Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore ...Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.展开更多
From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the ...From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the regional distribution in our country,except for Beijing,Shanghai,Tianjin and Hainan,the debt risk mainly concentrates in the western region.In a further step,it can be seen that this risk of debt is resulted by the imbalanced relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”which contains none-accordance of debt power(such as debt financing power),confusion of debt responsibility(such as debt management responsibility)and distortion of debt interests(such as the private benefit and the public interests).If we want to correct this problem,the keynote is to prevent the local government’s debt to be used by the purpose of reaching the private interests.Actually,it should play a role that the local debt financing takes to the“faithful”service for the social interests.For realizing this purpose,it should keep eyes on the relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”,which is the most important factor as for setting up the control system of debt risk about our local governments.Particularly,it includes the following aspects.First of all,it should find the right time to empower the local government with the debt power.Secondly,on the basis of both positive and negative sides,it should design a system to restrict the debt responsibility in the local government,in order to solve the problems such as new debt,invalid debt and overdue debt expansion.Thirdly,it should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.展开更多
党的十八届五中全会提出绿色新发展理念后,地方政府在促进企业绿色转型过程中担负重要职责。基于2015-2021年中国A股上市公司数据,将绿色地方政府专项债(简称绿色专项债)发行信息与企业环境、社会和公司治理(Environmental,Social and G...党的十八届五中全会提出绿色新发展理念后,地方政府在促进企业绿色转型过程中担负重要职责。基于2015-2021年中国A股上市公司数据,将绿色地方政府专项债(简称绿色专项债)发行信息与企业环境、社会和公司治理(Environmental,Social and Governance,简称ESG)评分数据匹配,通过构建多时点双重差分模型实证检验发行绿色专项债对企业ESG评分的影响。研究发现,绿色专项债的发行显著提高了企业ESG评分,这一结论经过一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现,该促进作用不仅通过提高企业绿色管理和绿色技术创新水平实现,还存在诱发企业“漂绿”自身报表的风险。此外,该促进作用在企业所处行业、所有制和所在地财政压力方面呈现出显著的异质性。基于上述结论,将地方政府专项债和绿色发展理念相联系、进一步推广绿色专项债,对发挥地方政府在环境治理中的作用和推动企业绿色转型具有重要意义。展开更多
基金the financial support from the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China(2022M720131)Spring Sunshine Collaborative Research Project of the Ministry of Education(202201660)+3 种基金Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation(22JR5RA542)General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation(2022YB014)National Natural Science Foundation of China(72034003,72243006,and 71874074)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2023lzdxjbkyzx008,lzujbky-2021-sp72)。
文摘Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.
文摘From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the regional distribution in our country,except for Beijing,Shanghai,Tianjin and Hainan,the debt risk mainly concentrates in the western region.In a further step,it can be seen that this risk of debt is resulted by the imbalanced relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”which contains none-accordance of debt power(such as debt financing power),confusion of debt responsibility(such as debt management responsibility)and distortion of debt interests(such as the private benefit and the public interests).If we want to correct this problem,the keynote is to prevent the local government’s debt to be used by the purpose of reaching the private interests.Actually,it should play a role that the local debt financing takes to the“faithful”service for the social interests.For realizing this purpose,it should keep eyes on the relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”,which is the most important factor as for setting up the control system of debt risk about our local governments.Particularly,it includes the following aspects.First of all,it should find the right time to empower the local government with the debt power.Secondly,on the basis of both positive and negative sides,it should design a system to restrict the debt responsibility in the local government,in order to solve the problems such as new debt,invalid debt and overdue debt expansion.Thirdly,it should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.
文摘党的十八届五中全会提出绿色新发展理念后,地方政府在促进企业绿色转型过程中担负重要职责。基于2015-2021年中国A股上市公司数据,将绿色地方政府专项债(简称绿色专项债)发行信息与企业环境、社会和公司治理(Environmental,Social and Governance,简称ESG)评分数据匹配,通过构建多时点双重差分模型实证检验发行绿色专项债对企业ESG评分的影响。研究发现,绿色专项债的发行显著提高了企业ESG评分,这一结论经过一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现,该促进作用不仅通过提高企业绿色管理和绿色技术创新水平实现,还存在诱发企业“漂绿”自身报表的风险。此外,该促进作用在企业所处行业、所有制和所在地财政压力方面呈现出显著的异质性。基于上述结论,将地方政府专项债和绿色发展理念相联系、进一步推广绿色专项债,对发挥地方政府在环境治理中的作用和推动企业绿色转型具有重要意义。
