Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits...Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits,the relevant trading mechanism has been far from perfect.The perfect mechanism for international carbon emissions trading should be a revealing preference game.In other words,only if all players in this game truly show their information and preferences can the Nash outcome be Pareto efficient and fair.China should actively participate in the international carbon emissions trading game;promote efficiency,justice,rationality,and the quality of being manipulation-free in the carbon emissions market;and play a more important role in perfecting the international carbon emissions trading mechanism.展开更多
Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation bet...Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation between all players because they do not contain the last period. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution concept for them. It requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in any subgame. It does not address immunity to deviations by coalitions. In particular, it does not rule out cooperation based on punishments of unilateral deviations that the grand coalition would like to forgive. We first briefly review concepts of renegotiation-proofness that rule out such forgiveness. Then we discuss the concept of strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviations by all coalitions in all subgames. In games with only one level of players (e.g. members of the population engaged in the same type of competitive activity), it fails to exist when the Pareto efficient frontier of the set of single period payoff vectors has no sufficiently large flat portion. In such a case, it is not possible to punish unilateral deviations in a weakly Pareto efficient way. In games with two levels of players (e.g. members of two populations with symbiotic relationship, while activities within each population are competitive), it is possible to overcome this problem. The sum of benefits of all players during a punishment can be the same as when nobody is punished but its distribution between the two populations can be altered in favor of the punishers.展开更多
In this papert the theory of major efficiency for multiobjective programmingis established.The major-efficient solutions and weakly major-efficient solutions of multiobjective programming given here are Pareto efficie...In this papert the theory of major efficiency for multiobjective programmingis established.The major-efficient solutions and weakly major-efficient solutions of multiobjective programming given here are Pareto efficient solutions of the same multiobjectiveprogramming problem, but the converse is not true. In a ceratin sense , these solutionsare in fact better than any other Pareto efficient solutions. Some basic theorems whichcharacterize major-efficient solutions and weakly major-efficient solutions of multiobjective programming are stated and proved. Furthermore,the existence and some geometricproperties of these solutions are studied.展开更多
New classes of functions namely (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I, quasi (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I and pseudo (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I functions are defined for multiobjective programming problem by using BenTal's generalized algebr...New classes of functions namely (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I, quasi (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I and pseudo (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I functions are defined for multiobjective programming problem by using BenTal's generalized algebraic operation. The examples of (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I functions are given. The sufficient optimality conditions are obtained for multi-objective programming problem involving above new generalized convexity.展开更多
This paper examines moral hazard problems in team setting. It is shown that there may exist budget balancing Nash equilibrium sharing rules that yield Pareto optimal (first best) efficiency provided that any of the f...This paper examines moral hazard problems in team setting. It is shown that there may exist budget balancing Nash equilibrium sharing rules that yield Pareto optimal (first best) efficiency provided that any of the following three conditions is satisfied: if peer pressure plays the role of mutual monitoring, or if agents over estimate the effects of their actions on jointed production, or if agents are sufficiently risk averse. The role played by the monitors in inducing first best efficiency is also discussed.展开更多
基金This work was funded by Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of Ministry of Education of China:Research on the Practices and Theoretical Innovation of Improving People's Wellbeing in the New Era[Grant number.18YJC710023]Major Projects of Social Science Fund of Jilin University:Research on China's Social Welfare System[Grant number.2019XXJD10]Major Projects of Trade Union of Jilin Province:Research on the Evaluation System of Harmonious Labor Relations[Grant number.2016LD007].
文摘Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits,the relevant trading mechanism has been far from perfect.The perfect mechanism for international carbon emissions trading should be a revealing preference game.In other words,only if all players in this game truly show their information and preferences can the Nash outcome be Pareto efficient and fair.China should actively participate in the international carbon emissions trading game;promote efficiency,justice,rationality,and the quality of being manipulation-free in the carbon emissions market;and play a more important role in perfecting the international carbon emissions trading mechanism.
基金supported by grant VEGA 1/0181/12 from the Slovak Ministry of Education,Science,Research,and Sport.
文摘Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation between all players because they do not contain the last period. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution concept for them. It requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in any subgame. It does not address immunity to deviations by coalitions. In particular, it does not rule out cooperation based on punishments of unilateral deviations that the grand coalition would like to forgive. We first briefly review concepts of renegotiation-proofness that rule out such forgiveness. Then we discuss the concept of strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviations by all coalitions in all subgames. In games with only one level of players (e.g. members of the population engaged in the same type of competitive activity), it fails to exist when the Pareto efficient frontier of the set of single period payoff vectors has no sufficiently large flat portion. In such a case, it is not possible to punish unilateral deviations in a weakly Pareto efficient way. In games with two levels of players (e.g. members of two populations with symbiotic relationship, while activities within each population are competitive), it is possible to overcome this problem. The sum of benefits of all players during a punishment can be the same as when nobody is punished but its distribution between the two populations can be altered in favor of the punishers.
文摘In this papert the theory of major efficiency for multiobjective programmingis established.The major-efficient solutions and weakly major-efficient solutions of multiobjective programming given here are Pareto efficient solutions of the same multiobjectiveprogramming problem, but the converse is not true. In a ceratin sense , these solutionsare in fact better than any other Pareto efficient solutions. Some basic theorems whichcharacterize major-efficient solutions and weakly major-efficient solutions of multiobjective programming are stated and proved. Furthermore,the existence and some geometricproperties of these solutions are studied.
基金Supported by the NSF of Shaanxi Provincial Educational Department(06JK152)
文摘New classes of functions namely (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I, quasi (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I and pseudo (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I functions are defined for multiobjective programming problem by using BenTal's generalized algebraic operation. The examples of (V, ρ)_(h,φ)-type I functions are given. The sufficient optimality conditions are obtained for multi-objective programming problem involving above new generalized convexity.
基金This research is supported by the post doctoral research foundation at the Amos Tuck School ofDartmouth College
文摘This paper examines moral hazard problems in team setting. It is shown that there may exist budget balancing Nash equilibrium sharing rules that yield Pareto optimal (first best) efficiency provided that any of the following three conditions is satisfied: if peer pressure plays the role of mutual monitoring, or if agents over estimate the effects of their actions on jointed production, or if agents are sufficiently risk averse. The role played by the monitors in inducing first best efficiency is also discussed.
