Size Distributions of Aerosol Sulfates and Nitrates in Beijing during the 2008 Olympic Games： Impacts of Pollution Control Measures and Regional Transport

For the 2008 Olympic Games, drastic control measures were implemented on industrial and urban emissions of sulfur dioxide （SO2）, nitrogen oxides （NOx） and other pollutants to address the issues of poor air quality in Beijing. To investigate the effects of SO2 and NOx reductions on the particulate sulfate and nitrate concentrations as well as their size distributions, size-segregated aerosol samples were collected using micro-orifice uniform deposit impactors （MOUDIs） at urban and downwind rural sites in Beijing before and after full-scale controls. During the sampling period, the mass concentrations of fine particles （PMI.s） at the urban and rural sites were 94.0 and 85.9 p.g m-3, respectively. More than 90% of the sulfates and 60% of nitrates formed as fine particles. Benefiting from the advantageous meteorological conditions and the source controls, sulfates were observed in rather low concentrations and primarily in condensation mode during the Olympics. The effects of the control measures were separately analyzed for the northerly and the southerly air-mass-dominated days to account for any bias. After the control measures were implemented, PM, sulfates, and nitrates were significantly reduced when the northerly air masses prevailed, with a higher percentage of reduction in larger particles. The droplet mode particles, which dominated the sulfates and nitrates before the controls were implemented, were remarkably reduced in mass concentration after the control measures were implemented. Nevertheless, when the polluted southerly air masses prevailed, the local source control measures in Beijing did not effectively reduce the ambient sulfate concentration due to the enormous regional contribution from the North China Plain.

EVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC GOODS GAMES BASED ON HISTORICAL PAYOFFS

We investigate the evolution of cooperation in public goods game based on individuals' historical payoffs. In particular, the fitness of individuals are characterized by two types of payoffs, which are obtained by acting as cooperators and defectors, respectively. Both of payoffs are the linear combination of the current payoffs and the cumulative historical payoffs. The results show that cooperation is enhanced by an increasing memory effect with a wide range of related factors. To explain this phenomenon, we plot some representative snapshots of the population and scrutinize the mean fitness of cooperators and defectors along the boundary. It is found that increasing memory effect induces a positive feedback mechanism for cooperators to expand their districts. Defectors can just survive through forming narrower clusters to exploit cooperators more widely. The threshold values for cooperators and defectors vanishing under the influence of noise are also investigated.

Fitness of others'evaluation effect promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.

Robust Resource Management Control for CO2 Emission and Reduction of Greenhouse Effect: Stochastic Game Approach

With the increasingly severe global warming, investments in clean technology, reforestation and political action have been studied to reduce CO2 emission. In this study, a nonlinear stochastic model is proposed to describe the dynamics of CO2 emission with control inputs: clean technology, reforestation and carbon tax, under stochastic uncertainties. For the efficient resources management, a robust tracking control is designed to force resources tracking a desired reference output. The worst-case effect of stochastic parametric fluctuations, external disturbances and uncertain initial conditions on the tracking performance is considered and minimized from the dynamic game theory perspective. This stochastic game problem, in which one player (stochastic uncertainty) maximizes the tracking error and another player (control input) minimizes the tracking error, could be equivalent to a robust minimax tracking problem. To avoid solving the HJI, a fuzzy model is proposed to approximate the nonlinear CO2 emission model. Then the nonlinear stochastic game problem could be easily solved by fuzzy stochastic game approach via LMI technique.

基于低空目标检测的分布式多输入多输出雷达功率分配合作博弈算法

为提升低空突防作战场景下分布式多输入多输出(Multiple Input and Multiple Output,MIMO)雷达系统的目标检测效能,提出一种合作博弈功率分配(Cooperative Game Power Allocation,CGPA)算法。基于带误差的支援信息建立了低空多径环境下的分布式MIMO雷达信号模型,并推导了基于奈曼皮尔逊准则的检测模型。结合Max-Min准则以信干噪比(Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio,SINR)为优化模型的效用函数。在此基础上,利用加权方法简化了联盟利益Shapley值的计算,得到满足帕累托最优性和公平性的合作资源分配方案。通过对发射功率资源的细致化管理,有效减小多径效应引起接收信号幅度的参差与衰落。在改善接收信号的稳定性的同时,挖掘并利用多径环境下丰富的散射特性,有效提升了雷达系统的探测效能。仿真实验验证了分布式MIMO雷达系统低空多径目标检测的出色性能,所提功率分配算法能够有效提升系统检测性能,并具有较好的实时性。

