Non-Cooperative Game of Coordinated Scheduling of Parallel Machine Production and Transportation in Shared Manufacturing

Given the challenges of manufacturing resource sharing and competition in the modern manufacturing industry,the coordinated scheduling problem of parallel machine production and transportation is investigated.The problem takes into account the coordination of production and transportation before production as well as the disparities in machine spatial position and performance.A non-cooperative game model is established,considering the competition and self-interest behavior of jobs from different customers for machine resources.The job from different customers is mapped to the players in the game model,the corresponding optional processing machine and location are mapped to the strategy set,and the makespan of the job is mapped to the payoff.Then the solution of the scheduling model is transformed into the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game model.A Nash equilibrium solution algorithm based on the genetic algorithm(NEGA)is designed,and the effective solution of approximate Nash equilibrium for the game model is realized.The fitness function,single-point crossover operator,and mutation operator are derived from the non-cooperative game model’s characteristics and the definition of Nash equilibrium.Rules are also designed to avoid the generation of invalid offspring chromosomes.The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated through numerical experiments of various sizes.Compared with other algorithms such as heuristic algorithms(FCFS,SPT,and LPT),the simulated annealing algorithm(SA),and the particle swarm optimization algorithm(PSO),experimental results show that the proposed NE-GA algorithm has obvious performance advantages.

Cooperative Game Theory Based Coordinated Scheduling of Two-Machine Flow-Shop and Transportation

A cooperative game theoretical approach is taken to production and transportation coordinated scheduling problems of two-machine flow-shop(TFS-PTCS problems)with an interstage transporter.The authors assume that there is an initial scheduling order for processing jobs on the machines.The cooperative sequencing game models associated with TFS-PTCS problems are established with jobs as players and the maximal cost savings of a coalition as its value.The properties of cooperative games under two different types of admissible rearrangements are analysed.For TFS-PTCS problems with identical processing time,it is proved that,the corresponding games areσ_(0)-component additive and convex under one admissible rearrangement.The Shapley value gives a core allocation,and is provided in a computable form.Under the other admissible rearrangement,the games neither need to beσ_(0)-component additive nor convex,and an allocation rule of modified Shapley value is designed.The properties of the cooperative games are analysed by a counterexample for general problems.