This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We ...This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We then define the relevant market by implementing the SSNIP test （a.k.a. the hypothetical monopolist test）. Finally, we evaluate the unilateral effect on the juices market with merger simulation. Our results show that carbonated soft drinks and juicess are in two separate relevant markets. More importantly, there may, be a significant unilateral effect on the juices market based on scenario analysis. 7his result confirms the MOFCOM decision itself, but highlights that competition damage comes more from unilateral efect than from the dubious portfolio effect.展开更多
文摘This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We then define the relevant market by implementing the SSNIP test （a.k.a. the hypothetical monopolist test）. Finally, we evaluate the unilateral effect on the juices market with merger simulation. Our results show that carbonated soft drinks and juicess are in two separate relevant markets. More importantly, there may, be a significant unilateral effect on the juices market based on scenario analysis. 7his result confirms the MOFCOM decision itself, but highlights that competition damage comes more from unilateral efect than from the dubious portfolio effect.
