Evolutionary analysis of green credit and automobile enterprises under the mechanism of dynamic reward and punishment based on government regulation

To explore the green development of automobile enterprises and promote the achievement of the“dual carbon”target,based on the bounded rationality assumptions,this study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of gov-ernment,commercial banks,and automobile enterprises;introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism;and analyzed the development process of the three parties’strategic behavior under the static and dynamic reward and punish-ment mechanism.Vensim PLE was used for numerical simulation analysis.Our results indicate that the system could not reach a stable state under the static reward and punishment mechanism.A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively improve the system stability and better fit real situations.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechan-ism,an increase in the initial probabilities of the three parties can promote the system stability,and the government can im-plement effective supervision by adjusting the upper limit of the reward and punishment intensity.Finally,the implementa-tion of green credit by commercial banks plays a significant role in promoting the green development of automobile enter-prises.

Combined Optimal Dispatch of Thermal Power Generators and Energy Storage Considering Thermal Power Deep Peak Clipping and Wind Energy Emission Grading Punishment

Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.

Power,punishment,patriarchy in Shakespeare’s Othello

An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.

An Unusual Punishment

One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."

Bayesian prestack seismic inversion with a self-adaptive Huber-Markov random-field edge protection scheme

Seismic inversion is a highly ill-posed problem, due to many factors such as the limited seismic frequency bandwidth and inappropriate forward modeling. To obtain a unique solution, some smoothing constraints, e.g., the Tikhonov regularization are usually applied. The Tikhonov method can maintain a global smooth solution, but cause a fuzzy structure edge. In this paper we use Huber-Markov random-field edge protection method in the procedure of inverting three parameters, P-velocity, S-velocity and density. The method can avoid blurring the structure edge and resist noise. For the parameter to be inverted, the Huber- Markov random-field constructs a neighborhood system, which further acts as the vertical and lateral constraints. We use a quadratic Huber edge penalty function within the layer to suppress noise and a linear one on the edges to avoid a fuzzy result. The effectiveness of our method is proved by inverting the synthetic data without and with noises. The relationship between the adopted constraints and the inversion results is analyzed as well.

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Application of Noise Reduction Method Based on Birgé-Massart Threshold

Flue gas generator set is a kind of large high-speed rotating machinery in petrochemical industry.This research focuses on noise reduction algorithms basis ontheBirgé-Massartthreshold.Obtained the threshold through Penalization Strategy Provided by Birgé-Massart;constructed different modulus maximum vertex neighborhood on different wavelet transform decomposition scales to influence the search process of modulus maximum point;obtained the appropriate modulus maximum points sequence on various wavelet decomposition scales;highlighted state feature information;finally usedMallat staggered projection to reconstruct signals.In order to validate the effectiveness of the algorithm,it was compared with four kinds of threshold noise suppression methods namely Rigrsure,Sqtwolog,Heursure,Minimaxi.The results show that this algorithm has a better signal to noise ratio and mean-square error.

Effects of Probability of Revelation of Defection and Penalty to Defection on Cooperative Behavior in 2-Person Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game

In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

基于奖惩和协商主题优先级的多Agent多问题协商模型——MMNAPP

文章针对多Agent系统(multi-agent system,MAS)中Agent之间的协商问题提出了一个基于奖惩和协商主题优先级的多Agent多问题协商模型———MMNAPP,对Agent间的协商问题进行了有益的探索,为多A-gent系统中协商问题的最终解决提出了一种新的方法。

Online Gradient Methods with a Punishing Term for Neural Networks

Online gradient methods are widely used for training the weight of neural networks and for other engineering computations. In certain cases, the resulting weight may become very large, causing difficulties in the implementation of the network by electronic circuits. In this paper we introduce a punishing term into the error function of the training procedure to prevent this situation. The corresponding convergence of the iterative training procedure and the boundedness of the weight sequence are proved. A supporting numerical example is also provided.

漫谈英语委婉语

英语里的委婉语(Euphemism)来源于希腊语,意思是悦耳的话(good speech)。委婉语亦称婉言,婉曲,是英语中的一种修辞格。委婉语是人们在运用语言过程中发展起来的一种特殊技巧,当要表达的意思因种种原因不宜直说,不想直说,或不敢直说时,人们常常使用缓和或模糊的词语,有礼貌、有分寸地来表达。 近年来,英语的委婉使用较为广泛,同一意思的新的委婉说法层出不穷。其使用主要常见于下述几个方面。

Investigation on Instantaneous Meshing Stiffness and Profile Modification of Involute Helical Gear

An efficient finite element model of involute helical gear is presented. A program based on compliance matrix method is developed for the calculation of instantaneous meshing stiffness, and the relationship between the rate of meshing stiffness and overlap ratio is given. On the basis of stiffness calculation, an optimization program for the optimal design of profile modification is developed according to the principle of internal point punishment function method.

Mathematical Neurolaw of Crime and Punishment: The <i>q</i>-Exponential Punishment Function

Whether people tend to punish criminals in a socially-optimal manner (i.e., hyperbolic punishment) or not is unknown. By adopting mathematical models of probabilistic punishment behavior (i.e., exponential, hyperbolic, and q-exponential probability discounting model based on Tsallis thermodynamics and neuroeconomics, Takahashi, 2007, Physica A;Takahashi et al., 2012, Applied Mathematics), we examined 1) fitness of the models to behavioral data of uncertain punishment, and 2) deviation from the socially optimal hyperbolic punishment function. Our results demonstrated that, the q-exponential punishment function best fits the behavioral data, and people overweigh the severity of punishment at small punishing probabilities and underweigh the severity of punishment at large punishing probabilities. In other words, people tend to punish crimes too severely and mildly with high and low arrest rate (e.g., homicide vs. excess of speed limit), respectively. Implications for neuroeconomics and neurolaw of crime and punishment (Takahashi, 2012, NeuroEndocrinology Letters) are discussed.

