The Impact of Short Selling Disclosure Regulatory Constraint on the Lending Market and Stock Ownership

We examine the impact of the short sell disclosure(SSD)regime on the stock lending market and investor behaviors,employing a staggered difference-indifference(DiD)methodology.Our research reveals that the introduction of the disclosure regime enhances market transparency,resulting in a diminished appeal of stock ownership in the lending market for active investors.This shift is accompanied by a reduction in information leakage risks and longer loan durations.Specifically,our analysis reveals a significant decrease in the risk of loan recall by 4.87%,accompanied by an average increase of 23.72%in loan duration for short selling activities.Furthermore,the cost associated with short-sell disclosure causes a decline in both lending supply and short demand.

关于我国P2P的风险控制探讨——基于“lending club”和“人人贷”的对比分析

P2P,英文叫做Peer-to-Peer lending,即点对点网贷或个人对个人网贷。近年来,P2P行业在我国呈爆发式增长,但跑路、自融、诈骗等问题平台迭出,如何完善平台风险控制,是摆在监管层、行业和平台自身的切实问题。本文通过分析P2P发展模式,结合我国P2P发展现状及面临的风险现状,将国外最大的P2P公司"Lending Club"和国内较知名的P2P公司"人人贷"进行风险控制模式对比,从P2P平台、行业、监管等方面提出风险管理对策,以促进P2P网贷更有序、更阳光的发展。

Real option pricing method for R&D investment under changing risk-free rate and discount rate

The polynomial spline model, which belongs to the static term structure model of interest rates, is studied. Every cash flow of the project is discounted relatively accurately by obtaining the discount rate from the static term structure model of interest rates. A simple basic model, which belongs to the dynamic term structure model, is studied, and the option pricing formula under changing risk-free rates is obtained by bringing it into the option pricing formula. Both dynamic and static term structure models are estimated by the use of the data of buy-back rates and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and an example is given to compare the differences between the traditional method and the method under the changes in the interest rates and the discount rates.

大数据赋能下网络借贷的价值共创模式研究——来自Lending Club的证据

在数字经济背景下,以网络借贷平台为对象研究网络多边平台的价值共创模式并对全球最大网贷平台Lending Club的百万条借贷数据进行机器学习,实证研究表明网络借贷平台上借款人、平台和投资者通过互动和资源整合实现了价值共创:借款人贡献了价值共创所需的大数据资源,平台提供大数据能力进行风险定价从而降低了信息不对称,投资者则利用自身经验知识参与价值共创。

P2P网贷平台盈利模式研究——以宜人贷和LendingClub为例

近年来,国内P2P网贷行业经历过爆发式增长之后,发展逐渐回归理性。随着监管制度逐渐完善,国内P2P网贷平台更加难实现盈利,盈利问题受到了整个社会的广泛关注。本文对发展较为成熟的两大P2P网贷平台宜人贷和Lending Club的盈利模式进行了深入研究,并对国内P2P网贷平台盈利模式的改善提出了相应的对策建议。

论P2P行业发展的机制风险及政策建议——兼谈Lending Club违规案例的启示

通过介绍Lending Club的业务模式和违规案例情况,分析P2P行业发展的固有业务局限和机制风险,针对国内P2P行业的监管现状及问题,对互联网金融行业监管提出细化专项整治、探索穿透式监管及强化信息披露和完善征信体系建设等方面的政策建议。

对中国P2P网贷平台的思考——基于Lending Club欺诈事件

Lending Club欺诈事件给美国甚至全球P2P行业的发展蒙上了一层阴影。放眼国内,近几年P2P发展迅速,但风险事件频发,现恰逢我国P2P网贷行业专项整治的特殊时期,从Lending Club事件中得到启示具有重要的现实意义。

我国P2P行业的风险防范与应对——基于Lending Club违规事件的探讨

近两年来,我国P2P理财行业经历着井喷式的发展,新平台一家接一家诞生,行业交易额屡创新高,受到多家风险机构以及知名互联网企业的高度关注,但与此同时行业问题也逐步显现,尤其是2015年以来跑路事件等各类问题的集中爆发,

A Consortium Blockchain Paradigm on Hyperledger-Based Peer-to-Peer Lending System

This paper focuses on how to use consortium blockchain to improve the regulation of peer-to-peer(P2 P) lending market. The partial decentralized consortium blockchain with limited pre-set nodes can well improve transparency and security, which is suitable for financial regulation. Considering irregularities of the P2P lending market, the Hyperledger-based Peer-to-Peer Lending System(HyperP2PLS) is proposed. First elaborate the application scenario and business logic of the system, where a national P2P Lending Trading Center will be established to integrate all transactions and information of P2P lending market. Then construct the system architecture consisting of the blockchain network, HTTP server, and applications. The algorithm of implementation process and the web application for users have been well illustrated. The performance analysis shows that HyperP2PLS can guarantee the reliability, safety, transparency and efficiency.

