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APPLICATION OF SINTAP TO THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF X65 PIPELINE STEEL
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作者 Deng Caiyan Zhang Yufeng Huo Lixing 《Chinese Journal of Mechanical Engineering》 SCIE EI CAS CSCD 2005年第3期389-392,共4页
The recently developed European flaw assessment procedure, structural integrity assessment procedure(SiNTAP) is applied to assessment for welded joints of the API 5L X65 pipeline steel with an assumed embedded flaw ... The recently developed European flaw assessment procedure, structural integrity assessment procedure(SiNTAP) is applied to assessment for welded joints of the API 5L X65 pipeline steel with an assumed embedded flaw and surface flaw at the weld toe. As one of the basic input data, fracture toughness crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) tests are conducted at 0℃ and performed according to the requirements of the standard of BS7448. For the heat affected zone (HAZ) specimens, the microstructure observation is performed to insure that the tip of the crack is located in the coarse grain zone. The result explains the dispersity of the test values. In structural integrity assessment procedure-fracture assessment diagram(SINTAP FAD) method, the failure curves of welded joints at level 1 and 3 are derived from the tensile test results. The results of the assessment show that all assessment points are located within the failure lines of analysis level 1 and 3. So the welded joint of the pipeline is safe. This study laid the foundation of application of SINTAP to pipeline structure assessment. 展开更多
关键词 Structural integrity assessment procedure(SINTAP) Crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) Fracture assessment diagram(FAD) Surface flaw Embedded flaw Safety assessment
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Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures 被引量:5
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作者 WANG Lei GAO HongWei +2 位作者 PETROSYAN Leon QIAO Han SEDAKOV Artem 《Science China Mathematics》 SCIE CSCD 2016年第5期1015-1028,共14页
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d... The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed. 展开更多
关键词 cooperative game theory coalition structure strategic stability imputation distribution procedure deviation instant ε-Nash equilibrium strong ε-Nash equilibrium
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