Reflection on methodology of the correlation between electromagnetic interference and safety in high-speed railway

Purpose – In the continuous development of high-speed railways, ensuring the safety of the operation controlsystem is crucial. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) faults in signaling equipment may cause transportationinterruptions, delays and even threaten the safety of train operations. Exploring the impact of disturbances onsignaling equipment and establishing evaluation methods for the correlation between EMI and safety isurgently needed.Design/methodology/approach – This paper elaborates on the necessity and significance of studying theimpact of EMI as an unavoidable and widespread risk factor in the external environment of high-speed railwayoperations and continuous development. The current status of research methods and achievements from theperspectives of standard systems, reliability analysis and safety assessment are examined layer by layer.Additionally, it provides prospects for innovative ideas for exploring the quantitative correlation between EMIand signaling safety.Findings – Despite certain innovative achievements in both domestic and international standard systems andrelated research for ensuring and evaluating railway signaling safety, there’s a lack of quantitative and strategic research on the degradation of safety performance in signaling equipment due to EMI. A quantitativecorrelation between EMI and safety has yet to be established. On this basis, this paper proposes considerationsfor research methods pertaining to the correlation between EMI and safety.Originality/value – This paper overviews a series of methods and outcomes derived from domestic andinternational studies regarding railway signaling safety, encompassing standard systems, reliability analysisand safety assessment. Recognizing the necessity for quantitatively describing and predicting the impact ofEMI on high-speed railway signaling safety, an innovative approach using risk assessment techniques as abridge to establish the correlation between EMI and signaling safety is proposed.

Safety Assessment of Closed-Loop Level Crossing Control Systems by Means of STAMP(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes)

There have been a large number of accidents at level crossings of railways and this has been considered to be a significant issue to be solved for the realization of safe and stable railway transport.A conventional level crossing control system is characterized by the use of two types of electronic train detectors;one detects a train approaching to a level crossing section and the other then detects the train having left the level crossing.By contrast,closed-loop level crossing control systems in which level crossing control equipment and train-borne equipment communicate with each other have been advocated and are expected to serve as an effective solution to the abovementioned issue.This paper describes the following three types of closed-loop level crossing control systems:decentralized level crossing control system,fully-centralized comprehensive level crossing control system and fully-centralized individual level crossing control system.This paper then assesses the safety of these systems in comparison to the conventional level crossing control system.For the purpose of the assessment of their safety,a new accident analysis model called STAMP(systems theoretic accident model and processes)that is suitable for software intensive systems is used to clarify the advantage of the proposed three types of level crossing control systems in terms of safety.

Interlocking System for CBTC (Communication Based Train Control) System

In recent years,the environment of railways and the systems such as CBTC(communication based train control)have been changing.To respond the changes and the needs of customers,a UTCS(unified train control system)has been developed to realize a system that evolves with customers.Previous type systems consist of independent components such as ATC(Automatic train control)system,electronic interlocking system,and facility monitoring system,and there are a complicated overlap of system configurations and functions and difference in concept between the systems.On the other hand,the integrated train control system consists of horizontal layers such as function layer,network layer,and terminal layer.Therefore,the system has been developed to make it simple with no unnecessary redundancy and evolving to meet the needs of customers.In this paper,we explain a method that realizes the interlocking function for CBTC system in the function layer based on the concept of“securing a train travelling path”including path blocking and routing,and evaluate the safety of the method using STAMP/STPA.