on the same topic carded out in 2011-2014 in the Baltic States, Latin America and West Africa.展开更多
文摘Criminal networks erode the legitimacy of democratic politics, affecting regions as diverse as Latin America （Briscoe, Perdomo, ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2014）, the Baltic States （Villaveces-Izquierdo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2013）, and West Africa （Aning ＆ Edu-Afful, 2013a; 2013b）. Contemporary research on this topic describes various factors that might increase the vulnerability of political actors, institutions, and processes to organized crime （Uribe Burcher, 2017）. In addition, there is a need to identify strategies to strengthen those political actors, institutions, and processes, making them resilient against criminal influence. Drawing from extensive field research conducted in Latin America, Africa, and West Asia in 2015-2016 （Perdomo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2016; Hunter ＆ Reitano, 2016; Briscoe ＆ Goff, 2016a; 2016b）, as well as additional desk research conducted during the same period, this paper maps a set of 28 actions that may increase these institutions＇ and actors＇ resilience to the influence of organized crime networks based on documented global experiences implementing such measures. The paper also reflects some of the findings from a pilot experience to assess the threat of nexus between organized crime in democratic politics in Peru conducted in 2015-2016, which used some of the proposed action points to build a prevention and mitigation plan.
文摘In recent years, increased attention from the media, the international community and policy makers has highlighted the destabilizing effects criminal networks have on the legitimacy of democratic politics, as well as the capacity of democratic systems to deliver basic services. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development highlighted in 2014 how illicit financial flows drain the state from resources needed to provide basic services （OECD, 2014）. While this problem affects not only developing and fragile states, these countries are particularly affected as this phenomenon tends to exacerbate inequality （Briscoe, Perdomo ＆ Uribe Burcher, 2014）. Mapping the factors that make politics vulnerable to the influence of organized crime is a key element in the effort to implement adequate strategies to prevent and mitigate this phenomenon. This paper explores 21 threat factors identified, understood as some of the conditions that may contribute to the likelihood that political corruption linked to organized crime takes place. These threat factors underline institutional weaknesses--including those related to illicit political fmance---and organized crime activities, which create opportunities for illicit networks to penetrate democratic political systems. The paper also discusses how these institutional weaknesses interrelate to specific criminal markets and networks. The paper draws from extensive desk research in 2015, which complements previous desk and field research on the same topic carded out in 2011-2014 in the Baltic States, Latin America and West Africa.
