Combined Optimal Dispatch of Thermal Power Generators and Energy Storage Considering Thermal Power Deep Peak Clipping and Wind Energy Emission Grading Punishment

Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.

Power,punishment,patriarchy in Shakespeare’s Othello

An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.

An Unusual Punishment

One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Online Gradient Methods with a Punishing Term for Neural Networks

Online gradient methods are widely used for training the weight of neural networks and for other engineering computations. In certain cases, the resulting weight may become very large, causing difficulties in the implementation of the network by electronic circuits. In this paper we introduce a punishing term into the error function of the training procedure to prevent this situation. The corresponding convergence of the iterative training procedure and the boundedness of the weight sequence are proved. A supporting numerical example is also provided.

Mathematical Neurolaw of Crime and Punishment: The <i>q</i>-Exponential Punishment Function

Whether people tend to punish criminals in a socially-optimal manner (i.e., hyperbolic punishment) or not is unknown. By adopting mathematical models of probabilistic punishment behavior (i.e., exponential, hyperbolic, and q-exponential probability discounting model based on Tsallis thermodynamics and neuroeconomics, Takahashi, 2007, Physica A;Takahashi et al., 2012, Applied Mathematics), we examined 1) fitness of the models to behavioral data of uncertain punishment, and 2) deviation from the socially optimal hyperbolic punishment function. Our results demonstrated that, the q-exponential punishment function best fits the behavioral data, and people overweigh the severity of punishment at small punishing probabilities and underweigh the severity of punishment at large punishing probabilities. In other words, people tend to punish crimes too severely and mildly with high and low arrest rate (e.g., homicide vs. excess of speed limit), respectively. Implications for neuroeconomics and neurolaw of crime and punishment (Takahashi, 2012, NeuroEndocrinology Letters) are discussed.

Role of Reward and Punishment in Education

This essay aims at illustrate the important role, of reward and punishment in education from a psychological viewpoint. According to Stimulus and Response theory, reward and punishment are now commonly used by teachers to encourage both congnitive activities and appropriate behaviour in classroom . Either of them can be used to encourage or supervise the students in learning, and rewarding is fawoured. However reward mechanism must be used properly and under control. It should 't be overused. Also, there is a place for punishment in education because errors need to be pointed out and antisocial behaviour should be corrected. It can be applied only when the intensity, duration and timing are carefully considered. In a word , reward system . is undoubtedly to have positive effect while punishment is proved to cause unpredictable result. Those specific informations are mentioned in the essay that follows.

The Rationale for Victims' Cooperation in Cases of Pleading Guilty and Accepting Punishment from the Perspective of Protecting the Right of Action

In the context of the more frequent application of the leniency system for pleading guilty and accepting punishment,the connotations of the rules on victim involvement should be enriched in the 2018 Criminal Procedure Law.Victims deeply influenced by the concept of cooperative justice will also have an intention to cooperate,thus resulting in a rationale for victims’cooperation.Victims’cooperation features a subjectivity of interactivity,understanding,and constraint.This kind of cooperation faces the accused,the procuratorial organ,and the court.The jurisprudential function of the rationale for cooperation of victims is embodied in such aspects as recognizing the victims as eligible subjects,enhancing the legal force of the recognizance in a case of pleading guilty and accepting punishment,and consolidating the legitimate basis for victim to obtain legal assistance.Oriented to protecting right of action of the victim,understanding and developing the rationale for the cooperation of the victim can start by reaching a judicial consensus on the"two limits"principle,optimizing the right of action system for victims,achieving the interconnection of multi-level litigation systems,and improving the rules on lenient punishment to enrich the plan for protecting victims’right of action in cases of pleading guilty and accepting punishment.

Discussion on the abolishment and recovery of corporal punishment in Xingfa Zhi of JinShu

Xingfa Zhi of JinShu recorded the field of ancient Chinese law live debate on major issues in detail,providing a vivid example in understanding the development of ancient Chinese law.These issues included the abolition of revenge,the Amnesty Penalty,the stability of law,the evolution of law,and the Abolishment and recovery of the corporal punishment.This article is only discussed on the related issues of the Abolishment and recovery of the corporal punishment.

Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance

In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect.

