This paper studies incentive effect and entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder. Author investigates 763 listed companies in SHSE, explores the statistical relationship between the largest shareholding and corp...This paper studies incentive effect and entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder. Author investigates 763 listed companies in SHSE, explores the statistical relationship between the largest shareholding and corporate performance. Author observes that the largest shareholder has the incentive effect and entrenchment effect on corporate valuation. Empirical relationship between the largest shareholding and corporate valuation shows that the firm value decreases with the equity ownership of the largest shareholders, consistent with a negative entrenchment effect, when the largest equity ownership is below 40.28% of the whole share. Then firm value rises when the proportion of the largest shareholder＇s rights was increased to 69.29%, being consistent with a positive incentive effect. But with the increase of the share of the largest shareholding, firm value falls again.展开更多
Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure...Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.展开更多
文摘This paper studies incentive effect and entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder. Author investigates 763 listed companies in SHSE, explores the statistical relationship between the largest shareholding and corporate performance. Author observes that the largest shareholder has the incentive effect and entrenchment effect on corporate valuation. Empirical relationship between the largest shareholding and corporate valuation shows that the firm value decreases with the equity ownership of the largest shareholders, consistent with a negative entrenchment effect, when the largest equity ownership is below 40.28% of the whole share. Then firm value rises when the proportion of the largest shareholder＇s rights was increased to 69.29%, being consistent with a positive incentive effect. But with the increase of the share of the largest shareholding, firm value falls again.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) programs (71502161 and 71672134)Key Programs of Philosophical and Social Science Planning of Zhejiang Province (17NDJC025Z)+1 种基金Natural Science Foundation Program of Zhejiang Province (LQ14G020011)"Zhi Jiang Young Social Science Scholar" Program of Zhejiang Province (G267)
文摘Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.