Diffusion mechanism simulation of cloud manufacturing complex network based on cooperative game theory

Cloud manufacturing is a specific implementation form of the "Internet + manufacturing" strategy. Why and how to develop cloud manufacturing platform(CMP), however, remains the key concern of both platform operators and users. A microscopic model is proposed to investigate advantages and diffusion forces of CMP through exploration of its diffusion process and mechanism. Specifically, a three-stage basic evolution process of CMP is innovatively proposed. Then, based on this basic process, a more complex CMP evolution model has been established in virtue of complex network theory, with five diffusion forces identified. Thereafter, simulations on CMP diffusion have been conducted. The results indicate that, CMP possesses better resource utilization,user satisfaction, and enterprise utility. Results of simulation on impacts of different diffusion forces show that both the time required for CMP to reach an equilibrium state and the final network size are affected simultaneously by the five diffusion forces. All these analyses indicate that CMP could create an open online cooperation environment and turns out to be an effective implementation of the "Internet + manufacturing" strategy.

Research on the Effects of the Most Used Market Power Mitigation Mechanisms Considering Different Market Environments

The market power mitigation method of the supply-side has become one of the key points affecting the stability of the electricity spot market.Different mitigation mechanisms are used in the current mature electricity markets of the world.However,the same market power mitigation mechanism shows different effects in different market environments.Every market operator in the world needs the most efficient way to mitigate market power.Considering that there is no relevant literature discussing the market power effects of different mitigation methods in detail,the mitigation effects need to be discussed and further researched.So,we analyze the effects of the most utilized market power mitigation mechanisms while considering different market environments.Firstly,we establish a Nash-Stackelberg interactive game model to simulate the competitive strategies of power suppliers.Secondly,the different market power mitigation approaches are modeled.Then,a multi-agent system(MAS)genetic interior-point algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of suppliers.Finally,through the simulation analysis,the market power mitigation effects of different mechanisms while considering three operation states of the system in two market structures are all analyzed.

Study on Game Model of Information Disclosure and Supervision

In recent years, the infringements of information disclosure are conspicuous in listed companies in China, which has seriously impeded the healthy development of the capital market. In this paper, the results of regulations of the infringements by means of the game theory and our findings suggest that we should witness less cases of violations when we intensify own efforts to check up and punish those violations, and lower the return of the infringement. At the same time, we would increase the effect of supervising violated behavior when we strengthen the deterrence.

Practice performing the game is used in the English teaching of primary school

This article regard exciting pupil’s interest to study English as starting point, stress to use performance game form “learn from acting” “learn from experience”, this paper elaborates that performance game activity suit psychological characteristic of children, prove terms that game select suitable materials, role in English teaching of game and English of children, I think the game is an effective means of happy teaching and Learn Independent from children’s English.

冬奥会促进就业:国际镜鉴与中国方略

承办冬奥会是张家口市千载难逢的发展契机,在经济下行压力增大的背景下,如何借助冬奥会综合效益推动城市经济增长、缓解就业压力亟需破题。基于此,文章聚焦冬奥会促进举办城市就业这一议题,在劳动经济学、区域经济学理论指导下,利用文献资料法、数理统计法及对比研究法,研究了冬奥会促进举办城市就业的特殊价值与历史经验,并以此为关照,在测算2022年冬奥会对张家口市直接就业带动贡献的基础上,尝试提出后冬奥时代张家口市就业促进的优化策略。

品牌电商的直播模式选择与直播双渠道决策模型

直播带货是当前企业促销的利器。基于博弈论方法,在无粉丝效应和存在粉丝效应两种情况下,构建品牌电商分别引入自营直播和网红主播直播下的两种直播双渠道决策模型,并进行模型求解和数值仿真分析。研究发现:品牌电商引入直播渠道可提升总体收益,品牌电商的直播模式选择受到消费者直播渠道偏好、网红主播的佣金率、粉丝规模等因素的影响,两种直播模式下定价和直播营销努力水平受到消费者直播渠道偏好、主播影响力、粉丝规模及佣金率影响,粉丝效应将推升直播模式下的产品售价。

