Market participants can only bid with lagged information disclosure under the existing market mechanism,which can lead to information asymmetry and irrational market behavior,thus influencing market efficiency.To prom...Market participants can only bid with lagged information disclosure under the existing market mechanism,which can lead to information asymmetry and irrational market behavior,thus influencing market efficiency.To promote rational bidding behavior of market participants and improve market efficiency,a novel electricity market mechanism based on cloudedge collaboration is proposed in this paper.Critical market information,called residual demand curve,is published to market participants in real-time on the cloud side,while participants on the edge side are allowed to adjust their bids according to the information disclosure prior to closure gate.The proposed mechanism can encourage rational bids in an incentive-compatible way through the process of dynamic equilibrium while protecting participants’privacy.This paper further formulates the mathematical model of market equilibrium to simulate the process of each market participant’s strategic bidding behavior towards equilibrium.A case study based on the IEEE 30-bus system shows the proposed market mechanism can effectively guide bidding behavior of market participants,while condensing exchanged information and protecting privacy of participants.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.U1966204,No.52122706)。
文摘Market participants can only bid with lagged information disclosure under the existing market mechanism,which can lead to information asymmetry and irrational market behavior,thus influencing market efficiency.To promote rational bidding behavior of market participants and improve market efficiency,a novel electricity market mechanism based on cloudedge collaboration is proposed in this paper.Critical market information,called residual demand curve,is published to market participants in real-time on the cloud side,while participants on the edge side are allowed to adjust their bids according to the information disclosure prior to closure gate.The proposed mechanism can encourage rational bids in an incentive-compatible way through the process of dynamic equilibrium while protecting participants’privacy.This paper further formulates the mathematical model of market equilibrium to simulate the process of each market participant’s strategic bidding behavior towards equilibrium.A case study based on the IEEE 30-bus system shows the proposed market mechanism can effectively guide bidding behavior of market participants,while condensing exchanged information and protecting privacy of participants.
