E-commerce is a typical form of retail digitalization that introduces online uncertainty and product returns.To decrease the negative influence of online uncertainty,the largest Chinese e-commerce company,the Alibaba ...E-commerce is a typical form of retail digitalization that introduces online uncertainty and product returns.To decrease the negative influence of online uncertainty,the largest Chinese e-commerce company,the Alibaba Group,invited an insurance company to develop return-freight insurance(RFI),a new kind of insurance,to compensate for consumers'losses in the event of online product returns.Complimentary RFl can increase consumer confidence in the retailer and attract more demand.Retailers who offer complimentary RFI demonstrate to consumers that their products and services are too good to incur excessive product returns.However,some low-quality online retailers can mimic competitors'behavior by offering complimentary RFI to consumers.This study aims to introduce an innovative online return policy based on RFI and to explore whether lowquality online retailers would use complimentary RFI as their return strategy to mislead consumers.Using signaling theory,we built a conceptual economic model that includes three exogenous pricing variables:RF,insurance premium,and compensation.These variables play different roles in the model because consumers cannot observe the insurance premium,but the compensation can be.The main finding of this study is that innovative complimentary RFI could be abused by low-type retailers when the premium and compensation are appropriate.Interestingly,compensation plays different roles for retailers with different product values:low-type retailers use complimentary RFI as a noise tool.When the product works for the consumer and the insurance profit is not too high,the compensation for the low-quality product should be larger than that for the highquality product,which is different from conventional wisdom.Although high-type online retailers may use complimentary RFl as a product quality signal,there is still a significant risk that nefarious elements will use it to create product quality noise.展开更多
Motivated by the practice that e-sellers cooperate with insurance companies to offer consumers the return-freight insurance(RI),this paper aims to investigate the competing e-sellers’RI strategies.Regarding the infor...Motivated by the practice that e-sellers cooperate with insurance companies to offer consumers the return-freight insurance(RI),this paper aims to investigate the competing e-sellers’RI strategies.Regarding the information asymmetry in the online context,reputation system is widely applied by e-platforms.In an online market with two competing e-sellers that sell the same product but are differentiated in their reputation,this paper builds an analytical model to explore the e-sellers optimal pricing and RI strategies.Combined with sellers’reputation and their RI strategies,the equilibrium outcomes under four cases are discussed.This paper reveals the conditions that e-sellers are willing to offer RI.Specifically,the findings demonstrate that low reputation e-seller is more likely to offer RI.Moreover,when the sellers are more divergent,they are more likely to co-exist in the market.Insurance premium and RI compensation play critical roles in their decisions.RI introduction tends to increase the price,thus offsets the benefits of RI,but does not affect the total consumer surplus.展开更多
基金supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China(Grants 71431002 and 71872033)the Major Programs of the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grants 22&ZD159).
文摘E-commerce is a typical form of retail digitalization that introduces online uncertainty and product returns.To decrease the negative influence of online uncertainty,the largest Chinese e-commerce company,the Alibaba Group,invited an insurance company to develop return-freight insurance(RFI),a new kind of insurance,to compensate for consumers'losses in the event of online product returns.Complimentary RFl can increase consumer confidence in the retailer and attract more demand.Retailers who offer complimentary RFI demonstrate to consumers that their products and services are too good to incur excessive product returns.However,some low-quality online retailers can mimic competitors'behavior by offering complimentary RFI to consumers.This study aims to introduce an innovative online return policy based on RFI and to explore whether lowquality online retailers would use complimentary RFI as their return strategy to mislead consumers.Using signaling theory,we built a conceptual economic model that includes three exogenous pricing variables:RF,insurance premium,and compensation.These variables play different roles in the model because consumers cannot observe the insurance premium,but the compensation can be.The main finding of this study is that innovative complimentary RFI could be abused by low-type retailers when the premium and compensation are appropriate.Interestingly,compensation plays different roles for retailers with different product values:low-type retailers use complimentary RFI as a noise tool.When the product works for the consumer and the insurance profit is not too high,the compensation for the low-quality product should be larger than that for the highquality product,which is different from conventional wisdom.Although high-type online retailers may use complimentary RFl as a product quality signal,there is still a significant risk that nefarious elements will use it to create product quality noise.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71971165)the National Key Research and Development Program of China(2021YFB3301801)+1 种基金the MOE Project of Humanities and Social Science of China(19YJE630002)the Soft Science Research Program of Shannxi(2018KRZ005)。
文摘Motivated by the practice that e-sellers cooperate with insurance companies to offer consumers the return-freight insurance(RI),this paper aims to investigate the competing e-sellers’RI strategies.Regarding the information asymmetry in the online context,reputation system is widely applied by e-platforms.In an online market with two competing e-sellers that sell the same product but are differentiated in their reputation,this paper builds an analytical model to explore the e-sellers optimal pricing and RI strategies.Combined with sellers’reputation and their RI strategies,the equilibrium outcomes under four cases are discussed.This paper reveals the conditions that e-sellers are willing to offer RI.Specifically,the findings demonstrate that low reputation e-seller is more likely to offer RI.Moreover,when the sellers are more divergent,they are more likely to co-exist in the market.Insurance premium and RI compensation play critical roles in their decisions.RI introduction tends to increase the price,thus offsets the benefits of RI,but does not affect the total consumer surplus.