How signaling and search costs affect information asymmetry in P2P lending:the economics of big data

In the past decade,online Peer-to-Peer(P2P)lending platforms have transformed the lending industry,which has been historically dominated by commercial banks.Information technology breakthroughs such as big data-based financial technologies(Fintech)have been identified as important disruptive driving forces for this paradigm shift.In this paper,we take an information economics perspective to investigate how big data affects the transformation of the lending industry.By identifying how signaling and search costs are reduced by big data analytics for credit risk management of P2P lending,we discuss how information asymmetry is reduced in the big data era.Rooted in the lending business,we propose a theory on the economics of big data and outline a number of research opportunities and challenging issues.

Consumer lending efficiency:commercial banks versus a fintech lender

Fintechs are believed to help expand credit access to underserved consumers without taking on additional risk.We compare the performance efficiency of LendingClub’s unsecured personal loans with similar loans originated by banks.Using stochastic frontier estimation,we decompose the observed nonperforming loan(NPL)ratio into three components:the best-practice minimum NPL ratio,the excess NPL ratio,and a statistical noise,the former two of which reflect the lender’s inherent credit risk and lending inefficiency,respectively.As of 2013 and 2016,we find that the higher NPL ratios at the largest banks are driven by inherent credit risk,rather than lending inefficiency.Smaller banks are less efficient.In addition,as of 2013,LendingClub’s observed NPL ratio and lending efficiency were in line with banks with similar lending volume.However,its lending efficiency improved significantly from 2013 to 2016.As of 2016,LendingClub’s performance resembled the largest banks–consistent with an argument that its increased use of alternative data and AI/ML may have improved its credit risk assessment capacity above and beyond its peers using traditional approaches.Furthermore,we also investigate capital market incentives for lenders to take credit risk.Market value regression using the NPL ratio suggests that market discipline provides incentives to make less risky consumer loans.However,the regression using two decomposed components(inherent credit risk and lending inefficiency)tells a deeper underlying story:market value is significantly positively related to inherent credit risk at most banks,whereas it is significantly negatively related to lending inefficiency at most banks.Market discipline appears to reward exposure to inherent credit risk and punish inefficient lending.

Team rivalry and lending on crowdfunding platforms:an empirical analysis

Background:Prosocial crowdfunding helps the underprivileged obtain non-profitseeking loans from multitudinous lenders.Some platforms introduce teamcompetition to motivate member participation and may thus induce team rivalry.Methods:We investigate how team rivalry affects lending decisions using data fromKiva.org.We argue that a rivalry relationship may engage teams to compete directlyagainst rivals by lending to the same project or prevent them from doing sobecause they intend not to cooperate.Result:We find that a team is less likely to lend to a project that has receivedfunding from its rival team,suggesting that rival teams tend to avoid cooperation.Conclusions:We discuss the implications of our findings for crowdfundingand competition-based motivation mechanisms in general.

COVID‑19 pandemic risk and probability of loan default:evidence from marketplace lending market

As the COVID-19 pandemic adversely affects the financial markets,a better understanding of the lending dynamics of a successful marketplace is necessary under the conditions of financial distress.Using the loan book database of Mintos(Latvia)and employing logit regression method,we provide evidence of the pandemic-induced exposure to default risk in the marketplace lending market.Our analysis indicates that the probability of default increases from 0.056 in the pre-pandemic period to 0.079 in the post-pandemic period.COVID-19 pandemic has a significant impact on default risk during May and June of 2020.We also find that the magnitude of the impact of COVID-19 risk is higher for borrowers with lower credit ratings and in countries with low levels of FinTech adoption.Our main findings are robust to sample selection bias allowing for a better understanding of and quantifying risks related to FinTech loans during the pandemic and periods of overall economic distress.

Borrower’s default and self-disclosure of social media information in P2P lending

Background:We examine the signaling effect of borrowers’social media behavior,especially self-disclosure behavior,on the default probability of money borrowers on a peer-to-peer(P2P)lending site.Method:We use a unique dataset that combines loan data from a large P2P lending site with the borrower’s social media presence data from a popular social media site.Results:Through a natural experiment enabled by an instrument variable,we identify two forms of social media information that act as signals of borrowers’creditworthiness:(1)borrowers’choice to self-disclose their social media account to the P2P lending site,and(2)borrowers’social media behavior,such as their social network scope and social media engagement.Conclusion:This study offers new insights for screening borrowers in P2P lending and a novel usage of social media information.