Behaviours of Multi-Stakeholders under China’s Renewable Portfolio Standards:A Game Theory-Based Analysis

China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is difficult due to the interests of multiple stakeholders,including power generation enterprises,power grid companies,power users,local governments,and the central government.Based on China’s RPS policy and power system reform documents,this research sorted out the core game decision problems of China’s renewable energy industry and established a conceptual game decision model of the renewable energy industry from the perspective of local governments,power generation enterprises and power grid companies.The results reveal that for local governments,the probability of meeting the earnings quota or punishments for not reaching quota completion are the major determinants for active participation in quota supervision.For power grid firms,the willingness to accept renewable electricity quotas depends on the additional cost of receiving renewable electricity and governmental incentives.It is reasonable,from the theoretical perspective,to implement the RPS policy on the power generation side.Electricity reform will help clarify the electricity price system and increase the transparency of the quota implementation process.Policy implications are suggested to achieve sustainable development of the renewable energy industry from price incentives and quantity delivery.

Corporal Punishment of Minors in the Muslim Family in Israel

Corporal punishment was always considered a valid disciplinary measure in Muslim Arab culture to be used as deemed necessary to shape a minor＇s behavior. Applying physical force against children as punishment for unwanted behavior has become a normative part of parents＇ routine interaction with their children, despite the fact that it is forbidden by Israeli law. Psychologists that work with the Muslim Arab population find it difficult to convince parent of the difficulties and conflicts that they create by enforcing corporal punishment on their children. Parents tend to reject professional advice because it is viewed as conflicting with their cultural mentality and traditions and ignore the vast research that proves the ineffectiveness of this type of discipline and the complications that it may lead to. What＇s more, Sharia law, the religious Muslim legal code that governs the lives of Muslim Arabs in Israel, advocates and even encourages corporal punishment. Legislation and further professional intervention is necessary to change this harmful practice and to protect Muslim Arab children.

Muted Message： Capital Punishment in the Hollywood Cinema

Contemporary Hollywood films seem at first glance to be opposed to capital punishment. However, this article＇s consideration of five surprisingly similar films （Dead Man Walking, The Chamber, Last Dance, True Crime, and The Life of David Gale） finds that they do not truly and consistently condemn capital punishment. Instead of suggesting that the practice of capital punishment is fundamentally immoral and should in general be ended, the films champion only worthy individuals on death row and delight primarily in the personal growth of other characters who attempt to aid the condemned. In the end, Hollywood offers only a muted message regarding the on-going use of capital punishment.

Property Study of Daily Consecutive Penalty Provision in Environment Laws of Taiwan Region

For the person violating prevention and control measures or has caused pollution, environment laws all set penalty provision. Moreover, for the person still does not improve within limited period, there is daily consecutive penalty provision. For that legal properties of these daily consecutive penalty provisions are administrative order penalty or administrative execution penalty,judicial practice in Taiwan always has different views. The target of ＂daily consecutive penalty＇ is compelling doers to fulfill their obligations or improve illegal state by continuously increasing property burden of obligor. The emphasis is fulfilling future responsibility or improving future,but not punishing the past violations. To realize the target of com- pelling obligor to improve,we should take administrative compulsory execution means. So, for the property of daily consecutive penalty,we should cleady position daily consecutive penalty as administrative execution penalty,and not only its penalty target has difference with administrative order penalty, but also made way and law enforcement focus are different from administrative order penalty.

Spread of Commercial Bribery and Private Sector Responsibilities in China

After years of governance, the momentum of the spread of commercial bribery in China has yet to be effectively curbed. Commercial bribery has become a major form ofcorruption in China, but there are very jew studies on this topic. This paper discusses commercial briber）, in terms of economics on transactions between the supplier （the bribegiver） and the demander （the bribe-taker）, analyzing reasons for the spread of commercial briberyin China from an economic perspective. The authors find that China＇s commercial bribery governance focuses on punishing the public sector and bribe-takers while it lacks sufficient governance measures on the private sector to address bribe-givers. This form of governance is dramatically different from that utilized in countries with mature market economies as well as some international organizations, which have different measures fortackling commercial bribery. Does governance have a causal effect on the spread of commercial bribery in China？The authors use penalty severity to indicate the private sector ＇srole and use a commercial bribery game under perfect rationality and evolutionary game theory models under bounded rationality to reveal the conditions and mechanism of the origin and spread of commercial bribery. The authors also analyze the role of the private sector （the potential bribe-giver） and the role of the punishment mechanism in commercial bribery governance. Results show that the penalties for bribe-giving are less severe than penaltiesfor bribe-taking. There is an especially clear asymmetric relationship between economic penalties for the bribe-giverand economic benefits gained from bribing, and the authors propose that this disparity is the institutional cause of the spread of commercial bribery in China. Froma local equilibrium and static perspective, asymmetric punishment is important for breaking down the alliance between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taken But from the general equilibrium and dynamic perspective, asymmetric punishment raises the potential bribe-giver＇s expected benefits, attracting the potential bribe-giver and encouraging the potential bribe-giver to extend the bribe offer. In this＇ regard, asymmetric punishment is an institutional defect of China＇s commercial bribery governance. Symmetric punishment mechanisms, with an emphasis on prevention and control, makes＇ the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker subject to the same level of criminal punishmentandalso raises a bribe-giver＇s .financial penaltiesto a level higher than the expected benefits. This in turn has the power tolimit the bribe-giver＇s bribery motivation and ability, leading the bribe-giver togive up bribery voluntarily through rational choice, and eventually curbing the spread of commercial bribery.