Regulatory agencies may,whether outside of set rules or within their discretion,depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules,which we term selective enforcement.Taking China,a country in tr...Regulatory agencies may,whether outside of set rules or within their discretion,depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules,which we term selective enforcement.Taking China,a country in transition,as an example,and using cases and large-sample tests,we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement.The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance.After controlling for the degree of violation,state-owned-enterprises(SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies;and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question,the less severe the punishment.It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished.We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously.This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies' expectations of obtaining refinancing.The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.展开更多
基金supported by the National Social Science Foundation(08CJY2009)the National Nature Science Foundation of China(70732002 and 70602011)+4 种基金the International Accounting PHD Program(IAPHD)scheme of Nanjing University for its supportthe Accounting and Finance Research Institute of the Shanghai University of Finance and the Center for Economic Transformation and Developmentthe Study of Economic Growth and Structural Transformationthe 985 plan topics of Nanjing University,the New Century Excellent Talents Projectthe First Scholarship Award for Excellent Doctoral Students of the Education Ministry for their support
文摘Regulatory agencies may,whether outside of set rules or within their discretion,depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules,which we term selective enforcement.Taking China,a country in transition,as an example,and using cases and large-sample tests,we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement.The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance.After controlling for the degree of violation,state-owned-enterprises(SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies;and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question,the less severe the punishment.It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished.We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously.This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies' expectations of obtaining refinancing.The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.
