This article analyzes the enlightenment of studying the German"dual system"under the new situation for our country's promotion of enterprises to participate in vocational education and elaborates on the ...This article analyzes the enlightenment of studying the German"dual system"under the new situation for our country's promotion of enterprises to participate in vocational education and elaborates on the nature of German"dual system"of skills training,the core role of enterprises and the motivation of economic subsidies.Based on expounding the current situation of our vocational education,this article focuses on the analysis of key issues affecting the quality of vocational education in our country and the reasons why Chinese enterprises lack motivation to participate in vocational education.Finally,based on the enlightenment of Germany's"dual system",it is pointed out that our country's vocational education reform should adopt effective measures of economic subsidies to strengthen the motivation of enterprises to participate in vocational education.展开更多
Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management,but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government.This study contended that ente...Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management,but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government.This study contended that enterprises have at least three strategies regarding emergency management:non-participation,short-term participation,and long-term participation.We constructed a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of the government and enterprises,and employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government and enterprises.The results show that if and only if the utility value of participation is greater than 0,an enterprise will participate in emergency management.The evolutionary game then enters the second stage,during which system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost,reputation benefit,and government subsidies,and by an incremental relationship between emergency management benefit,government subsidies,and emergency training cost.This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on collaborative emergency management,and the results provide important references for promoting the performance of collaborative emergency management.展开更多
基金General Scientific Research Project of the Department of Education of Zhejiang Province in 2020“Research on China Image of German Mainstream Media in the context of COVID-19”(Y202045465)Research Project of Federation of Social Sciences of Zhejiang Province in 2021“Research on China Image of Western Mainstream Media in the context of COVID-19”(2021N22)。
文摘This article analyzes the enlightenment of studying the German"dual system"under the new situation for our country's promotion of enterprises to participate in vocational education and elaborates on the nature of German"dual system"of skills training,the core role of enterprises and the motivation of economic subsidies.Based on expounding the current situation of our vocational education,this article focuses on the analysis of key issues affecting the quality of vocational education in our country and the reasons why Chinese enterprises lack motivation to participate in vocational education.Finally,based on the enlightenment of Germany's"dual system",it is pointed out that our country's vocational education reform should adopt effective measures of economic subsidies to strengthen the motivation of enterprises to participate in vocational education.
基金supported by the Major Project of National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.21&ZD166)the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.22VRC200)the China Scholarship Council(CSC,Grant No.202206420064)。
文摘Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management,but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government.This study contended that enterprises have at least three strategies regarding emergency management:non-participation,short-term participation,and long-term participation.We constructed a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of the government and enterprises,and employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government and enterprises.The results show that if and only if the utility value of participation is greater than 0,an enterprise will participate in emergency management.The evolutionary game then enters the second stage,during which system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost,reputation benefit,and government subsidies,and by an incremental relationship between emergency management benefit,government subsidies,and emergency training cost.This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on collaborative emergency management,and the results provide important references for promoting the performance of collaborative emergency management.
