Principal-subordinate hierarchical multi-objective programming model of initial water rights allocation

The principal-subordinate hierarchical multi-objective programming model of initial water rights allocation was developed based on the principle of coordinated and sustainable development of different regions and water sectors within a basin. With the precondition of strictly controlling maximum emissions rights, initial water rights were allocated between the first and the second levels of the hierarchy in order to promote fair and coordinated development across different regions of the basin and coordinated and efficient water use across different water sectors, realize the maximum comprehensive benefits to the basin, promote the unity of quantity and quality of initial water rights allocation, and eliminate water conflict across different regions and water sectors. According to interactive decision-making theory, a principal-subordinate hierarchical interactive iterative algorithm based on the satisfaction degree was developed and used to solve the initial water rights allocation model. A case study verified the validity of the model.

Review on the Study of the Allocation of Corporate Control in Enterprise Theory

With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.

Comparative Study on Collective Forest Tenure Reform and Water Rights System Reform in China

Collective forest tenure reform and water rights system reform are two types of resource system reform initiated by the Chinese government since the implementation of the reform and opening policy of the 1980 s.Forest tenure reform has been completed and water rights system reform is ongoing.This study analyzes key points and problems with collective forest tenure reform and summarizes four typical successful reform measures and lessons that will have implications for the developing water rights system：the collective forest-cutting quota system,collective forest tenure compensation,collective forest tenure confirmation,and collective forest tenure trading center.A flexible water permission index,compensation measures in water rights trade,water rights approval,and various forms of water rights trading platforms are proposed as reform measures.This study fills a gap in comparative studies between two important resource system reforms in China and provides a reference for further reform and development of water rights systems locally and abroad.

Allocating Personal Data Rights: Toward Resolving Conflicts of Interest over Personal Data

Conflicts of interest over personal data arise from the variety of legal subjects involved and the value of personal data in today’s information society.This article attempts to resolve such conflicts of interest by examining the possibility of allocating data rights which balance competing interests.It suggests that the allocation of personal data rights should follow certain rules to ensure that the interests of relevant data subjects are protected.By examining the reasons for conflicts of interest over personal data,as well as the subjects and substance of such conflicts,the article puts forward an appropriate approach for allocating personal data rights by balancing the interests of different data subjects.For source data subjects,personal data rights are allocated,to protect personal information and data property interests;for data controllers,data property rights are allocated to protect their data property interests when they make data valuable,meanwhile liabilities are allocated to data controller,in case of infringing on other subjects'interests;for data supervisors(mostly the government),allocating the right to protect or make use of data on behalf of public interests and the power of supervising data use industry;for the data users,they are allocated data property rights with the consents of source data subjects and data controllers when make use of data.

Optimizing Allocation of Intellectual Property

The Coase theorem claims that as long as property rights are clearly defined, the allocation of resources can be optimized through free transactions. The authoritative nature of this claim means that its application in the field of intellectual property has seldom been questioned. Starting from an analysis of the characteristics of intellectual property, this article analyzes the applicability of the Coase theorem＇s black box theory of property rights, the welfare principle implied in the theorem and the effect of equitable knowledge dissemination. It seeks to reveal the shortcomings of the establishment and implementation of an intellectual property regime based completely on the Coase theorem so as to seek a new theoretical foundation for the optimization of intellectual property allocation.

A Realistic Path to Implementing China's Budget Law

The core issue for the implementation of modem budget law is to optimize the satisfaction of society＇s demand for public goods. The form of implementation mechanism that will best achieve this goal has thus become a major topic in the field of legal research. To go beyond the Anglo-Saxon budget model and construct a realistic path for the implementation of China＇s budget law, this issue needs to be explored from the perspective of Chinese citizens in a way that safeguards the fundamental interests of the people and is premised on upholding and improving the People＇s Congress system, so as to achieve a balance between internal and external budget allocation relationships. There are three routes to implementing China＇s budget law： the political, the social, and the judicial. Under the first, citizens＇ political identity interests are represented by deputies who oversee the budgetary powers of administrative bodies through the People＇s Congress. Under the second, citizens individually or collectively participate, influence or even decide the allocation of public economic resources through dialogue, negotiation, reasoning and argument with the responsible budgetary agency in the course of the budget＇s compilation, examination and approval, execution and supervision. Under the third, the establishment of a system for budgetary litigation allows citizens to participate in and supervise the implementation of the budget law, individually or collectively. This provides judicial security for the law＇s implementation. These three realistic implementation routes represent the dialectical unity of concerted institutional effort aimed directly at effective implementation of budget law. Judicial interpretations of budget law implementation indicate the importance and urgency of promoting national governance capacity through reform of the legal systems governing finance and taxation. This explains the significant role of finance and taxation law in national governance.