基于季节性碳交易机制的园区综合能源系统低碳经济调度

为有效提高碳排放配额分配的合理性,并且避免年度结算时碳排放量超标导致环境污染加剧问题,提出基于奖惩因子的季节性碳交易机制,以园区综合能源系统(park integrated energy system,PIES)为对象进行低碳经济调度。首先,构建包含能量层–碳流层–管理层的综合能源系统(integrated energy system,IES)运行框架,建立电气热多能流供需动态一致性模型;其次,分析系统内“日–季节–年度”碳排放特性,打破传统应用指标法的配额分配方法,采用灰色关联分析法建立碳排放配额分配模型,并基于奖惩阶梯碳价制定季节性碳交易机制;最后,以系统内全寿命周期运行成本及碳交易成本最小为目标,对执行季节性碳交易机制的PIES进行低碳经济调度,分析长时间尺度下季节性储能参与调度的减碳量。搭建IEEE 33节点电网5节点气网7节点热网的PIES,并基于多场景进行算例分析,验证此调度方法能够实现零碳经济运行,保证系统供能可靠性,为建立零碳园区奠定理论基础。

生态补偿视角下流域跨界水污染协同治理机制设计及演化博弈分析

针对流域相邻两地区和流域管理机构三方博弈主体,引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制,构建流域跨界水污染三方演化博弈理论模型。通过稳定性分析得出流域跨界水污染协同治理理想状态的稳定条件,并结合新安江流域生态补偿试点案例进行仿真分析。结果表明:(1)引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制可有效推动新安江流域相邻两地采取达标排放行为,促使系统达到(1, 1, 0)稳定状态;(2)动态奖惩机制组合使用有助于系统演化,从博弈主体初始意愿、实施效能和支持倾向等角度综合考虑,动态奖励-静态惩罚策略监管效果最优,动态奖励-动态惩罚策略次之;(3)流域跨界水污染协同治理的实现策略与相邻两地达标排放的治理成本与收益、双向生态补偿金额度、流域管理机构发放生态补偿奖励金额、积极监管成本和收益等因素密切相关。

认罪认罚从宽制度的再完善:以轻微犯罪治理为场域

目前,我国已经进入轻微犯罪时代。通过认罪认罚从宽制度治理轻微犯罪是重要的刑事司法途径。然而,轻微犯罪治理与认罪认罚从宽制度之间仍存在一定的不适性,特别是实体与程序的衔接不畅、治理需求与制度供给的不一致等。因此,应当强化轻微犯罪治理与认罪认罚从宽制度之间的契合度与协同性,以轻微犯罪治理的实际需求为导向,按照刑事一体化的理念,不断完善认罪认罚从宽制度及其相关的实施机制。当前,刑法与认罪认罚从宽制度之间的制度性“沟壑”亟待填补。为此,既需要调试现行刑法理论的互斥部分,也要重新审视刑法总则相关规定的适宜性和有效性,进而及时启动必要的实体性立法修正程序。《刑事诉讼法》修改在即,整合性的程序回应也势在必行,独立的认罪认罚从宽协商程序、更加健全的量刑协商机制等均是轻罪治理的主要关切点。

生态环境法典的罪刑条款设置

“《刑法典》是环境刑法更好的归属”的观点,只是一种主观判断,不一定符合事实;我国清末以来的刑法典都预设了多元刑事立法模式,单一刑法典模式不是由刑法典自身形成的,而是由于其他法律不设置罪刑条款形成的,生态环境法典应当直接设置环境犯罪的罪刑条款;罪刑条款应当与行为规则、行政处罚条款密切接近,故应采取分散型设置方式;行政刑法的特点是通过补强行为规则,确保行为规则的有效性,故生态环境法典中的罪刑条款通常采取行政犯的表述方式,但部分条款也可以采取刑法犯的表述方式;罪刑条款应以行政处罚条款为基础,通过增加不法要素与责任要素的方式,使环境犯罪具备应受刑罚处罚性;处理行政处罚与刑罚处罚的关系时,重在防止以刑罚处罚替代行政处罚;应当将行为人积极履行《民法典》规定的“修复生态环境责任”,规定为环境犯罪的减免处罚事由;生态环境法典中的罪刑条款设置应注重必要性、明确性、合理性、协调性,不必顾虑与现行刑法典中环境犯罪条款的重复与交叉。

地方政府为何会推进举报式执法?

举报式执法因其兼具工具价值和民主价值,被地方政府在社会管理时所选择应用。我国地方政府在举报式执法手段的选择与治理方式方面存在显著的地区差异性,以150787份通过公民举报而推进的行政处罚案件为研究对象,通过对中国各地区2015—2021年的面板数据进行测算与研究发现,地方财力、地方执法压力以及公众参与需求,是地方政府选择与公众进行合作、采取举报式执法治理手段的重要考量因素。此外,地方举报制度建设能够显著促进地方政府选择举报式执法,并提高合作治理程度。在下一阶段的中国社会治理改革中,地方政府应建立科学的举报奖励制度,促进政社合作,以举报式执法之优势缓解行政资源匮乏与政府信息不对称的治理问题。

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。