从博弈到协同:城市学校体育场地对外开放治理的实现路径

城市学校体育场地对外开放是用好群众身边的体育设施、缓解群众“健身去哪儿”难题的重要举措。研究基于协同治理理论,采用博弈论的分析方法,揭示城市学校体育场地对外开放困境的形成逻辑,分析国家有关政策的执行效应及地方政府、各职能部门与学校间的多重博弈关系。提炼厦门市学校体育场地对外开放经验,发现民生体育价值理念能有效促使多元利益主体从博弈走向协同,地方政府整合协同治理要素,实施高位推动的治理结构、政绩共容的制度安排、权责匹配的集体行动与技术赋能的实践图景,能实现学校体育场地对外开放协同治理的良好效果。

直播电商下厂家、MCN机构及主播动态运营策略

直播电商的营销模式在激活消费市场、推动经济增长等方面具有重要作用。本文综合考虑主播影响力和消费者参考质量效应的影响,针对由厂家、网红孵化机构(multi-channel network,MCN)及主播构成的直播电商体系,分别从参考质量效应、观众打赏、MCN机构补贴以及电商平台补贴角度构建5种决策模型,并对比分析其动态均衡策略及绩效水平。研究结果表明:消费者参考质量效应有利于提高直播电商体系成员的相关努力程度和绩效水平;观众打赏能够在一定程度上激励主播相应努力水平,进而推动直播电商体系整体利润的提高;MCN机构对主播提供补贴的先决条件取决于双方的边际收益和主播所获的观众打赏情况,满足其先决条件后能够在一定程度上消除双重边际效应从而实现直播电商体系的Pareto改善;此外,来自电商平台的补贴能够实现直播电商体系的完全协调,且补贴比率受成员博弈地位、收益情况及观众打赏的共同影响。

On the Application of Game-playing in the English Vocabulary Teaching for Junior High School Students

As is known to all,mastering a quantity of vocabulary is the key of English learning.Literature research,observational method and empirical research are the main methodologies of the study.The interview and corresponding sound recording help figure out the traditional vocabulary teaching methodologies.The finished questionnaire plays an important role in getting familiar with participants’vocabulary learning conditions.The results of the study manifest that game-playing method takes effect in vocabulary teaching.Not only can the games activate participants’enthusiasm,but also involve them in the activity and help focus on their attention.It is beneficial to help them mastering vocabularies more firmly.

严肃游戏在高职护理教学中应用效果评价探讨

为了深入探究严肃游戏在高职护理教学中的应用效果,随机选取学生分为实验组和对照组。在实验组中采取严肃游戏辅助教学手段,在对照组中采取传统的教学模式。实验组的理论和实践技能表现、评判性思维能力和团队合作能力表现显著高于对照组,在统计学意义上具有显著差异(p<0.05)。充分彰显了严肃游戏在高职护理教学中的有效性,进一步验证了严肃游戏作为一种创新教学方法对教学效果的积极影响。

基于改进分层博弈交叉效率模型的政策评价

政策评估作为政策实施过程中的关键环节,是检验政策效果的基本途径与实现资源优化配置的重要依据.在复杂博弈情境下,决策单元群体间竞合关系不变的假设已经不能满足现实中效率评价的需求,考虑群体间动态变化的合作与竞争关系至关重要.本文将外界冲击下主体间竞合关系演变纳入效率评价框架,提出改进分层博弈交叉数据包络分析方法:从公平的视角出发,基于二次目标模型构建多层次效率矩阵,结合Shapley值对决策单元动态关系演变进行效率评价,进而,以水权交易市场试点政策为例,验证该模型的可行性.该方法放松了政策前后群体竞合关系稳定的假设,验证了水权交易市场政策的有效性和外溢性,为能源与环境领域试点政策效果评价提供了新方法.

