The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized an...The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized and dynamic,few nodes in the network may not associate with other nodes.These uncooperative nodes also known as selfish nodes corrupt the performance of the cooperative nodes.Namely,the nodes cause congestion,high delay,security concerns,and resource depletion.This study presents an effective selfish node detection method to address these problems.The Price of Anarchy(PoA)and the Price of Stability(PoS)in Game Theory with the Presence of Nash Equilibrium(NE)are discussed for the Selfish Node Detection.This is a novel experiment to detect selfish nodes in a network using PoA.Moreover,the least response dynamic-based Capacitated Selfish Resource Allocation(CSRA)game is introduced to improve resource usage among the nodes.The suggested strategy is simulated using the Solar Winds simulator,and the simulation results show that,when compared to earlier methods,the new scheme offers promising performance in terms of delivery rate,delay,and throughput.展开更多
We study asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pai...We study asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We show that there exists an optimal solution that is a 9-approximate Nash equilibrium, significantly improving the existing upper bound of 54 on the instability factor. We present fast implementation of the best response dynamics for computing a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we perform empirical study on the price of stability, narrowing the gap between the lower and upper bounds to 0.7436.展开更多
文摘The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized and dynamic,few nodes in the network may not associate with other nodes.These uncooperative nodes also known as selfish nodes corrupt the performance of the cooperative nodes.Namely,the nodes cause congestion,high delay,security concerns,and resource depletion.This study presents an effective selfish node detection method to address these problems.The Price of Anarchy(PoA)and the Price of Stability(PoS)in Game Theory with the Presence of Nash Equilibrium(NE)are discussed for the Selfish Node Detection.This is a novel experiment to detect selfish nodes in a network using PoA.Moreover,the least response dynamic-based Capacitated Selfish Resource Allocation(CSRA)game is introduced to improve resource usage among the nodes.The suggested strategy is simulated using the Solar Winds simulator,and the simulation results show that,when compared to earlier methods,the new scheme offers promising performance in terms of delivery rate,delay,and throughput.
基金Supported in part by China 973 Project(Grant No.2011CB80800)National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.10531070,10721101,11222109 and 71101006)CAS Program for Cross & Cooperative Team of Science & Technology Innovation
文摘We study asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We show that there exists an optimal solution that is a 9-approximate Nash equilibrium, significantly improving the existing upper bound of 54 on the instability factor. We present fast implementation of the best response dynamics for computing a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we perform empirical study on the price of stability, narrowing the gap between the lower and upper bounds to 0.7436.
