期刊文献+
共找到1篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
Design of Principal-agent Incentive Mechanism between Government and NPO
1
作者 Honglian Guo Zhenzhen Wu Han Li 《Proceedings of Business and Economic Studies》 2021年第1期41-45,共5页
Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the ... Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Research shows that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.The output coefficient is positively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Reducing absolute risk aversion,increasing output coefficient and increasing government incentives can effectively motivate NPO to actively participate in social rescue activities. 展开更多
关键词 PRINCIPAL-AGENT Incentive intensity Level of output Expected utility
下载PDF
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部