Risk assessment of transnational oil investment in Central Asia using a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method

Central Asia(including five countries:Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan,and Tajikistan)is rich in oil reserves and has become one of the most important target regions for global oil investment.The construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt has prompted Central Asia to look outwards for more collaborations in the oil industry.China's need for oil investment in Central Asia has also increased significantly.This research established a comprehensive index system for assessing the risks of transnational oil investment in Central Asia.The system incorporated political,regulatory,economic,social,and infrastructural indices.Based on the Delphi method and fuzzy comprehension evaluation method,we qualitatively and quantitatively assessed and analyzed the risks of transnational oil investment in Central Asia.The results indicate that the risk score for regulatory risk was highest with the value of 6.1670,indicating a high risk level in transnational oil investment,followed by economic,social,political,and infrastructural risk indices.Of the 18 secondary risk indices calculated,there were seven indices with the probability of high risk occurrence exceeded 30.0%and the descending order was as follows:establishment of mining rights;host country intervention in operations;taxing system;stability of regulations;war and turmoil;labor capital;and ethnic,cultural,and religious differences.These seven critical risks should be watched closely and avoided during transnational oil investment in Central Asia.This study provides a comprehensive understanding of the potential risks of investing oil in Central Asia.The findings demonstrate the causes of these risks and provide a scientific basis for reasonably avoiding oil investment risk and improving investment benefits for both host and investing countries.

Interactive information disclosure and non-penalty regulatory review risk

Using monthly data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's‘Hudongyi’platform and comment letters from December 2014 to December 2018,this study investigates the influence of interactive information disclosure on non-penalty regulatory review risk.The findings reveal that the richness and activeness of interactive information disclosure are positively associated with regulatory review risk.Moreover,the non-penalty regulatory review is effective as it significantly reduces the probability of receiving a comment letter in the subsequent three periods.The timeliness of interactive information disclosure is negatively associated with regulatory review risks.Additionally,we find that newspaper media coverage partially mediates the relationship between interactive information disclosure and regulatory review risk.For companies with low levels of internal governance,in low-competitive industries,and state-owned companies,the positive relationship between the number of investor questions and regulatory review risk is strengthened.These findings enrich the literature on the determinants of regulatory review risk and the economic consequences of interactive information disclosure in emerging markets.

Coping strategy of independent directors for job-fulfillment risk under different ownership types and enforced legal environments

Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.