Machine learning approach to drivers of bank lending:evidence from an emerging economy

The study analyzes the performance of bank-specific characteristics,macroeconomic indicators,and global factors to predict the bank lending in Turkey for the period 2002Q4–2019Q2.The objective of this study is first,to clarify the possible nonlinear and nonparametric relationships between outstanding bank loans and bank-specific,macroeconomic,and global factors.Second,it aims to propose various machine learning algorithms that determine drivers of bank lending and benefits from the advantages of these techniques.The empirical findings indicate favorable evidence that the drivers of bank lending exhibit some nonlinearities.Additionally,partial dependence plots depict that numerous bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic indicators tend to be important variables that influence bank lending behavior.The study’s findings have some policy implications for bank managers,regulatory authorities,and policymakers.

How does an individual’s default behavior on an online peer-to-peer lending platform influence an observer’s default intention?

Previous studies indicate that individuals’default behaviors on online peer-to-peer(P2P)lending platforms greatly influence other borrowers’default intentions.However,the mechanism of this impact is not clear.Moreover,there is scarce research in regard to which factors influence the relationship between an individual’s default behavior and an observer’s default intention.These important questions are yet to be resolved;hence,we conducted two experiments using the scenario-based research method,focusing on Chinese online P2P lending platforms.Our results indicate that an individual’s default behavior can trigger an observer’s default intention as a result of the imperfect punitive measures as they currently exist on Chinese online P2P lending platforms.Both the observer’s moral disengagement level and pragmatic self-activation level serve as mediating variables.In situations where an observer knows an individual’s default behavior,the level of intimacy between the defaulter and observer positively affects the relationship between their default behavior and intention.The intimacy level also positively influences the relationship between the individual’s default behavior and the two mediator variables.Based on the findings,we provide management suggestions in the context of online P2P lending.Our study sets a foundation for future research to utilize other methods to extend the present research findings to other regions and domains.

An Analysis of the Loan Exit Gaming on Relationship Lending in China

This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.

P2P网络借贷运营模式研究——以陆金所和Lending Club为例

P2P是互联网金融中最热门的代表形式之一,较之于传统金融机构的高利率、高门槛,日益成为民间借贷的有效补充。从2013年开始,P2P网贷平台在中国进入了一个爆发增长的时期,但随后就是不断出现的系列风险事件。P2P网贷平台的运营模式引起了人们的广泛关注。本文以中美最具影响力的P2P网贷平台陆金所和Lendingclub为例,分析其运营模式及发展背景差异,并提出优化国内P2P网贷运营模式的对策建议。

An Analysis of Evolution of Lending Patterns of IFAD China's Rural Financial Project

This paper tells us briefly the background and aims of the fundation of IFAD.It points out that IFAD plays an important part in helping the development of agriculture and food production in developing countries,and in reducing the poverty conditions in the poorest countries.It tells us that IFAD has offered donation to China for 8 times,with a total amount reaching to 56.839 million dollars.With the development of the economy of China,IFAD has changed its lending financial policies to China from a highly beneficial policy to a moderate lending policy.The operation of the loan projects have greatly improved the living conditions and of the local and the conditions of agricultural production,promoting the improvement of economy,social stability,and enviroment.It discusses several lending patterns of IFAD China's rural financial projects.The government-leading model,which is represented by the IFAD financial lending loan.Market-oriented model of formal financial institutions,which is represented by IFAD Rural Credit Cooperatives,with market oriented.Government supporting as secondary model,which are dominated by IFAD Women's lending patterns and Village Development Fund lending model.In this paper,advantages and disadvantages of lending patterns are analyzed and evaluated.It discusses the development trend of IFAD financial lending patterns in terms of Rural Credit Cooperatives and a pattern which is community-oriented and farmers-benefited.

Soft Information,Core Competitive Edge and Private Relationship Lending——A Case of Village Banks

In view of the development problems of village banks,through introducing the concept of private relationship lending,the functions of soft information,the channels of village banks for collecting soft information,and the private relationship lending of village banks under Chinese rural human environment of highlighting relationship while despising rationality are proved.According to the recognition standard of core competitive edge,it can be concluded that the core competitive edge of village banks is private relationship lending.In the first place,these kinds of small and medium-sized quarter banks have competitive advantages in launching private relationship lending;in the second place,the lending businesses of village banks based on soft information attracts small and medium clients;in the third place,the private relationship lending has realized the scale economy.Furthermore,the reasons why village banks can not display the core competitive edge have been analyzed:firstly,village banks have not found that private relationship lending is their core competitive edge;secondly,the internal motivation on establishing private relationship lending of village banks is insufficient;thirdly,village banks have not prepared well in developing private relationship lending;The relevant policies and countermeasures are put forward,including transforming idea and vigorously developing private relationship lending;intensifying training and improving the quality of personnel involved;strengthening supervision and avoiding the violation behaviors of personnel involved;emulating experiences and perfecting the private relationship lending mechanism of village banks.