In high jump, the determination of a student's theoretical best performance helps the elaboration of the PE teacher's early expectations. By affecting the student's motivation profile, knowledge of these expectatio...In high jump, the determination of a student's theoretical best performance helps the elaboration of the PE teacher's early expectations. By affecting the student's motivation profile, knowledge of these expectations will have an impact on his progress. The study focuses on two ninth grade classes, where both are presented with a contest, a test and a questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the cycle. We determine their actual and theoretical performances as well as their initial and final levels of self-determination. Only one class has been given knowledge of their theoretical performance. Then, two variables are analyzed: the "learning" variable linked to the duration of the cycle, and the "pedagogic modality" variable, whether the student is aware of his theoretical performance or not. The ANOVA (analysis of variance) tests performed have showed no significant impact of these variables on the performance, but their interaction is an important factor over the perceived progress. This significance is also observable on our subjects self-determination levels, intrinsic motivation and their overall skills. By fostering the teacher's perception, knowledge of the theoretical performance does not affect directly the student's performance but heightens his intrinsic motivation and favors the progress in his skills.展开更多
The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. ...The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis.展开更多
Using multiple methods including questionnaires, in-depth interviews, participant observation and field experiments, we have identified two social-psychological mechanisms in educational inequality: the self-fulfilli...Using multiple methods including questionnaires, in-depth interviews, participant observation and field experiments, we have identified two social-psychological mechanisms in educational inequality: the self-fulfilling prophecy ofparentaI expectations at home and the threat of stereotyping encountered at school. The physical mechanism of educational inequality is manifested in the poor health of migrant workers' children and their devalued behavior. Targeting these physical and psychological mechanisms, we have designed two simple but effective intervention strategies to raise the children's academic achievement: passing on the incremental theory of intelligence and establishing a multiple assessment system. These intervention strategies effectively improved the children's academic performance, increased their identification with learning, and lowered the stereotype threat. It is hoped that these strategies can be applied to the new generation of migrant workers entering the labor market.展开更多
文摘In high jump, the determination of a student's theoretical best performance helps the elaboration of the PE teacher's early expectations. By affecting the student's motivation profile, knowledge of these expectations will have an impact on his progress. The study focuses on two ninth grade classes, where both are presented with a contest, a test and a questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the cycle. We determine their actual and theoretical performances as well as their initial and final levels of self-determination. Only one class has been given knowledge of their theoretical performance. Then, two variables are analyzed: the "learning" variable linked to the duration of the cycle, and the "pedagogic modality" variable, whether the student is aware of his theoretical performance or not. The ANOVA (analysis of variance) tests performed have showed no significant impact of these variables on the performance, but their interaction is an important factor over the perceived progress. This significance is also observable on our subjects self-determination levels, intrinsic motivation and their overall skills. By fostering the teacher's perception, knowledge of the theoretical performance does not affect directly the student's performance but heightens his intrinsic motivation and favors the progress in his skills.
文摘The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis.
基金the Major Project of the Key Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences of the Ministry of Education(Center for Sociological Research and Development Studies of China,Peking University)for 2011(Grant No.11JJD840003)led by Professor Fang Wen,with financial aid from the Doctoral Program Research Fund of Harbin University of Commerce
文摘Using multiple methods including questionnaires, in-depth interviews, participant observation and field experiments, we have identified two social-psychological mechanisms in educational inequality: the self-fulfilling prophecy ofparentaI expectations at home and the threat of stereotyping encountered at school. The physical mechanism of educational inequality is manifested in the poor health of migrant workers' children and their devalued behavior. Targeting these physical and psychological mechanisms, we have designed two simple but effective intervention strategies to raise the children's academic achievement: passing on the incremental theory of intelligence and establishing a multiple assessment system. These intervention strategies effectively improved the children's academic performance, increased their identification with learning, and lowered the stereotype threat. It is hoped that these strategies can be applied to the new generation of migrant workers entering the labor market.