On Incentive and Coordination Mechanism of Service Outsourcing Based on Principal-Agent Theory and Blockchain Technology

To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing,this paper builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-agent framework,examines the dynamic game situation before the contract being signed,and develops four information models.The analysis reveals a Pareto improvement in the game’s Nash equilibrium when comparing the four models from the standpoint of the supply chain.In the complete information scenario,the service level of the service provider,the customer company’s incentive effectiveness,and the supply chain system’s ultimate profit are all maximized.Furthermore,a coordinating mechanism for disposable profit is built in this study.The paper then suggests a blockchain-based architecture for the service outsourcing process supervision and a distributed incentive mechanism under the coordination mechanism in response to the inadequacy of the principal-agent theory to address the information asymmetry problem and the moral hazard problem.The experiment’s end findings demonstrate that both parties can benefit from the coordination mechanism,and the application of blockchain technology can resolve these issues and effectively encourage service providers.

Service outsourcing strategy decision for value creation in manufacturing firms

This study aims to resolve the difficult problem of manufacturers’service outsourcing strategy decision-making,with services divided into two types:hygienic and motivational.We build a value creation model for the manufacturer,service contractor,and customer under different outsourcing strategies,and we examine optimal outsourcing decision-making in various scenarios and its effect on the value creation of related entities.The results indicate that motivational services have a lower bound characterized by service utility.When the manufacturer derives services higher than this lower bound,it should operate its own motivational service and outsource the hygienic service to create greater value.When the manufacturer is limited by resources or capabilities and is required to outsource the motivational service,it can maintain value creation by setting an appropriate contract coefficient.The service contractor should undertake motivational services within the contract boundary negotiated by the manufacturer and conduct hygienic services outside the boundary.Theoretically,outsourcing both service types can maximize customer value,but this may not achieve the manufacturers’optimal value creation.

Can harvest outsourcing services reduce field harvest losses of rice in China?

The purpose of this study is to quantify the rice harvest losses in China and to evaluate the impacts of machinery and harvest outsourcing services on these losses,given the background of high-speed mechanization and outsourcing services.Data were collected from a national survey conducted in 2016 by the research team in conjunction with the Research Center for the Rural Economy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China.A non-parametric method was used to test whether combine harvesting and outsourcing services could significantly reduce harvest losses.Next,quantile regression was used to estimate the real effects of machinery and outsourcing services on harvest losses.The analysis yielded four main study outcomes.First,the harvest loss rate of rice in China was 3.65%.Second,mechanical reaping and winnowing caused greater losses than manual methods,while the opposite was true of field transportation.Third,combine harvesting increased the losses.Fourth,the effects of an outsourcing service on losses differed among the different harvesting methods.Outsourcing services increased losses in segmented harvesting but they reduced losses in combine harvesting.

Can whole steps of grain production be outsourced? Empirical analysis based on the three provinces of Jiangsu,Jilin,and Sichuan in China

Certain outsourcing services for agricultural management in China,such as pest control in grain production,have experienced prolonged sluggishness,contrasting with the relatively high level of outsourcing services observed in harvesting,land preparation,and sowing.This study examines the feasibility of implementing whole-step outsourcing in grain production by conducting a case study of rice and maize production in Jiangsu,Jilin,and Sichuan provinces in China.The provision of outsourcing services hinges on two essential conditions:technological advancements fostering specialized production and economies of scale,coupled with a market size sufficient to realize the aforementioned potential economies of scale.The results showed that outsourcing pest control or harvesting services had varying economies of scale.The outsourcing services in pest control were less common than in harvesting services,and their marginal growth space of the economies of scale with technological change was also smaller.Determined by the operational characteristics of pest control itself,the market scale of its professional services is small.Therefore,achieving the whole-step outsourcing of grain production necessitates not only technological innovation but also effective policy interventions to overcome the constraints of market scale.Such interventions include(1)optimizing crop layouts between planning regions and reducing land fragmentation and(2)supplying timely and effective inter-regional agricultural information for service providers aided by information technology.