With the arrival of the ＂housing stock＂ in first - tier cities, the second - handhousing^market will become the dominant property market. This ardcle aim to the first - tiercities of second - hand housing prices and...With the arrival of the ＂housing stock＂ in first - tier cities, the second - handhousing^market will become the dominant property market. This ardcle aim to the first - tiercities of second - hand housing prices and new home price index for the empirical analysis, thedata related to the cointegration analysis found that the result of the first -tier cities real estatemarket in China, the new home price index is the significant factors influencing the second -hand house price indexi For Beijing, Shanghai second - hand housing and new home price in-dex time series johans test, found that there exists cointegration relationship between two varia-bles,the new city real estate market prices out of a line on the secondary market have clearguide. Therefore, the real estate market regulation aiming at the first -tier cities and the＂housing stock＂ should take the second - hand housing market as the main direction, startingwith the sale price and influencing factors of new houses. At the same time, in different cities,we should adhere to the city＇ s policies, reflect the policy differentiation, promote the reformof the real estate supply side, and promote the return of housing properties.展开更多
It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incen...It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.展开更多
文摘With the arrival of the ＂housing stock＂ in first - tier cities, the second - handhousing^market will become the dominant property market. This ardcle aim to the first - tiercities of second - hand housing prices and new home price index for the empirical analysis, thedata related to the cointegration analysis found that the result of the first -tier cities real estatemarket in China, the new home price index is the significant factors influencing the second -hand house price indexi For Beijing, Shanghai second - hand housing and new home price in-dex time series johans test, found that there exists cointegration relationship between two varia-bles,the new city real estate market prices out of a line on the secondary market have clearguide. Therefore, the real estate market regulation aiming at the first -tier cities and the＂housing stock＂ should take the second - hand housing market as the main direction, startingwith the sale price and influencing factors of new houses. At the same time, in different cities,we should adhere to the city＇ s policies, reflect the policy differentiation, promote the reformof the real estate supply side, and promote the return of housing properties.
基金Supported by Hubei Provincial Foundation for Natural Science under Contract 99J041 and 2001ABB104
文摘It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