考虑延迟效应的标准联盟技术标准化

技术标准联盟是实现技术标准化的重要载体,由于不同企业在技术基础、吸收能力和市场把控等方面存在差距,联盟的技术标准化存在延迟特征。然而,延迟时间对联盟技术标准化产生的影响尚不明确。基于此,在考虑延迟效应影响的基础上,构建了联盟企业技术标准化问题微分博弈模型,考察了3种不同博弈机制下联盟主导企业与配套企业的最优策略、最优收益和标准研发及扩散情况,探讨了标准化延迟时间对联盟企业策略选择的影响。研究发现:延迟时间正向影响联盟企业的标准化努力程度、技术水平和标准市场占有率,负向影响主导企业为配套企业承担的标准化成本比例和联盟整体收益。延迟时间存在3个阈值,只有当延迟时间小于最小阈值时,协同合作机制才明显优于其他机制;当延迟时间大于最大阈值时,联盟成员在Nash非合作机制下达到最优决策。3种博弈机制对联盟标准化的促进作用不同,Nash非合作机制只有在联盟发展程度较低时才能缓慢地促进技术标准化行为,协同合作机制能够在联盟发展程度较高的基础上仍以较大的幅度推动技术标准化,加快技术标准的扩散。

农户风险规避、羊群效应与农业绿色生产转型——基于“企业+合作社+农户”模式的演化博弈分析

基于3方演化博弈,构建政府补贴条件下“企业+合作社+农户”农业绿色生产转型博弈模型,引入农户风险规避、羊群效应,研究3方主体行为的演化规律和稳定策略,并利用Matlab软件进行数值仿真.结果表明:企业、合作社、农户均需要政府补贴的帮助,政府的补贴力度越大,系统收敛至理想状态的速度越快;企业、合作社、农户任何一方不进行绿色生产转型都会使得转型成本剧增;农户的风险规避程度越高,农业绿色生产转型就越难以实现;农户中存在的羊群效应有利于农业绿色生产方式在农户中传播.基于此提出“企业+合作社+农户”模式下农业绿色生产转型相关建议.

碳核查合谋行为的奖惩动态性与时滞性研究

在当前全球致力于实现碳达峰、碳中和的背景下,建立一个高效且可信的碳市场对于促进碳排放减少至关重要。为保障碳市场运行中碳排放报告数据的真实性、可靠性和科学性,中国政府借鉴国际碳核查运行机制,采取了一套监测(monitoring,M)、报告(reporting,R)、核查(verification,V),即MRV体系,其核心是地方政府引入第三方核查机构对企业碳排放报告进行核查,并将结果反馈给政府。而在实际运行中,会出现合谋问题,即排放企业通过向第三方机构寻租从而隐瞒真实的碳排放量,此类合谋问题给碳市场合规运行带来挑战。为探究地方政府如何解决上述合谋问题,该研究构建了3种演化博弈模型,分别是静态奖惩模型、动态奖惩模型和时滞效应模型,在此基础上,基于中国深圳市碳市场运行数据进行理论分析与仿真分析。研究结果表明:(1)碳核查体系发展存在3个阶段,中间阶段是一个不稳定阶段,这一阶段碳核查体系中所有参与者意愿选择概率产生波动,造成了政府奖惩出现失效的情况。(2)动态奖惩机制的引入对于碳核查体系中间阶段产生的不稳定性具有正向的调节作用,可使得碳核查体系演化围绕着唯一的理想稳定策略趋近;而时滞效应的引入可以使系统更快地趋近理想稳定状态,对于不稳定性具有更明显的调节效果。(3)地方政府对第三方机构的监管比对排放企业的监管难度更大。因此,地方政府需要设定严格的第三方机构准入标准,并根据第三方机构与排放企业的行为,灵活制定奖惩措施,以确保碳核查体系的合规运行。

考虑低碳补贴和技术延迟的供应链效应研究

为促进我国低碳经济的发展,政府对低碳产业采取补贴政策。考虑到技术普遍存在延迟效应,为避免其对政府低碳补贴、供应链各成员利润和社会福利带来的动态影响,选择一个零售商和一个制造商组成的二级供应链,并构建了其与政府之间关于延迟效应的微分博弈模型。本文分别统计了长视策略与短视策略两种情况分别在分散型决策和集中型政策下的最优策略、碳减排量和企业信誉演化路径,并将结果对比分析后经研究认为:政府的低碳补贴比率和技术延迟时间呈负相关,对企业的经营发展起到了促进作用。而技术延迟时间过长则会使得制造商选择短视政策,从而不利于企业利润和社会福利的发展。集中型决策下的减排量和社会福利总是最优的,但延迟时间在一定范围内供应链利润才是最优的,一旦超过这个范围分散型决策下的供应链利润高。